Energy and Environment (NER 67)

National Economic Review

National Institute of Economic and Industry Research

No. 67               November 2012

The National Economic Review is published four times each year under the auspices of the Institute’s Academic Board.

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ISSN 0813-9474

Energy and environment

Graham Armstrong, Consultant, NIEIR

Abstract

This paper first reviews the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties in Durban (COP-17) and discusses the global and Australian developments during the months leading up to COP-18 in Doha, Qatar in November–December 2012. The legislation progress and climate action developments of Brazil, South Africa, India, China, the USA, the European Union and Australia are reviewed. Although the Durban climate talks were able to maintain momentum in the global climate effort, it remains to be seen whether the Durban Agreement will in fact be a ‘historic breakthrough’ or a deferment of ambitious climate action into the future. Second, the paper reviews Australian climate change policy developments up to 12 September 2012.

Introduction

Since the Durban Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference (COP-17) in December 2011, there has been little comment on global climate change policy. In Australia, comments and debate have focused almost exclusively on the Clean Energy Futures Act (CEFA), particularly the perceived negative effects of carbon pricing. Globally, more countries and regions have developed (e.g. British Columbia in Canada, some US states and China), or are developing, carbon pricing (e.g. through taxes or emission trading schemes (ETS)) (e.g. South Korea) and complementary initiatives (e.g. renewable energy, energy efficiency improvement (EEI), forestation and agriculture and transport fuel). A review of COP-17 Durban and events leading up to COP-18, Doha, Qatar are outlined in what follows.

Durban

Outcomes of Durban

Despite the disappointment that annual negotiations on a post-2012 regime have not resulted in an overall global climate agreement with quantified objectives for, at least, major greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters, there have been several positive developments. For instance, there are agreements on adaptation, the Green Climate Fund and the Technology Mechanism. With the Durban Platform, the division between developed and developing countries in terms of differentiated responsibilities has become less strict. Moreover, the focus seems to have shifted from quantified commitments (what) towards how pathways for low emission development can be realised.

Negotiating a climate policy package with quantified targets for countries (such as tried in Kyoto) is very complex. Countries negotiate within an intergovernmental setting without an overarching authority so that no country can be committed to sign a deal that it does not want. Consequently, negotiations become a game to form a coalition, the size of which is determined by the countries for which the benefits of joining the coalition are higher than the costs. As climate change is a global issue, the coalition needs to be global, so that for all countries the benefits are higher than the costs.

Negotiations have become so complex that an ambitious package with strict emission reduction commitments is likely to drive up costs. This is especially the case with many low emission technologies still being early on their learning curves with much R&D to be done, followed by deployment in the market and diffusion to commercial application. In this respect, the current financial market turbulence, with reduced availability of private and public financing, does not work in favour of new efficient technologies.

Moreover, as the Kyoto Protocol has shown, costs of quantified national commitments are difficult to predict and become an endogenous economic parameter.

Practice has shown that once a country realises that it cannot comply with the target, it can withdraw from the agreement (e.g. Canada stepped out of the Kyoto Protocol). This is especially the case if other countries are in a similar position and are willing to join the move.

On the benefit side, there is a challenge to make countries aware that ambitious climate actions could also support sustainable development objectives. There is always a risk that climate policy-making resembles the prisoner’s dilemma: if a country does not undertake actions but the others do, then it benefits from the others; if the country fears that it is the only one taking strong actions, then it will be reluctant to do so. In both cases, an individual country, in an uncoordinated setting, has an incentive not to act. The challenge, therefore, is to find ways to support countries in maximising climate and development benefits against given resources, irrespective of what other countries do.

How have the recent climate negotiations managed to address this challenge? After Durban, media headlines were not spectacular. There was a general feeling that there had been an agreement not to agree now. Durban did not provide hard figures. Canada avoided penalty by stepping out of the Kyoto Protocol. The week after Durban, this action was emphasised.

However, Copenhagen, Cancun and Durban have delivered important results, with the establishment of a framework for adaptation, through the Green Climate Fund and the Technology Mechanism, as well as provisions such as low carbon development strategies and the Technology Needs Assessments. Although not enough yet for the ‘Green Industrial Revolution’ that United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Executive Secretary Figueres desires, these mechanisms and provisions could considerably contribute to required system changes in countries for climate and development, backed by international capacity support, with financial, technology and knowledge transfer. All these steps are modest, but they do reflect progress.

The Durban Agreement: A deal to negotiate a deal

‘We have made history’, said UN climate negotiation chair Maite Nkoana-Mashabane when gavelling the longest negotiation session in the history of the two decades of climate negotiations to a close. However, considerable uncertainty remains as to the effectiveness of the Durban Agreement to realise sufficient climate change mitigation. This review investigates the main elements of the Durban Agreement (these are briefly summarised in Box 1) and the perspectives of several negotiating Parties, analyses the Durban outcome, and looks forward to Qatar (COP-18).

After the failure of Copenhagen (2009) and the only modest success of Cancun (2010), expectations for Durban to realise a comprehensive, legally binding agreement were not high. As such, the negotiations were essentially preoccupied with two main objectives:

  • to maintain momentum in the process to realise an agreement that incorporates all main emitting Parties (especially the USA and the BASIC countries, Brazil, South Africa, India and China); and
  • to revitalise the Kyoto Protocol through the establishment of a second commitment period and, as such, prevent the creation of a commitment gap.

Box 1 E and E NER 67

The Durban Agreement

The outcome of the Durban negotiation round, which ran from 28 November until 11 December (2 days longer than scheduled) is the Durban Agreement. One of the main components of the Durban Agreement is the establishment of a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 2011a). Within this second commitment period (which is scheduled to start in 2013 and end in either 2017 or 2020 (to be decided upon at COP-18)), the aim is to ensure aggregated emissions by Parties included in Annex I are reduced by at least 25– 40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020 (IISD, 2011). To realise this aim, it is the intention to convert the Cancun Agreement pledges for emission reductions into quantified emission limitation or reduction objectives (QELRO), information on which was to be submitted by the Parties to the Ad-hoc Working Group–Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) by 1 May 2012. An important unresolved issue in this regard is the implication of carry-over of assigned amount units (AAUs (abatement credits)) from the first to the second commitment period on the scale of emission reductions to be achieved (IISD, 2011). In addition, to eliminate the ‘ambition gap’ between the pledged reductions and the above emission reductions goals, the AWG-KP decision emphasizes the relevance of the 2013–2015 review of pledges.

Furthermore, the Durban Agreement outlines a negotiation process that is to result in a ‘protocol, or legal instrument, or agreed outcome with legal force’ that covers all negotiating Parties (UNFCCC, 2011b) and is to come into effect and be implemented from 2020. As such, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (AWG-DP) is to complete its work no later than 2015. An important consideration in the process will be to raise the level of ambition in terms of emission reductions. This consideration will be informed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report, the 2013–2015 review and the work of the subsidiary bodies.

The Durban Agreement also allows for the completion of the design of the Green Climate Fund and designates the World Bank as the interim trustee. With these developments, the Fund should be operational in 2012 (UNFCCC, 2011c). The aim of the Fund will be ‘to promote the paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways’ by providing balanced support for developing countries between mitigation and adaptation efforts in the context of  sustainable development. With the aim of making the Technology Mechanism fully operational in 2012, the negotiations also focused on the two components of the Mechanism: the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network. The Durban Agreement contains a decision on the modalities and procedures of the TEC policy-making body (UNFCCC, 2011d). The TEC has had its first meeting and has developed a rolling work-plan for 2012–2013. This is an important step towards the operationalisation of the Technology Mechanism with the objective of enhancing action on technology development and transfer to support action on mitigation and adaptation. Besides financial support, support for technological development is seen as a major component of an effective climate action strategy.

Perspectives and opinions

The Durban Agreement was heralded by most negotiating Parties as a positive development towards a global climate policy regime.

The process established under the AWG-DP mirrors the call for a ‘roadmap for climate action’ made by the European Union (EU) prior to Durban. The EU posited that, for it to be persuaded into a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, a pathway to universal action was a prerequisite. Therefore, it is not surprising that the EU sees the Durban Agreement as a ‘historic breakthrough’ document capable of finally realizing a global and ambitious climate policy regime (Ebels, 2011).

An important development in the international negotiations was the alignment of the small island states and least developed countries with the position of the EU (Vidal and Harvey, 2011a). This coalition allowed for a stronger negotiation position to confront the other Parties. In addition, the African countries were determined to prevent the burial of the Kyoto Protocol on African soil (IISD, 2011).

Because the USA has consistently called for symmetry between developing countries (especially China and India) and the developed countries in terms of climate policy actions, it eventually supported the proposed roadmap of the EU (Vidal and Harvey, 2011b). As such, the USA is satisfied with the Durban Agreement as it ascribes to a legal document in 2020. The US climate envoy Todd Stern stated that the Agreement:

‘had  all  the  elements  that  we  were  looking  for’

(EurActiv, 2011a; U.S. Department of State, 2011).

With a large number of Parties backing the EU proposal, attention turned to India and China. Early on in the negotiation process, China signalled some flexibility to participate in a climate regime with legal force (Conway-Smith, 2011). In return for support for the roadmap process, the EU offered to commit to a second period of the Kyoto Protocol. The formulation of what form of legal status the 2020 agreement would entail, without any current clarity of what the specifics of the deal are going to be, encountered fierce resistance, especially by India (Vidal and Harvey, 2011c). As such, the realization that the BASIC countries have agreed to a commitment with legal force ‘applicable to all Parties’ is a substantial deviation from their original negotiation position and, therefore, a major concession.

Effectiveness of Durban

With the establishment of the AWG-DP and the agreement on a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, the multilateral process seems to have been revitalised. However, several aspects of the Durban Agreement allow for critical analysis. Importantly, Canada, Russia and Japan will not participate in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (Euractiv, 2011b). This signals the dwindling political importance of the Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is still to be inscribed with new QELRO and amendments, and the length of commitment is still to be decided. Therefore, ‘commitment’ is limited. As such, all the second commitment period appears to achieve for now is to realise continuity for climate action.

In addition, due to persistent pressure provided by the USA, India and China, the Durban Agreement specifically incorporates the year 2020 for implementation of a new climate regime (Lynas, 2011). As such, this formulation appears to exclude the option for earlier implementation even if political agreement has been achieved. The wording of the AWG-DP aim to realise a ‘protocol, or legal instrument, or agreed outcome with legal force’ is sufficiently ambiguous to allow for multiple interpretations. In fact, when one considers the considerable negotiation effort invested in this formulation, it is not at all clear whether the different Parties have a similar understanding of what is to come into effect in 2020.

These two aspects are significant because they separate mitigation ambition and the legal nature of targets until 2020 (Lynas 2011). The voluntary Copenhagen process, dubbed pledge-and-review, will be the only system in which all Parties participate until 2020. Critics point to the fact that the pledged emission reductions made so far are insufficient to limit temperature increase to 2°C (CAT 2011). Moreover, while the Durban Agreement notes that ‘the process shall raise the level of ambition’, it does not provide methods to actually do so. This limits the potential of the Agreement.

The participation by all Parties in a legal climate regime signals the end of the Kyoto Protocol dichotomy of Annex I Parties and non-Annex I Parties. As such, it appears Durban will allow for the reformulation of the meaning of the Convention principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ into a spectrum of climate action in light of country-specific development. This could turn out to be one of the main achievements of Durban as this dichotomy was one of the principal obstacles for global agreement on climate action throughout the history of the negotiations on climate change.

Durban Agreement: A historic breakthrough or a deferment of ambitious climate action?

The long timeline involved with the established process raises doubt as to the commitment of negotiating Parties to undertake climate action. This doubt is further substantiated by the history and dynamics of the climate negotiations, which clearly outline the trade-offs made between participation, compliance and stringency. The negotiation process as it is currently formulated postpones multilateral action outside of the Kyoto Protocol to 2020.

In the meantime, climate action will need to be initiated unilaterally through the voluntary pledge-and-review approach, which, in its current form, offers no effective approach to climate change. This realisation not only stems from the notion that current pledges and actions are insufficient to realise the emission trajectory required to limit climate change to 2°C, but also finds a basis in the notion that voluntary commitments have a historically inadequate performance record both inside and outside the climate change negotiations. Moreover, because the pledge-and-review approach does not provide incentives for ambitious action, the level of commitment is unlikely to become sufficient after Durban.

The 2013–2015 review, the Fifth Assessment Report by the IPCC, and the work of the subsidiary bodies are to provide means to reduce this gap in ambition over the next couple of years. As such, while the Durban climate talks were able to maintain momentum in the global climate effort, it remains to be seen whether the Durban Agreement will, in fact, be a ‘historic breakthrough’ or a deferment of ambitious climate action into the future.

The USA

The US administration has proposed CO2e emission limits for new electricity generators at 454 kg CO2e/MWh. Unless carbon capture and storage (CCS) can be applied commercially, this effectively restricts new generators to combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) or renewables. The rules do, however, allow new coal-fired plants to exceed the cap for 10 years provided they subsequently make up the difference by installing effective pollution controls: essentially declaring that CCS may be viable 10 years after a new coal generator is built.

Low gas prices and lower demands for electricity have favoured gas generation, kept electricity prices low and made coal generation less competitive. Continuation of these trends means that the proposed GHG inventory (GHGI) (tCO2e/MWh) rules would not have a significant impact.

Under the US Clean Air Act, with Supreme Court affirmation, the GHG emissions are a threat to ‘public health and welfare’ and GHGI rules will have to be developed for existing generators.

The European Union

European Union Allowance Unit (EUA) CO2 prices continued at low levels through the first half of 2012, at €6–9/t (A$7.5–11.25), well below the Australian CEFA prediction of A$29/t in 2015–2016 and the Australian floor price of A$15/t (see discussion below).

The  UK  Government  has  proposed  a  floor  price  of €30/t (A$38) in 2009 prices, well above the current EUA price. UK programs and regulations mean that, effectively, in the UK CO2e prices are in the A$25–30/t range. The EU is examining the possibility of reducing permit caps to provide a stimulus to attain higher EUA prices.

Current EU emissions are well below the current cap for the 11,000 liable companies, due mainly to economic conditions: hence, the EUA price drop from approximately €30 in 2008 to today’s levels of <€10/t.

Sales of permits to raise revenue for green energy projects and new EEI initiatives will add to EUA oversupply, which could reach 8.45 × 106 available permits in 2020 against a planned 2020 cap of 1.8 × 106 permits.

In December 2011, an EU committee proposed three possible strategies:

  • withhold (set aside) a tranche of permits from the market;
  • withhold 1.4 billion permits; or
  • tighten the cap.

Tightening the cap, the most effective solution (although by how much is hard to determine), would be strongly resisted by heavy emitters, such as Poland, and would reduce EU investor confidence. Cap reduction would have to be spread among EU states, which might not be easy depending on the size and timing of the cap reduction. Improving economic conditions could ease the cap reduction problems. A gradual reduction could be monitored to gauge the economic impact, which could be quite modest as the market adjusted to emission reductions by developing lower than expected cost abatement actions.

Australian developments

On 1 July 2012, the start of the fixed carbon price period commenced. As it approached, support for the carbon package dropped to below 40 per cent. Negative comments from some industry groups and the Federal Opposition continue to dominate media coverage of the legislation. Positive aspects of the package, such as compensation, early mover advantages, transition to an ETS, grants for EEI in the industrial sector and movement by other countries and jurisdictions, do not receive nearly as much publicity. Surveillance of the international press on climate change policies reveals, overall, a quite different story: one that is much more positive.

A particular aspect of the debate is the A$23/t CO2 starting price on 1 July 2012: it is above other specific CO2e prices (except in British Columbia in Canada), while the EUA price continues to be <€10/t. However, in other jurisdictions, regulatory policies have a price impact, and while probably <A$20/t, are pushing the global economy towards a lower GHGI level compared with business as usual (BAU). In the UK, the EUA prices and regulatory policies and initiatives have pushed the effective CO2 price above A$25/t.

Clean Technology Investment Program

Further details of the Clean Technology Investment Program (CTIP) were released in April 2012. Under the program, A$800 million is allocated for general manufacturers and another A$200 million for food and beverage processors and metal foundry and forging firms. For firms with turnovers of <A$100 million, 1:1 grants will be available for funding of <A$500,000. For grants from A$500,000 to A$10 million, applicants will be required to contribute A$2 for every A$1 from government. For grants of +A$10 million, a contribution of A$3 for every A$1 from government will be required (co-investment).

The total expenditure (private plus government) for EEI is likely to be well below the potential for economic EEI investment over the next 20 years. However, the CTIP is an appropriate initiative that could stimulate further EEI investment.

The CTIP application process, based on previous requirements, may be overly administratively burdensome for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) where no employee is dedicated to the grant application process. This does, however, create an opportunity for firms, such as Energetics, that specialise in EEI to work with SMEs on CTIP applications (also VEET in Victoria).

The CEFA programs (CTIP and the Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC)) require statements on Australian participation in applications in an effort to ‘maximise’ Australian content of programs (not a mandatory percentage as in Ontario, Canada).

International permits and the floor price for permits

A floor permit price of A$15/t was proposed in the ETS phase of the CEFA. Up to 50 per cent of a firm’s liability under the CEFA was to be accessible from eligible international permits under the Clean Development Mechanism certified emission reductions (CERs) and joint implementation (JI) emission reduction units. Several politicians, industry groups and analysts proposed removing the floor price and letting the market (domestic and international) determine the price. Note that at a CO2e price below A$20/t CO2e, the impact on BAU emissions is likely to be negligible.

A ‘surrender tax’ on international permits was proposed if international permit prices continued to be below A$15/t. For example, if a permit were purchased at A$12/t, a A$3/t levy would be imposed to arrive at the A$15/t floor price.

In the ETS phase it seemed there would be two permit markets:

  • The international permit market with prices set in those markets: up to 50 per cent of the ETS cap permits could come from this source.
  • The domestic permit market for the balance of the ETS cap permits liability (which could be 100 per cent of the ETS cap if the international price were above the domestic price). Several politicians, industry groups and analysts called for a lower or no floor price, but this approach was rejected by the government. At CO2e prices below A$20/t, our analysis indicates that there will be price impacts but little impact on GHG abatement (GHGA).

Caps for the post-fixed carbon price will not be set until 2014. The caps set will depend on:

  • the 2020 target (now 5 per cent below 2000 levels by 2020);
  • progress towards the target by 2014; and
  • the schedule decided on for annual progress towards the target.

To meet the current 2020 target, modelling in 2011 estimated that approximately 160 Mt CO2e/a would need to be removed from trend GHG emissions. By 2014, the carbon tax and associated programs might have reduced this GHGA to 140 Mt CO2e/a, but the 2012–2014 GHGA impact is quite uncertain and could be very low. Assuming 50 per cent of the 140 Mt came from international permits at A$15/t (price could be much higher by 2020), 20 Mt would need to come from domestic GHGA over 2014–2020. The first cap period would presumably be for 2015–2016, the first ETS year after the fixed price years of 2012–2013, 2013–2014 and 2014–2015. Over the 2015–2016 to 2019–2020 period, domestic GHGA could come from the following.

  1. Closure of 2,000 MW of GHGI coal capacity and replacement with CCGT capacity (but not likely to be viable at under A$40/t CO2e).

With a 90-per cent capacity factor (CF) brown coal closure (2,000 MW) and a GHGI of 1.5 t CO2e/MWh, annual saving would be:

2,000 × 8.76 × 0.9 × 1.5 × 103

t = 23,652,000 t.

Replaced by 2,000 MW of CCGT at 90 per cent CF and a GHGI of 0.4 t CO2e/MWh:

2,000 × 8.76 × 0.4 × 103 = 6,307,200 t.

There is a net saving of 17,344,000 t per annum.

To save 70 Mt/a would require approximately 10,000 MW of coal of higher (>1.2 t CO2e/MWh) coal capacity to be displaced by CCGT requiring a CO2e price of A$40–50/t depending on relative coal and gas prices. A total of 45 Mt CO2 from displacing approximately 6,000 MW of higher GHGI coal might be feasible at approximately A$50/t CO2e.

  1. The Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI) might deliver 10 Mt CO2e at <A$25/t CO2e but levels and prices are quite uncertain.
  2.  Enhanced EEI might deliver 10 Mt CO2e at <A$0/t CO2e (value of discounted energy savings less investment cost).
  3. Renewables (above the renewable energy target (RET), which is included in BAU) at A$50– 150/t CO2e, approximately 5 Mt CO2e might be possible but unlikely given current trends and policies.

The above very preliminary estimates indicate that the target could be reached with international permits at an average cost of approximately (price × per cent contribution of GHGA required by 2021):

15 × 0.5 (international) + 50 × 0.32 (fossil generation) + 20 × 0.07 (CFI) + 0 × 0.07 (EEI) +   100 × 0.04 (renewables) = A$(7.5 + 16 + 1.4 +  0 + 4) = A$28.5/t CO2e (This is not the market permit price. It is the average GHGA price paid by liable parties.)

The above example indicates a potential path for achieving a 2020 target. Emissions would be reduced (50 per cent overseas and 50 per cent in Australia). However, how would the permit market evolve?

September 2012 update

As outlined above, the permit floor price of A$15/t CO2e in the ETS period was criticised as:

  • being too high and unnecessary in some industry analysts; and
  • being too low to bring about structural change toward low emission technologies by others.

In early August, it was reported in the media that changes were in the offing to limit further (from 50 per cent of liabilities) the proportion of international permits that could be acquired by liable parties. In the early years of the ETS (2015–2016) it has become more likely that international permits could be available at prices >A$5–10/t CO2, necessitating an administratively cumbersome surrender ‘tax’ top-up to A$15 from the price actually paid by liable parties.

On 28 August, the Federal Government announced major climate change policy changes. These changes are:

  • removal of the floor price of A$15/t CO2e, which was to operate over 2015–2016 to 2018– 2019, the first 3 years of the ETS phase;
  • linking of the ETS phase directly to the EU market (initially one-way, Australia buying 1 g EEAAs, but two-way by 2018), resulting in EU permit prices being the same as Australian prices; and
  • limiting access to CDM CERs and JI emission reduction units (ERUs) to 12.5 per cent of a liable entity’s liabilities (previously 50 per cent).

The Treasury modelling estimate of a A$29/t price in 2015–2016 was retained.

Issues

  1. Price of EU permits post 2014–2015. Current estimates are approximately A$12 in 2015 and A$20 in 2020. However, these estimates depend on:
  • EU growth with the current EU scheme; and
  • any changes to the EU scheme (e.g. cap tightening and deferring permit auctions) that (several proposed) that would have the effect of increasing the EU permit price.
  1. Approach taken for the proposed auctioning of domestic permits to ensure that the 2020 target of a 5-per cent reduction on 2000 emissions by 2020 is achieved. This would not become evident until liable parties began buying ERUs and EU AAUs to cover their liabilities.
  2. At permit/CO2e prices below approximately A$20/t, there would be negligible domestic GHGA from price responses by consumers and generators, although GHGA from complementary policies would continue. Limited domestic GHGA over 2015–2020 is likely to result in higher GHGA action costs, if desired, post-2020.

September 2012 status of Australian climate change policies

The 2020 target remains at 5 per cent below 2000 levels, requiring 159 Mt CO2e of abatement by 2020 according to the Treasure 2011 modelling in the Strong Growth, Low Pollution (SGLP) report (Australian Government, Treasury). In 2009–2010, emissions were 578 Mt CO2e and in the Treasury modelling, the 2020 BAU (i.e. no CEF Act policies) was 679 Mt CO2e.

At a carbon price of A$29/t CO2e by 2020, domestic emissions were estimated in the SGLP report to be 621 Mt CO2e (i.e. 58 Mt CO2e below BAU without carbon pricing), but approximately 12 per cent above 2000 levels of 550 Mt CO2e. This gives a 2020 target of approximately 520 Mt CO2e, 159 Mt CO2e below 2020 BAU emissions of 679 Mt CO2e. With domestic emission reductions of 58 Mt CO2e, 101 Mt CO2e would come from international permits.

Now with CEF Act policies in place with lower projected electricity growth rates, 2020 emissions are likely to be much less, perhaps by around 60 Mt CO2e. This would reduce the abatement task to meet the 2020 target to approximately 100 Mt CO2e.

Given the policy change to restrict JI and CDM Kyoto credits to 12.5 per cent of liabilities, the linking with the EU and the availability of EU permits (EU assigned abatement units (EUAAs)) for acquitting liabilities, and the reduction in the abatement task, where will permits for the attainment of the 2020 target now come from?

2020 emissions, targets and greenhouse gas abatement sources

  1. 2020  emissions  under  BAU  (i.e.  without  the CEFA) will now be approximately 620 Mt CO2e, as against 679 Mt CO2e in the Treasury 2011 SGLP, due to slower growth in emissions and responses to the carbon tax and CEF Act complementary measures.
  2. Attainment of the 2020 target (5 per cent below 2000 emissions by 2020) would then require abatement of approximately 100 Mt CO2e (620 – 520), compared with 159 Mt CO2e in 2011 SGLP. (Note: levels in the SGLP are not entirely consistent with respect to 2000 levels, projected 2020 levels and the abatement task required.)
  3. At 100 Mt CO2e  abatement required 12.5 per cent (12.5 Mt CO2e ) could come from Kyoto (CDM and JI) credits at <$10/t Mt CO2e , perhaps <$5/t CO2e .
  4. Some of the other 87.5 Mt CO2e (100 – 12.5) could possibly come from purchase of EU permits (EUAAUs) and from Australian CFI permits if the prices were below domestic auctioned permit prices. EUAAUs are permits to emit CO2. Currently, a surplus of EUAAUs are available due to issuance being greater than requirements, mainly due to low economic growth causing emissions to be lower than anticipated. Available permits do not result in emissions abatement unless their price is high enough to induce a switch from a higher GHGI source to a lower GHGI source. Thus, purchase of EUAs may or may not result in GHGA. Given the foreseeable surplus amount of EU permits, GHGA from purchase of these permits is likely to be negligible. Abatement to attain a given target must be sought elsewhere.
  5. Other abatement could come from additional carbon price response and complementary measures (e.g. CTIP, CEFC and CFI).

However, note that under the CEF Act, closure of 2,000 MW of high GHG intensive generators was proposed, entailing negotiation of closure with the generator owners. Prime targets for closure were Hazelwood, Yallourn and Morwell brown coal operators in Victoria, Playford B (low grade black coal) in South Australia and Collinsville (black coal) in Queensland. However, on 3 September the government announced the failure of negotiations due to unacceptably high closure dollar demands (>A$2 billion expected cost) by the generation companies. With lower than previously expected permit prices in the ETS phase, the economics of operating high GHGI plants have improved, hence their asset values.

The closure would have saved up to 23 Mt CO2e per year out of the required reduction to meet the 2020 target of a now estimated 100 to 120 Mt CO2e (lower than the previously estimated 160 Mt CO2e due to lower electricity and gas demands and impacts of complementary policies). The government claims that the closure abandonment will not affect target attainment. Why? Because of lower target attainment requirements or lower costs of other GHGA opportunities?

This failure to close the 2,000 MW of highest GHFI generators, together with compensation for carbon pricing to high GHGI generators and lower CO2e prices, makes it much less likely that significant gas generation will replace coal generation.

  1. On 1 September, the government announced that 40 million permits would be auctioned in 2013– 2014 at a projected price of $15/t CO2e. If the EU AAU price is <$15/t CO2e, why would liable parties bid $15/t CO2e at the auction for up to 40 million permits unless EU AAU access was restricted (not apparent)?
  2. How then will the target be attained? Presumably, by monitoring and frequently announcing progress towards the 2020 target and, if necessary, taking further GHGA action (e.g. by subsidising the new gas base load) to attain the target.
  3. Liable parties will continue to buy permits from CDM, JI and the EU to meet their liabilities unless domestic permit auctioning results in prices for domestic permits <EU AAU prices. If prices are less than the EU AAU prices, domestic permits can be sold into the EU market when two-way linking is established.
  4. In conclusion, to attain the 2020 target under the new permit availability arrangements, target GHGA must be continuously estimated and announced, and progress toward the target continuously monitored and announced. This is necessary to limit 2020 emissions to approximately 520 Mt CO2e. With the current (September 2012) polices, it seems very unlikely that the 2020 target will be attained.

Liable parties

Generators

Fossil generators would have to purchase permits to cover their liable emissions from accredited suppliers (see below).

Other liable parties

Other liable parties would attempt to reduce their emissions at a cost below the expected permit price by changing production characteristics and improving energy efficiency (assisted by CEFA programs). The resulting (balance of) liable emissions would be purchased in the permit market(s).

Permit suppliers

Carbon Farming Initiative

Accredited CFI units (Australian carbon units (ACUs)) can be sold directly to liable parties. If non-liable party EEI ‘suppliers’ could reduce their emissions impact through EEI and the use of renewables, they could become, for example, accredited suppliers of permits.

Government

Permits will be auctioned on the basis of the cap for each year. Liable parties will bid for these auctioned permits on the basis of requirements and marginal costs of internally reducing their emissions and purchasing international permits (depending on price and CFI AEUs).

Potential evolution of greenhouse gas emissions, greenhouse gas abatement and carbon prices over 2012–2013 to 2020–2021

In regards to estimated target emissions, does the target refer to total emissions or to liable emissions (liable emissions are approximately 65 per cent of total emissions)? Some emission reductions will come from non-liable sectors, such as agriculture.

In 2012–2013 to 2015–2016 there will be some impact of the fixed CO2e price, with the impact depending on the elasticity of demand for covered fuels, particularly electricity. Complementary measures and economic conditions (e.g. closures and household formation) will also have an impact. Note that the now expected carbon price impact will be less than the total of other price increasing impacts (e.g. fuel prices, network costs and green program costs) and not enough to significantly shift generation merit order. CEFA complementary measures are unlikely to have a significant impact until around 2015. These impacts will depend on the 2013 election results.

Overall, it is now expected that there will only be a small departure from BAU trends over this period.

The impacts of the CEFA over 2015–2016 to 2020– 2021 will depend on:

  • the CO2e permit prices over this period and the expected prices beyond this period;
  • economic conditions; and
  • the impacts of complementary measures.

Changes to the CEFA (likely under the Opposition and global pressure) would change the emission path and policy impacts.

Preliminary analysis suggests that under the CEFA, as it stands, the target (2020) could be reached if actual and expected average permit prices exceed approximately A$30/t; that is, until a combination of complementary measures and CO2e prices induce a significant (6,000–8,000 MW) shift from coal to CCGT generation. No other domestic actions appear likely to fill the target gap if this change does not eventuate.

Liable parties

In April 2012, the Clean Energy Regulator released a list of 280 liable parties: more will be added later. This is preliminary and well below the estimated 500 liable parties estimated in the CEFA analysis. A particular liable party issue is the liability of landfill sites operated mainly by municipalities. Although the minimum liable party emissions limit is 25,000 tCO2e, because landfills emit methane (×21 global warming potential) many sites, seemingly small, could become liable parties. Reduction of emissions is possible through collection of methane (from anaerobic digestion of organic wastes) and combustion to produce electricity (eligible under RET) and heat. This is practiced widely overseas (some with Australian technology) and at some landfill sites in Australia.

Accordingly, the ‘problem’ could be resolved with best practice waste management, such as at Nanaimo in British Columbia, Canada.

In June 2012, BHPB said it would not be in favour of rescinding carbon pricing but would attempt to make it ‘more optimal’ (not explained). Over 2006–2017, BHPB has a target of holding emissions constant despite a large increase in production from the company’s range of operations.

Lowy Institute Poll, 2012

The Lowy Institute’s 2012 Poll, an opinion survey of 1,005 Australian adults in March–April 2012 on a range of issues reported the following on climate change:

  • 63 per cent are against the Clean Energy Futures Act (carbon pricing elements);
  • 45 per cent are strongly against the Act (53 per cent of men and 36 per cent women);
  • 35 per cent are in favour of carbon pricing;
  • 52 per cent oppose the legislation as it will result in job losses;
  • 38 per cent say it is not necessary to act on climate change before other countries (were they told some countries were acting?);
  • 57 per cent are in favour of the Coalition removing the ETS (39 per cent with a degree) but 39 per cent against this action;
  • 36 per cent support more aggressive action on climate change (in 2006, 68 per cent were in favour);
  • 45 per cent support global warming being addressed but in a gradual and low cost way (increase of 5 per cent from 2011); support for this option is 56 per cent for the 18–29 year age group;
  • 7 per cent say they are less concerned since the climate change debate began in Australia; and
  • 18 per cent are not sure global warming is a problem and reject any steps that would have an economic cost.

The poll is not good news for the government and its partners (e.g. the Greens) but will opinions change once carbon pricing is introduced on 1 July? We await the next 6–12 months with great interest.

Polls: 1 July 2012 on

A Fairfax poll on 1 and 2 July indicated that 62 per cent of those surveyed opposed the carbon tax (up from 57 per cent in April/May) and 33 per cent were in favour. Fifty-three per cent said they would be worse off under carbon pricing despite substantial compensation. The message on the advantages of carbon pricing and the compensation was, at that time, not getting through.

In the same week, a poll by ANU’s Crawford School of Public Policy found that 40 per cent of liable companies, carbon financiers and carbon analysts (53 per cent of emitters) believed the carbon pricing would be repealed by 2016. However, only 21 per cent of those surveyed thought there would not be a scheme in 2020. Seventy per cent believed that the 5 per cent below 2000 emissions by 2020 would still be in place in 2015. Twenty-five per cent thought that the target would become more ambitious. Seventy per cent of emitters surveyed had already cut emissions; 84 per cent said they expected to make cuts over the next 3 years.

A report by The Economist found that 75 per cent of senior executives polled expected the scheme to survive, but only 33 per cent believed carbon pricing advantages would outweigh the longer-term risks of the scheme. Hence, a significant proportion of business does not believe Abbott!

A Fairfax/Nielsen poll in late July 2012 indicated that the percentage of those who thought they would be worse off under a carbon taxed dropped to 38 per cent from 51 per cent in late June 2012, with 52 per cent believing they were no worse off (37 per cent in late June and 54 per cent in late August). However, in August–September 2012 electricity and gas bills will be arriving to ‘remind’ people of the carbon tax impact, even though this will be responsible for only part of the price increase incorporated into the bills

References

Australian Government, Treasury (2011), ‘Strong Growth Low Pollution: Modelling a Carbon Price’. Available from: http://carbonpricemodelling.treasury.gov.au/carbonpric emodelling/content/report.asp.

CAT (Climate Action Tracker) (2011), ‘Climate Action Tracker: Durban Agreements a Step towards a Global Agreement but Risk of Exceeding 3°C Remains’. Available from: http://climateactiontracker.org/news/116/Durban-Agreements-a-step-towards-a-global-agreement-but-risk-of-exceeding-3C-warmingremainsscientists.html.

Conway-Smith, E. (2011), ‘China is Surprise Good Guy at Durban Climate Conference’, Globalpost, 6 December 2011. Available from: http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/afric a/south-africa/111205/china-surprise-good-guy-at-durban-climate-conferenc.

Ebels, P. (2011), ‘EU Claims Climate Victory but Global Warming Goes On’, EUobserver, 12 December 2011. Available from: http://euobserver.com/885/114590.

EU (2011), European Commission Press Release: Durban Must Deliver a Roadmap for Climate Action by All Major Economies. Available from: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?referenc e=IP/11/1436&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN &guiLanguage=en.

EurActiv (2011a), ‘UN Climate Talks Wrap 2020 Global Pact’, EurActiv, 12 December 2011. Available from: http://www.euractiv.com/climate-environment/un-climate-talks-wrap-2020-globa-news-509607.

EurActiv (2011b), ‘Canada Becomes First Country to Quit Kyoto Protocol’, EurActiv, 13 December 2011. Available from: http://www.euractiv.com/climate-environment/canada-country-quit-kyoto-protoc-news-509686.

U.S. Department of State (2011), United Nations Climate Change Conference in Durban, South Africa. Available from: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/12/178699.htm.

IISD (International Institute for Sustainable Development) (2011), ‘Summary of the Durban Climate Change Conference’, 28 November–11 December 2011, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol. 12. IIISD, New York, NY. Available from: http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12534e.pdf.

Lynas (2011), ‘The Verdict on Durban – A Major Step Forward but Not for Ten Years’. Available from: http://www.marklynas.org/2011/12/the-verdict-on-durban-a-major-step-forward-but-not-for-ten-years.

UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) (2011a), Decision CMP.7: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at its Sixteenth Session. Available from: http://unfccc.int/2860.php.

UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) (2011b), Decision CP. 17 Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. Available from: http://unfccc.int/2860.php.

UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) (2011c), Decision CP. 17: Launching of the Green Climate Fund. Available from: http://unfccc.int/2860.php.

UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) (2011d), Decision CP. 17: Technology Executive Committee – Modalities and Procedures. Available from: http://unfccc.int/2860.php.

Vidal, J. and F. Harvey (2011a), African Nations Move Closer to EU Position at Durban, EurActiv, 9 December 2011. Available from: http://www.euractiv.com/climate-environment/african-nations-move-closer-eu-p-news-509568.

Vidal, J. and F. Harvey (2011b), ‘Durban Climate Talks See US Back EU Proposal’, Guardian, 8 December 2011. Available from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/dec/08/d urban-climate-talks-us-backs-europe.

Vidal, J. and F. Harvey (2011c), ‘Durban Climate Deal Struck after Tense All Night Session’. Guardian, 11 December 2011. Available from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/dec/11/d urban-climate-deal-struck.

Governing the Market: Threats to Australia’s Stability and Security

National Economic Review

National Institute of Economic and Industry Research

No. 64   July 2010

The National Economic Review is published four times each year under the auspices of the Institute’s Academic Board.

The Review contains articles on economic and social issues relevant to Australia. While the Institute endeavours to provide reliable forecasts and believes material published in the Review is accurate it will not be liable for any claim by any party acting on such information.

Editor: Kylie Moreland

National Institute of Economic and Industry Research

This journal is subject to copyright. Apart from such purposes as study, research, criticism or review as provided by the Copyright Act no part may be reproduced without the consent in writing of the relevant Institute.

 

ISSN 0813-9474

Governing the market: Threats to Australia’s stability and security

Peter Brain, Executive Director, NIEIR

 

Abstract

This paper was presented as a lecture in the Senate Occasional Series at Parliament House, Canberra on 8 August and represents an update of ‘The Australian Federation 2001: Political structures and economic policy’, a 2001 Alfred Deakin Lecture. The basic message here is that unless Australia adopts a middle course between the highly successful corporatist state model of development and the extreme neoliberal model that Australia has selected as its development framework, Australia’s internal stability and national security could well be severely degraded over the next two decades. In short, Australia will have to relearn and reapply some strategies and instruments to govern the market.

 

This will involve some restoration of the practices and institutions that were swept away in the name of microeconomic reform over the past two decades. Australia will never be able to match the efficiency of the informal governance structures of corporatist states. For Australia, leadership will have to be provided by its governance institutions in general and parliament in particular.

Introduction

In my 2001 ‘Alfred Deakin Lecture’ I set out to:

(i)            explain why Australia in the 1980s had adopted the extreme neoliberal (or the economic rationalists) model as its development framework; and

(ii)           discuss some likely consequences of that choice.

Put simply, under the neoliberal model the state plays a largely passive role, with many of the key decisions determining the direction and quality of Australia’s economic development and its social consequences being left to the market. The explanation for why Australia adopted the model was, in part, attributed to the relatively weak state of Australia’s parliamentary institutions as a representative democracy and strong executive. This is not to say that the Australian system does not produce good outcomes for many decisions. The problem is that for some key strategic decisions the tendency is to select simple, easy to market solutions for economic and social problems that reflect the capacity, interests and vision of the political leadership group. More complex solutions that require the input of the broader political community and the design of new governance structures that may lie beyond the control of strongly established, including bureaucratic interests, tend to be eliminated at an early stage.

The likely consequences for the future noted in the 2001 lecture include:

(i)            increasing wealth/income inequalities;

(ii)           increasing foreign ownership and a narrow based economy;

(iii)          no solution to Australia’s high current account deficit and foreign debt;

(iv)         financial instability as a result of the capacity of the financial sector to expand debt to whatever level was in its interest; and

(v)          a vulnerability to negative economic shocks and a poor capacity to respond, which is now an important issue in the context of a likely carbon price shock.

The focus of this paper is to elaborate on the likely consequences of the adoption of the neoliberal model for Australia.

The Corporatist state model

The neoliberal approach focuses on market conduct and structures on the assumption that if market conduct and structure are appropriate then optimal outcomes will be achieved. Whatever outcomes are achieved through market forces will in the main, by definition, be optimal.

Corporatist states tend to approach development from the reverse direction. Objectives are specified in terms of social, political, security, export and industry output/cost targets. The means are then designed to mobilise whatever is necessary to achieve the defined objectives in the minimum time subject to global resource constraints and global as well as local market forces. The strategies of corporatist states to achieve objectives involve reducing the risks to the institutions (governance and commercial) charged with the responsibility of ensuring the objectives are achieved by:

(i)            building large scale enterprises to dominate markets and supply chains, reaping maximum economies of scale and scope, and reducing market risk to a minimum;

(iii)          ensuring that all necessary resources in terms of finance, skills and technology are available for the task;

(iv)         ensuring that any other domestic or foreign organisation cannot impede the performance of the chosen organisation(s) for the task; and

(v)          relying on regulation rather than the price mechanism.

An early Corporatist state, Germany grew by 12 per cent per annum between 1933 and 1937, with the unemployment rate cut from a third back to full employment, while most developed economies had an inferior performance though not necessarily by much. What is important is not whether a more neoliberal approach would have been more effective, but the approach was different and it seemed to work. It changed history.

The North Asian countries took note of the German strategies and applied them post war with astonishing results. One nation’s experience, South Korea’s, is miraculous. In 1961, South Korea had an annual income of US$82 per person or less than half that of

 

Ghana at the time. Today, it is one of the wealthiest countries in the world. It took the UK two centuries and the United States one and a half centuries to achieve a similar result (Chang, 2008). More importantly Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore continue to maintain per capita GDP growth rates well beyond the level achieved by other countries with a similar high level of per capita income.

In this context there are three categories of corporatist states:

(i)            The social market model of Western Europe with democratic institutions where policy institutions rely on codified statute and regulations with some reliance on non-parliamentary governance bodies representing stakeholder interests.

(ii)           The corporatist state model of Singapore, Korea, Japan and Taiwan which may or may not have effective democratic institutions but where the governance is non-transparent relying on networks between governments, bureaucracy and businesses with decisions made in the interests of the collective irrespective of codified statutes and regulations. The penalties for non-compliance are exclusion from social networks and business supply chains with severe consequences for social standing and material advancement.

(iii)        The extreme authoritarian models of Germany/Italy in the 1930s and Russia and China today, where along with social and commercial exclusion, violence (i.e. loss of property, liberty and in the extreme cases life) is a penalty for non-compliance. The extreme authoritarian model has an impenetrable informal governance structure.

 

The Germans showed in the 1930s that the arrest of an individual for economic treason when it was clearly understood that the real crime was the import of product instead of using the favoured domestic supplier was a very effective form of industry policy, which did away with the need for costly tariffs, subsidies or other financial inducements. In this context, it is interesting to note that the criteria applied in determining what foreign enterprises can and cannot currently do in China is expressed in terms of largely undefined parameters based on the concept of national economic security. Many countries aspire to the status of corporatist states. Few, however, have the capacity to reach the desired status. On this criteria the classification of Russia as a corporatist state is problematic.

China: Where to?

Of high importance to Australia’s national interest is how China will evolve. Neoliberals tend to assume that it will evolve into a market-based economy.

China is not going to be transformed into a neoliberal market economy. Instead, it may well transform itself into perhaps the most efficient corporatist state model of all time with, over the next two to three decades:

(i)            A large number of its state-owned (or indirectly controlled) enterprises (70 per cent of business assets are still under direct government control) becoming the largest companies in the world, dominating the control of capacity in many industries.

(ii)           A Communist Party that will grow rapidly and in influence on the basis of generating individual material advancement that will also provide an informal governance framework that will be simply impenetrable. No matter what the codified statutes, China will have a machinery of governance capable of doing the opposite on non-transparent command. In this context, who owns the enterprises will be irrelevant.

The Chinese see large-scale foreign investment in China mainly as a short-term strategy to:

(i)            introduce new technologies, management expertise and new skills generation; and

(ii)           construct distribution systems to the world economy,  in the shortest possible time.

It is likely as their own enterprises are built up to reach world competitiveness, the assets of foreign enterprises that directly compete with and are of no strategic value if left independent to a mandated Chinese enterprise will be taken over by a combination of intimidation (as per the Russian approach to BP and Shell assets in oil and gas sites), financial incentives and frustration, of which the recent creation of Communist Party control of Trade Union cells in foreign enterprises will be a useful tool. At worst foreign enterprises exiting China may find that they will lose a significant proportion of non-Chinese assets and intellectual property and, in the extreme, the entire enterprise.

The only major uncertainty about China is the extent to which extreme nationalism will become a hallmark of its external relations similar to what occurred in Germany in late 1930s. The recent signs in this regard are not encouraging. There are signs that strong nationalism is taking root among the young with the state having the capacity, like Germany, to manufacture outpourings of mass nationalism triggered by suitable incidents. The optimists assume that massive environmental problems and widening inequalities will trigger a move, at worst, towards the social market model. The pessimists contend that threats to the legitimacy of the elite in the context of severe resource and environmental constraints will result in the sustained administration of the drug of extreme nationalism and the rectification of past injustices at the hands of the West. To quote Robert Kagan (2008) in his recent assessment of China:

If East Asia today resembles late-nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century Europe, … a comparatively minor incident could infuriate the Chinese and lead them to choose war, despite their reluctance. It would be comforting to imagine that this will all dissipate as China grows richer and more confident, but history suggests that as China grows more confident it will grow less, not more, tolerant of the obstacles in its path. The Chinese themselves have few illusions on this score. They believe this great strategic rivalry will only ‘increase with the ascension of Chinese power.

All that has to be done is to assume, as is the case here, that China behaves no worse that the United States as a global power or no worse than the Western European powers behaved towards China in the 19th century to arrive at the conclusion that a difficult period for Australia lies ahead. This is returned too below.

The governance riddle

The riddle is that the leadership of corporatist states is even more politically exclusive and dominated by existing bureaucratic and commercial interests than is the case in Australia. Yet these states, because of a combination of history, culture, ethnic homogeneity, strength of nationalism, genes, a common view of economic competition as warfare by other means, requiring the nation to be on a permanent war footing, or whatever, are capable of delivering high performance sustainable outcomes on a long-term basis. My only answer to this riddle for Australia, based on observed Western European outcomes, is that the appropriate response to the corporatist states is not to emulate them in political structures and conduct, but to achieve similar outcomes by strengthening the institutions of representative democracy. That is, governance and the institutions of governance are important. This is in contrast to the neoliberal view that governance is relatively unimportant.

What  is  the  focus  here  is  in  regard  to  some  of Australia’s current and future economic problems, how would a corporatist state solution differ from the actual or likely neoliberal solution.

Monetary policy

The 2001 lecture I pointed to the Australian neoliberal ‘privatised’ monetary policy regime where no intermediate target for credit growth was set as is the case for the monetary policy of the European Union. Provided CPI inflation is within the desired bounds then debt accumulation could be at whatever level the market was willing to absorb. For the European Central Bank (ECB) inflation in the long run is a monetary phenomena and any credit growth on a sustained basis in excess of desired nominal GDP growth will result in undesirable inflation. In Australia credit growth in excess of desired nominal GDP growth is taken as a sign of a healthy economy. For the ECB monetary growth should be little more than desired nominal GDP growth.

 

As Table 1 indicates, the ECB has achieved its objective since 1996, while in Australia the growth in M3 relative to nominal GDP has been 28 per cent. This does not seem much but, as will be outlined below, the consequences for long-run economic and social stability will be very large.

Over the years I have criticised the Australian approach to money policy as irresponsible. That is, I have agreed with the ECB view provided inflation is defined as including established asset prices (shares, dwellings) as well as newly produced goods and services.

Therefore, sustained credit growth in excess of desired nominal GDP growth will:

 

(i)            increases the vulnerability of the economy to negative shocks by encouraging borrowing for

(ii)           create an increasing proportion of households in ‘serf’ status by forcing households to pay high debt service/rent payments as a proportion of income over an extensive period of their life cycle;

(iii)          lead to house prices (and rents) putting home ownership beyond the reach of an increasing proportion of the population and

(iv)         easy short-term growth diverting energy and attention from the constant resource mobilisation effort required for long-run sustainable growth.

Capture

The excess monetary growth for Australia drove the build-up in asset values (Figure 1) which encouraged households to borrow and spend (Figure 2). Figure 2 shows the precipice the Australian economy is now sitting on. Non-dwelling investment borrowings by households over the last half decade have increased from 5 per cent of income to currently around 15 per cent. If only a third of this is used to support consumption, then a repeat of the 1991 experience of household borrowings for non-dwelling investment turning negative would cause the household savings ratio increasing by 5–7 percentage points, plunging the economy into the severest recession since the depression. In the context of Figure 2, the current (August 2008) dilemma facing the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) is self evident. Although inflation is 1.5 per cent per annum above the 3 per cent upper bound of acceptable outcomes, the RBA can either maintain tight monetary control and risk a severe recession, or abandon tight monetary policy and risk the return of longer-term unsatisfactory inflation, thereby simply postponing the day of reckoning to greater pain down the track.

Capture2

Capture1

The RBA has only itself to blame for this as it is simply the result of a decade of irresponsible monetary policy. It knew of the ECB approach, but showed no intellectual leadership and simply went along with the short-term political objective of maintaining the financing of the new aspirational society. Indeed, a good case can be made that Australia’s low inflation rate over the decade to 2006 was in spite of, not because of, the RBA. Its only effective task over this period was to ensure that financial structural disequilibrium did not occur. It failed. Ultimately, Parliament will be held responsible for delegating without appropriate guidelines a core governance responsibility to unelected officials.

 

 

Towards debt serfdom

What if Australia escapes the current policy difficulty and interest rates start to come down within a year or so? The current undersupply of housing (a shortage of around 150,000 units by 2010) is increasing rents and when interest rates come down will trigger a rapid rise in dwelling prices as many try to escape rental status. In other words, the 2003–2007 cycle will be repeated with a further increase in the proportion of households that could be classified as ‘serfs’ risking longer-run social stability.

The origins of serfdom in Russia were based on the need to keep labour fixed in place because of the excess supply of land relative to labour, with high marginal physical product of labour resulting from the large territorial gains from conquest with small populations. Market forces would have driven wages to very high levels. Various tactics were tried to constrain labour mobility, such as finding replacement labour before a peasant could move. One tactic was for the landlord (the farmer of the day) to willingly lend to peasants all that was needed and more (e.g. implements, livestock and fencing): another unfortunate linking of readily available finance with an emerging aspirational society. Droughts, wars and plagues would force more lending until peasants were hopelessly in debt. This debt serfdom facilitated legislated serfdom, with the peasant tied to the land with the requirement of up to 3 days a week work for the landlord. As other family members could work on the serf’s allocated land or in the cash economy, modern serfdom ‘status’ will be taken here to arise when households pay over 35 per cent of income in debt service and rent.

The recent Australian history of the more than doubling of the household debt to income ratio since the mid-1990s is well known. However, there is little recognition of what this might mean at the micro level. Both Tables 2 and 3 clearly spell this out. It means less homes in fully-owned status and more households paying more than 35 per cent of income in rent and debt service costs. In terms of mortgage households, the 2008 estimate of the share of households paying more than 35 per cent of income in debt service costs is 23 per cent due to interest rate rises since June 2006. It should be kept in mind that from the 2006 Census, those households paying more than 35 per cent of income in debt service costs were paying an average debt service cost of just under 50 per cent of income. That is, the living standard of a household with no debt would, on average, be twice that of the average household of serf status, despite both households having the same income.

By 2018, on current conservative trends (an increase in the household debt to income of 30 per cent from current levels and interest rates declining from current levels), it is estimated that at least 22 per cent of households will be paying more than 35 per cent of income in debt service and rent costs, or a doubling since 1996 levels. This excludes the high debt of fully-owned households. It might be claimed that the use of the concept of ‘serf’ status in the modern context is over the top as households can eventually escape debt status and Russian serfdom was intergenerational. I would counter argue that, in fact, the intergenerational aspect of serfdom is de facto also emerging in modern times.

Capture3

Capture4

The movement towards neoliberal solutions in education and health means that access to quality services is determined by household circumstances. The greater the number of households in serf status, the more likely the serf status will be passed on to their children as a result of underinvestment in social capital complemented by increasing resort to reverse mortgages, allowing a lifetime of high debt service costs with little or no inheritance for children. This is consistent with findings from the United States vis-à-vis Sweden. For the United States, the correlation coefficient between status of parents and children is approximately 0.5, while for high taxing equal opportunity education/health service across Sweden, it is 0.2 (Bjorklund and M. Jantti, 1997). The irony is that the United States is a society that is approaching as rigid an intergenerational class structure as what prevailed in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries which, in part, forced the migration to the United States.

The likelihood is that if something radical is not done, there will be a high degree of intergenerational correlation in serf status. This will leave Australia with an unenviable choice around 2030 of either a severe one-off tax on wealth to ‘emancipate’ the serfs, or suppression of the serf class to maintain social stability. In any case, a society in 2018, characterised by the results given in Table 3, will be a very grumpy place. Economists have discovered that after national per capita income is greater than US$20,000, happiness is a function of relative incomes not absolute incomes. The greater the serf class, the greater the inequality of discretionary income and the greater the unhappiness.

Housing affordability

One of the core solutions to arrest the march towards a serf society is to significantly increase housing affordability for first home buyers. In this regard, the case of Germany is important because German house prices in nominal terms are only a little more than what was the case a decade earlier and have fallen in real terms. In other parts of Europe, such as Italy, house prices have doubled, so that although ECB tight monetary policy has helped, it is a necessary not a sufficient condition for maintaining high levels of housing affordability. For Australia, over the same period the increase in house prices has been a little under 180 per cent. You would think that current German housing market policies would be at the top of the agenda for all Australian governments.

Corporatist state-type housing solutions have been followed in Austria and Germany for decades. These are called social partnerships. These policies are aimed at coordinating and accommodating conflicting interests between landlords, tenants, financial institutions and government. One core feature is risk shifting from the private sector to the state.

In terms of the rental market, the features of the German housing market are:

(i)            long-term contracts of 3–10 years for tenants;

(ii)           defined rules for rent increases (e.g. consumer price indexing);

(iii)          housing benefit support based on monthly income for both renters and owner-occupiers;

(iv)         strong public sector housing construction with municipal housing construction providing approximately 10–15 per cent of housing stock.

In terms of dwelling construction and the supply of housing, direct subsidisation of housing construction at the state level takes into account the regional housing market situation. Construction support is allocated to housing companies, housing associations and individual builders on application, via, for example, preferential interest loans, grants, guarantees/securities and provision of land.

Direct financial support comes from Federal Government/state financial institutions. The focus of loans is on:

(i)            housing stock renovation;

(ii)           CO2 reduction retrofitting;

(iii)          rental new housing construction; and

(iv)         low interest loans for the construction or purchase of owner-occupier housing.

The CO2 Building Renovation Program of 25 billion Euro was introduced in 2008 for the modernising of heating systems and the energy efficiency optimisation of building shells for both renters and owner-occupiers. In addition, regulation makes it difficult to borrow more than 60 per cent of house value, with German lenders reluctant to allow mortgage top ups if a home increases in value. The overarching German objective is to ensure that the supply of houses runs well ahead of demand.

In an unequal society, increasing housing affordability and equal opportunity for housing affordability can only come from one strategy; namely, through rationing of opportunities by rationing of finance and a very targeted list of incentives. This is how the market was governed to allow Australia to solve its last major housing crisis after World War II. Each state had different strategies. Victoria rationed credit via the State Savings Bank, while New South Wales (which lost its Saving Bank in the Depression) focussed on public sector housing construction. There were many other niche instruments that have been swept away over the past 20 years under the mantra that the market will solve everything. However, the Federal Government has introduced new supply-side measures. What is clear about housing policies is that they have to be comprehensive to stop ‘leakage’ into house prices if they are to achieve the delivery of affordable housing to those who need it.

Telecommunications

If the corporatist states are as good as I am inferring in economic development, then it would be expected that they would be well ahead in the provision of quality telecommunications infrastructure. This is the case. By mid-2008, the average download speed was 61 Mbps in Japan, 45 Mbps in South Korea, 18 Mbps in Sweden, 17 Mbps in France and 1.9 Mbps in the United States.

Eighty per cent of households in Japan can connect to a fibre network at a speed of 100 mlps, 30 times the average speed in the United States. Australia is 30–50 per cent below United States levels. Australia has announced a supply-side initiative to improve the situation, but the past delay in trying to incorporate market forces into the process will mean that like electricity to Timbucktoo, Australia will get there but only when quality telecommunications is a competitive necessity and no longer a competitive advantage. The image of Australia being a technological laggard is not a good one in terms of attracting investment. The same approach in many other economic aspects has and will cost Australia dearly.

Greenhouse gas abatement policies

There is no better example of this than the approach to greenhouse gas abatement policies (GGAP). The design of GGAP regimes currently being undertaken in Australia is proceeding along strict neoliberal lines. The central touchstone is that the market is the most efficient platform for engineering the appropriate changes. All the government has to do is to set an emissions cap and the resulting price changes will miraculously allow the emissions objective to be achieved. Quoting from the ‘Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Green Paper’ (2008, p. 12):

There are two distinct elements of a cap and trade scheme – the cap itself and the ability to trade. The cap achieves the environmental outcome of reducing greenhouse gas pollution. The act of capping emissions creates a carbon price. The ability to trade ensures that emissions are reduced at the lowest possible cost.

Let’s consider by illustration a segment of the adjustment effort, mainly the electricity sector. Assume that a target is set to reduce total emissions by 20 per cent below 2005 levels, which would represent a (EU 2020 target) 223 million tonne reduction from a 2020 business-as-usual level in 2020. Of the 223 million tonnes, a large part of the reduction would need to come from the electricity sector. Around 91 million tonnes would need to come from replacing approximately 11,000 MW from coal fired plants. To do this, the price of carbon would need to (on NIEIR and ACIL-Tasman estimates) quickly ramp up to around $55/tonne by 2020, based on the long-run marginal cost of alternative supply in order to achieve the long-run marginal costs of a combined cycle gas turbine plant in combination with the mandated Federal renewables target.

A corporatist state would immediately conclude that the Australian market of independent generators independently bidding for supply would not be successful, even if the $55 CO2 price were achieved. The market will not react because to achieve the target, approximately $50 billion would have to be spent on generators, gas development, pipeline and transmission investment. In an unfettered market environment, the risks would simply be too great.

The risks would include:

(i)            Existing supplier risk. Yes, the asset value of existing brown and black coal plant would be reduced by over 90 per cent. However, bankruptcy would merely mean that the new owners would be willing to supply some of the market at short-run marginal cost, which might require an additional $20–25 a tonne in CO2 price (i.e. $80/tonne) to reduce the risk. If they continued their pre-emissions trading scheme output, the cap would not be attained.

(ii)           Technology risk. Electricity generation technologies are rapidly changing. At any point in time, technological change may well reduce the real long-run marginal cost by 20–50 per cent in 10 year’s time. Few are going to build a $2 billion plant today that could become obsolete shortly after it becomes operational.

(iii)          Regulatory risk. If a $60–80/tonne CO2 price results in excessive economic damage, the CO2 price will be lowered and cap attainment strictly regulated, for example, by applying a mandatory gas target, as is now applied in Queensland. Without a compensation guarantee of future prices, few will risk large investment funds.

(iv)         Gas supply risk. Yes, long-term contracts for gas supply will be negotiated with existing suppliers. However, at any time, gas discoveries could result in suppliers willing to supply long-term gas at a fraction of current prices, especially if the location were remote from existing gas distribution infrastructure or the global LNG market were oversupplied.

One option a corporatist state would readily implement would be to combine all the generators into a single body. The arithmetic is simple. Under the present structure of independent suppliers, a $55/tonne carbon price would result in costs per megawatt hour increasing from $45–$50 to approximately $90, or around 80 per cent of the wholesale price. If these costs could be spread over the entire capacity, as would be the case under a single entity, then the wholesale price increase could be limited to 20 per cent, or approximately 7 per cent for the price increase at the retail level, which would represent a minor irritant.

However, there would be further short-term savings. The price increases would be phased in as plants were completed. In terms of cost savings, the strict neoliberal approach to the current Australian situation would result in cumulative CO2 price costs of anywhere between a minimum of $110 billion and $150 billion being imposed on the economy between now and 2020 to allow for market instability and required risk margins, without any guarantee that much of the required capacity would be completed by 2020.

The corporatist state would allow a guaranteed outcome for total cumulative electricity costs increases of between $15 billion and $20 billion. All other risks are reduced to zero by allowing a monopoly. It is this logic that explains why the electricity sector was nationalised in Australia in the first half of the 20th century as state after state gave up trying to induce the required supply response at the right price from an albeit regulated private electricity sector.

A good corporatist state that did not want to renationalise the generating industry in Australia would sit down with the generators and hammer out an agreement for ownership change, exit arrangements on reasonable terms, and a regulatory environment that delivered an outcome in line with the old nationalised model where the private sector could still play a part. The current Queensland model for encouraging the use of gas in electricity generation would be a good place to start. The ultimate model would probably resemble this model and the model used by Victoria to run its train system.

The Garnaut recommendation to ignore private sector losses is not the right way to go. Governments are going to have to rely on the private sector (albeit with substantial risk shifting to the public sector) to undertake a substantial portion of the hundreds of billions of expenditures needed for greenhouse gas reduction.

Any rational corporatist state approach to CO2 reduction would place the emissions trading system at the end point, not at the beginning, in policy design. It would work out all the possible regulatory, technology and mandatory market incentives (by directly paying tradesmen to retrofit dwellings with insulation, solar panels, gas etc.), with the carbon price then set in terms of financing requirements and long-term strategic direction. A corporatist state would laugh off the suggestions of the neoliberals that Australia needs a high CO2 price for energy efficiency. Yes, there is some low lying fruit, but this isn’t the main game. Australia makes little equipment, so energy efficiency gains will depend on how overseas suppliers respond to the world carbon price. Accelerated depreciation allowances, tied investment allowances and energy efficiency performance regulation would be far more efficient in encouraging speedy adjustment. High carbon prices by themselves would simply result, in many cases, in plant shutdowns when they reached the end of their commercial life.

If the Treasury modelling into carbon prices simply assumes that the market operates optimally with ‘near perfect’ substitution between factors of production, then it should be immediately thrown into the bin. In this context, one of the best things the Federal Parliament could do for climate change is to give back to the states their income tax base set in line with their responsibilities so they can build the necessary transport infrastructure and urban design to minimise the CO2 content of connectiveness. The situation is now reaching an extreme position, where an increasing number of households in major metropolitan areas will not have the time and/or financial incomes to reach their place of work on a regular basis. The Federal Parliament must stop the practice of spending what should be State resources on income tax cuts to enhance its short-term election prospects.

Finally, in relation to climate change, if the implication of Figure 3 is correct, then by 2012 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change may well revise the sea level rise up by 2100 to 10–20 metres in the same way that predictions of an ice free summer Arctic have been quickly brought forward from 100 years time to the near term. The 2–4°C predicted rise in global temperatures, even with substantial emission reduction success, would still result in rises in the sea level of tens of metres. This would require a response to reduce CO2 in the atmosphere back to the 1990 level of 350 parts per million, which would, in turn, require a near zero emissions target by 2050. This would necessitate drastic action, but the tools of the corporatist state could enable it to be done, albeit with no increase in living standards (consumption per capita) for decades.

 

National security

In the 2001 lecture I gently suggested that to protect the national interest and economic sovereignty it was desirable to bring foreign investment decisions under more parliamentary control and not leave them to an effectively unaccountable body. This course of action has become more urgent. There is no national interest in allowing major customers (i.e. Chinese enterprises) to control Australian resources. The objective here is simply to transfer value from Australia to China to enhance international competitiveness and real incomes. The concept of sending tax inspectors to Beijing to politely ask to see the books of what will be the biggest companies in the world owned by a potentially hostile country to try and recoup billions of lost tax revenue is laughable.

A good case can be made that Australia is heading towards a classic ‘banana republic’ status. The phrase ‘banana republic’ was invented to describe a country like Honduras, where foreign interests (United States) controlled the region producing the principle Honduras exports (bananas) and all supporting infrastructure. The region was run like a private chiefdom in which companies kept order, and crushed labour dissent using their own security forces or, when necessary, by calling in United States troops, who then established military bases in the country. The irony is that the aim of preventing Australia from becoming a banana republic (Paul Keating, 1986) was one reason for adopting the extreme neoliberal model. It wouldn’t be the first time that a policy shift achieved the reverse of what was intended. In this context, for Parliament not to take back control of foreign investment decisions could well be seen from the hindsight of 2030 as pure treason. The immediate task is to reduce Chinese foreign investment in Australian mineral resources to zero.

When doing this, Parliament could usefully abolish the Productivity Commission and replace it with a body directly under Parliamentary control, focussed on protecting Australia’s economic and political sovereignty. The Productivity Commission can do good work but, unfortunately, its ideological blinkers can result in it unintentionally operating as a fifth column within government, reinforcing those private and foreign messages and demands that have and will undermine the national interest. This is an intolerable situation.

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United States and Australian security

Whether the above can occur depends in part on the speed of the relative decline of the United States relative to China. Over the next decades, Australian security very much depends on the relative decline in political economy strength of the United States being as slow as possible so as to allow the region to develop balanced multipolar counterweight power centres in which Australia can enhance its security. Unfortunately, trends in this regard are not optimistic. The United States seems to have gotten itself into an unstable political cycle, where the Republicans have been hell bent on exhausting the Federal treasury (largely for the benefit of their own constituency) so there are few resources available to correct some of the United States fundamental problems (not all that dissimilar to Australia). This, when coupled with established interests being able to influence both parties for changed regulation, removal of regulation and less regulatory oversight for the enormous benefit of a few and the eventual misery of many does not bode well for a political response that will arrest the United States’ relative decline.

In this context, not surprising, is the outcome that during the Bush administration three-quarters of the economic gains went to the top 1 per cent of taxpayers (The Economist, 2008). To sustain its economic strength and to combat climate change, the United States, like Australia, requires a redistribution of resources from consumption to investment. The magnitude of such a change can probably only be done with very strong political leadership that, in relatively normal times, would only effectively come from a leader from the right; that is, a Republican such as Teddy Roosevelt. This avoids the charge of class warfare. For a Democrat leader to engineer this outcome would require a massive economic or security crisis, as per Franklin Roosevelt. This might, of course, occur, but the probability is that the United States will continue to experience destabilising political cycles that will sap its economic and political strength.

The point may well be reached sooner than any of us think when the United States will have to decide, as Britain had to in 1902 with the Anglo–Japanese treaty, what its strategic interests were and what had to be let go. That is, the United States will have to decide what will remain in its sphere of interest and what will have to be conceded to, for example, China and India. As Australia becomes more vital to the Chinese economy, and the greater the Chinese investment in Australia, the more likely, irrespective of history, culture and tradition, that the United States will have to decide that Australia can no longer be justified as being a member of its sphere of influence.

From this perspective, the faster Australia can diversify its trade and the stake of countries in Australia, the greater the ability Australia will have to protect its effective sovereignty. This gives industry policy a strategic security status, which is common to most corporatist states.

Industry policy

The record of Australian industry policy has been appalling. As Table 4 indicates, the relative fall in Australia’s non-mining merchandise exports has accelerated over the past decade, which would be expected given the Coalition Government’s downgrading of industry policy. Australian service exports in real terms have been virtually stagnant since 2000. The resort to trade agreements will not be successful. NIEIR investigated the impact of the trade agreements to the end of 2007, including the United States Free Trade Agreement, and found the effect to be small, in terms of manufacturing (NIEIR, 2008). They might have been successful 20 years ago, but now

Australia’s trading relationships are being massively overshadowed by the growth of Asia and Latin America. The neoliberal policy focus is largely irrelevant. The concept of an Australia–China free trade agreement is an oxymoron.

To succeed in the future, Australia will have to integrate itself into the informal networks of Asia, using whatever levers it has to lift the glass ceiling applying to Australia as set by informal governance structures. These levers would include defence relationships, foreign investment in Australia, ethnic networks operating from Australia, cultural affinity and the strategic foreign investment in selected countries. For success, this requires a coordinated effort from many.

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Conclusion

The outlook over the next 20 years has to be approached with a sense of pessimism. Left unabated, current trends suggest that Australia will be facing increasing external pressure, coupled with internal economic malaise and a growing feeling that political institutions are not working. The most recent period that is likely to be similar to the future is the mid-1970s. The mid-1970s was characterised by a combination of intense Cold War pressure and economic meltdown from an energy crisis. The mid-1970s was a strange time, with coups, quasi coups and attempted coups in a number of places, including the UK, where the early stages of an attempted coup centred on Lord Mountbatten. The attempted coup was terminated by the resignation of the British Prime Minister of the day, Harold Wilson (Freedland, 2006).

To avoid similar circumstances prevailing, Parliament’s role is clear. It must put in place institutions and policies that will govern the market in such a way that the current and future challenges are controlled, stemmed and defeated. A large percentage of the population could have a very poor long-term expectation of the future, and this time around Australia could be without powerful friends. To effectively combat the three challenges of climate change, external security and internal stability, the requirement is for the adoption and maintenance of a semi-wartime footing in policy focus and implementation.

 

 

References

Australian Government  (2008),  Carbon  Pollution Reduction      Scheme   Green   Paper,   July,   p.   12, Department of Climate Change.

Bjorklund A., and M. Jantti (1997), Intergenerational mobility in Sweden compared to the United States,

American Economic Review, Volume 87 See Also The Economist, Even higher society even harder to ascend, 29 December 2004.

Chang, H-J. (2008), Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and   the   Recent   History   of   Capitalism, Bloomsberg Press, NY.

Freedland, J.  (2006),  The  Wilson  Plot  was  our Watergate, The Guardian, 15 March 2006.

Kagan, R. (2008), The Return of History and the End of Dreams, Alfred A. Knopp, New York.

NIEIR (2008), An Evaluation of the Impact of Australian Free Trade Agreements to the End of 2007, for the AMWU, 9 April.

The Economist (2008), 1 August, p. 43.

Income Tax Zone Rebates

National Economic Review

National Institute of Economic and Industry Research

No. 68               October 2013

The National Economic Review is published four times each year under the auspices of the Institute’s Academic Board.

The Review contains articles on economic and social issues relevant to Australia. While the Institute endeavours to provide reliable forecasts and believes material published in the Review is accurate it will not be liable for any claim by any party acting on such information.

Editor: Kylie Moreland

This journal is subject to copyright. Apart from such purposes as study, research, criticism or review as provided by the Copyright Act no part may be reproduced without the consent in writing of the relevant Institute.

ISSN 0813-9474

Income tax zone rebates

 Dr Ian Manning, Deputy Executive Director, NIEIR

Abstract

 

Remote area zone rebates or allowances have been a feature of Australian income tax since 1945 and the social security system since 1984. In 2009, the Henry report on the tax system recommended that they should be reviewed, but no action has been taken. Zone rebates accord with each of the major purposes of the tax system. The first of these is the promotion of economic efficiency and economic development, chiefly by supporting the costs of infrastructure provision in remote areas and so assisting the pastoral and mining industries, where there is a case for compensation for the incidental effects of macroeconomic policy on these industries, and also assisting tourism, defence and indigenous development. The second major purpose of the tax system is the ability to pay principle; in this case, compensation for lower real incomes due to higher outback prices. Third is the benefit principle; that is, recognition of the higher cost of access to essential services from outback areas. As the Henry review expected, there is also a case for a review of zone boundaries, of the residence requirements and, in particular, of the rates, which have not been indexed since 1993. This paper presents the case for a review.

This paper was prepared for the Shires of Bulloo, Murweh, Paroo and Quilpie, the Maranoa Regional Council and Regional Development Australia, Darling Downs South West region. It is printed with permission.

Introduction

 For 68 years the income tax has included provisions to reduce the tax that would otherwise be payable by residents of remote areas. The major report into the tax system prepared by the Australian Treasury in 2009 (Australia’s Future Tax System: Report to the Treasurer or, informally, ‘the Henry review’) refers to these provisions as the ‘zone tax offset’. The report admits that it does not examine the zone offset in any detail but its basic attitude is clear from the wording of its Recommendation 6:

To remove complexity and ensure government assistance is properly targeted, concessional offsets should be removed, rationalised or replaced by outlays. … The zone tax offset should be reviewed. If it is to be retained, it should be based on contemporary measures of remoteness.”

Such a review has yet to materialise. The remote area tax rebate continues to be offered at rates that were last adjusted in 1993 and, therefore, have been significantly eroded by inflation. As of September 2011, all classes of zone rebate were worth around 62 per cent of their value in 1993 (adjusted by the consumer price index for Darwin). Longer term comparisons are more difficult because of changing consumption patterns, rising incomes and the switch from tax deductions to rebates. Updating using the consumer price index, the current zone A rebate is worth approximately 70 per cent of the value of the zone A rebate to a single worker on average earnings in 1948, but in relation to average weekly earnings the current zone A rebate is worth only a quarter of its value in 1948.

Given the recent lack of indexation, it appears that the remote area rebate is fated to fade away. This paper outlines the case for retaining and updating it.

History of income tax concessions for remote areas

In its present form, the Australian income tax dates from the Second World War. To pay for the war, the Commonwealth increased its rates of income tax considerably and incorporated the various state income taxes into its own tax. When the fighting ended the enhanced income tax continued to be collected, largely to pay for post-war investments in national development and also to enhance the social security system. In line with contemporary practice, the tax featured a schedule of rising marginal rates.

At the time, Australia was experiencing full employment and both businesses and governments resorted to paying ‘district and regional allowances’ to attract workers to remote and tropical jobs, many of which were considered of high priority for national development reasons. Much of the benefit of these supplements was clawed back by the Commonwealth through its marginal tax rates: at the time, the top marginal rate was over 75 per cent, although the marginal rate for a typical worker was around 18 per cent. In 1945 zone allowances were introduced in the form of deductions from taxable income for taxpayers resident in regions where workers commonly received district or regional allowances to compensate them for ‘disabilities of uncongenial climatic conditions, isolation or relatively high cost of living’.

Zone allowances were made available to all taxpayers who spent at least 6 months of the tax year living in a zone, not merely those who received district or regional allowances.

Two zones were defined. Zone A comprised the Australian tropics apart from the Queensland east coast south of Cape Tribulation, and zone B included the Queensland coast from Cape Tribulation south to Sarina plus the following: a belt of inland Queensland adjacent to zone A; the far west of New South Wales; the far north of South Australia; the Western Australian goldfields and the west of Tasmania. From the beginning, and to this day, zone A attracted a greater allowance than zone B.

In 1955 the zone A boundary was extended south to the 26th parallel. From 1958 zone allowances were complemented by loadings on the deductions for dependants, which had long been a feature of the tax system. In 1975 the zone allowance was converted to a rebate. The additional allowances for dependants were also converted to rebates and zone residents became entitled to percentage additions to their basic dependent rebates. When rebates for children were merged into Family Allowance payments they remained as an element in the zone rebate system.

The Public Inquiry into Income Tax Zone Allowances was conducted in 1981. Zone dependant rebates were increased as a result of this inquiry. A second important change was the creation of special areas, defined as places within zone A or B located more than 250 km by the shortest practicable surface route from the nearest town with more than 2,500 people as of 1981. The rebate in the special zone has been set at 3.47 times the zone A rebate.

Finally, in 1984 remote area allowances were introduced as supplements to all the major income-support social security payments. Remote area allowances are available to pensioners and some beneficiaries who are permanent residents of tax zone A and special tax zones located within zone B. They are not available in the non-special parts of zone B. The allowances are paid at the same rate without distinction between the special zones and the rest of zone A. Although not part of the income tax system, these allowances are an obvious complement to the income tax zone rebate. Taken together, they mean that the Commonwealth provides income allowances for nearly all permanent remote area residents.

The Cox Inquiry

The 1981 Cox Inquiry is the only review of the system to date and, therefore, is worth considering in detail. The four members of the Public Inquiry into Income Tax Zone Allowances called for submissions and arranged public consultations. After going through this process they found that their views diverged. As a result, the team of four members produced three reports with different recommendations. The main report was signed by the chairman (P. E. Cox) and S. G. W. Burston and, with reservations, by the other two members. G. Slater prepared a minority report with alternative recommendations and A. M. Kerr added a statement in which he endorsed some recommendations and varied others. However, the Cox Inquiry was unanimous in recommending that zone allowances should continue; the differences between its members concerned the geography of eligibility and the rates of allowance.

It is likely that in any future review much the same arguments will be considered and similar divergences will emerge. We will accordingly base our discussion of the purpose of the rebates on the points raised in 1981. We will also ask whether conditions have changed so as to affect the relevance of the arguments, keeping in mind two obvious differences since 1981:

  • that the real value of the rebates has declined through failure to index them; and
  • that the income tax rebates are now complemented by social security entitlements.

There have also been various other more subtle changes since 1981 and, indeed, since 1945.

Incidence of zone rebates

Serious discussion of remote area rebates is only possible if we know who they benefit. As compared with a situation where rebates are not available, do they benefit employees, granting them higher disposable incomes, or do they benefit employers, allowing them to reduce cash pay rates?

When remote area allowances were introduced in 1945 it was assumed that they were essentially a benefit to employers who would be able to attract labour with lower remote area loadings than would have been required in the absence of the tax allowance. However, much recent discussion of the equity of zone rebates assumes that they have no effect on pay rates and, therefore, the rebate benefits the employee. It is hard to make a definitive judgement since the answer depends on an unobservable variable: What would remote area wage rates be in the absence of the zone rebate?

Tentative answers are as follows:

  1. Where the rebate is large (as it was, in relation to wage rates, when the provision was first introduced), it is hard to argue that it will not affect at least some wage rates. When this happens at least some of the benefit will accrue to employers, who may increase the level of remote area employment in response. Per contra, when the rebate is small (as it is now, in relation to wage rates) it is less likely to be taken into account in wage negotiations.
  2. Where wage rates are fixed by centralised wage-setting authorities without regard for geographic area, it is more likely that the benefit will accrue to employees. When wage rates are set by ‘the market’, it is more likely that the rebate will be taken into account in setting wage rates and, therefore, will accrue to employers.

Given the erosion of the value of the rebate in relation to wage rates, one would expect a trend towards its benefiting employees rather than employers. However, the trend away from centralised wage determination to bargained rates has increased the chances that the rebate will benefit employers. These two trends cancel out, and the best that can be said is that the incidence of the rebate is likely to vary with circumstances. By contrast, the remote area allowance in social security unambiguously increases the income of its recipients.

Decentralisation and industry development

The Second World War was a shock to Australia’s sense of security. One reaction to this shock was to seek to raise the national population and in particular to populate the north: those vast regions with population densities way below those not so far away in Asia. It was also believed that there were significant unutilised resources in the north and that exploitation of these resources would be of national benefit. Tax incentives were an obvious element in policies to populate and develop the north.

‘Develop the north’

In 1945 it was commonly believed that one of the hindrances to populating and developing the north was the ‘uncongenial climate’. For decades up until the Second World War most tropical countries were under the control of the European powers as colonies. In these countries the colonialists managed and the natives worked. The racial division of labour in the tropical colonies meant that the idea that people eligible to be citizens of White Australia could do all the work necessary to develop tropical Australia was still somewhat novel. Populating the north would be a great national experiment and there was a sense that the nation as a whole should participate in the experiment by providing cash rewards to people who went north.

The Australian population doubled during the 37 years separating the original provision of zone allowances and the Cox Committee’s hearings in 1981, but not in the pattern envisaged by those who sought to populate the north: the growth was based on manufacturing and much of it occurred in the cities, reflecting deliberate policies of industry development. The committee held its hearings at a time when Australia was debating government involvement in industry development, particularly tariffs. Tariff cuts were a cause célèbre in remote areas where it was argued that abandoning protection would provide a major stimulus to local export industries, including pastoral production and mining. It was even argued that, in the absence of tariff cuts, zone rebates were justified as compensation for the costs of protection. Three decades on, tariffs have been cut, the mining and pastoral industries continue their cycle of boom and bust (currently boom) and the argument for zone rebates as compensation for tariffs has disappeared. The Australian population has grown by a further 50 per cent, still mainly in the major cities and their immediate surrounds but with one significant change: Darwin has moved from backwater status to become a vibrant if small city.

During the post-war period the cry to develop the north became muted. The memory of recent conflict faded and various high-profile investments to develop the north struck economic trouble (e.g. Humpty Doo rice and the Ord River Dam). At the same time, Australians became less anxious about their capacity to survive and work in the tropics, although to this day Australian tourists avoid the north and centre during the hot and wet seasons. Despite these subsiding anxieties, the Cox Inquiry took the idea of compensation for an uncongenial climate seriously. The committee observed that no place in Australia has a completely congenial climate: everywhere there are episodes when it is too hot or too cold or too wet or too dry. However, some places are less comfortable than others. According to a meteorological discomfort index, which emphasises heat and humidity, the most uncongenial region extends eastwards from Kununurra. Even in this area it is now possible (at an expense) to create congenial indoor, car-driving and plant-operating conditions through air conditioning. If air conditioning is the answer, there is no need for compensation for uncongenial climate but there may be a case for compensation for the cost of air conditioning and, for that matter, for the cost of heating in cold places.

Interest in population geography did not disappear when the metropolitan electorates forgot about populating the north, but was replaced by the promotion of decentralisation, which meant moving jobs out of the capital cities to reduce congestion costs. This argument for decentralisation was, however, irrelevant to zone rebates since it was not necessary to move more than a moderate distance from the capital cities to avoid congestion; indeed, longer moves into the remote regions tended to increase transport costs.

Although decentralisation provided no more than weak support for zone rebates, there was still the argument that it was in the national interest to encourage the development of remote area resources. Whereas this argument was important in 1945, the Cox Inquiry gave it relatively little attention. All members of the inquiry, despite their divergences in other respects, seem to have been persuaded that resource development would be better pursued by other means. They provided very little discussion of what these other means might be, although in the 1980s there was a rising body of opinion that held that development should be left to the private sector. The Cox Inquiry concluded that zone rebates were justified on ‘horizontal equity’ but not industry development grounds. The equity arguments will be considered below, after the economic development arguments are reconsidered.

Structure of the outback economy

Discussion of the economic development argument for zone rebates not only requires assumptions about incidence (employee or employer?) but a definition of the remote areas. It would be possible to adopt current tax definitions (i.e. zone A, zone B and the special zone), but, as the Henry report points out, these zones are in need of review. Remote areas can be conceptualised in two main ways:

  • as regions of low population density that either lack urban centres or have few and isolated towns; or
  • as regions with limited agricultural resources apart (perhaps) from small irrigated oases.

The two concepts are related, with the low population density the result of the limited resource base. For the purpose of this discussion the remote area, or outback, will be defined as country where there is no, or very little, arable or forest land. By this definition Victoria, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory do not contain any remote areas. In Western Australia, South Australia and New South Wales the remote areas comprise all country outback of the wheat-sheep belt and in Queensland all country west of the Maranoa, the Peak Downs and the Tablelands back of Cairns. All of the Northern Territory is remote except Darwin and its immediate surrounds. To avoid confusion with ‘remote Australia’ as defined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), we will refer to this area as the outback.

Although the outback lacks arable land and, hence, has few farmers, it is by no means lacking in pastoral and mineral resources. This is reflected in the industry distribution of the approximately 150,000 jobs (1.6 per cent of the national total) that were located in the outback in 2001 (Table 1).

 Table 1   Outback employment by industry, 2006

 Capture

 Three industries were overrepresented in outback employment: mining (including associated manufacturing such as smelting and equipment repair), the pastoral industry (plus fishing, hunting and a few meatworks) and tourism (in so far as this can be separated from the more general accommodation and transport industries). Defence and general government service employment was present at slightly above national average rates, while all other employment was underrepresented in relation to the national average. In particular, the outback generates few jobs in finance, information, professional and scientific services.

Arguments for assistance to outback economic development

Several strands of argument for assistance to outback economic development can be distinguished. Two of the arguments are familiar from the history of zone rebates:

  • the strategic and moral argument that Australia wishes to occupy, and be seen to occupy, its whole national territory, and to take such measures as are necessary to defend it; and
  • the argument that resources should be developed.


The question is whether, given the range of policies available, zone rebates are an efficient means towards achieving these ends. In addition, a new argument has arisen. In 1945 and even in 1981 the proponents of developing the north tended to overlook the fact that much of remote Australia was already occupied by indigenous people, admittedly at low density but including regions where a century of efforts to develop profitable settler enterprises had failed. Over the past 30 years indigenous occupation has been recognised by the award of native title over significant parts of remote Australia to traditional owners. Social and environmental changes mean that these owners and their families can no longer live on their traditional lands as hunter-gatherers. Although some remote indigenous communities have an assured economic base, many of them depend on a mixture of Centrelink payments and government employment. It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter into the current vigorous debate about the economic future of these communities but it is fair to ask whether zone rebates have a role in generating ‘real jobs’ for them.

The economic development argument for zone rebates resolves into the judgement that it is desirable to develop remote areas more rapidly than would take place under ‘hands off’ policies and that zone rebates make sense as a component of the resulting economic development policies.

If the benefit of zone rebates goes to the employee, they may be interpreted as an incentive to employees to undertake remote area work. If the benefit of zone rebates goes to the employer, they may be interpreted as an incentive to employers to create remote area jobs. Although the discussion could be cast in terms of either interpretation, the present discussion will assume that the benefit of the rebates goes to employers and reduces the cost of remote area labour. It is, in effect, a wage subsidy.

At this point it must be conceded that the effectiveness of wage subsidies in generating remote area employment and economic development is likely to vary across the outback and also between remote area industries. However, outback areas have several features in common:

  1. Their industry structure is thin. Typically, they have only one or two economic base industries plus support services.
  2. Their  economic  base  industries  are  typically trade-exposed;   indeed,   most   are   export industries directly dependent on overseas markets.

 These characteristics leave the remote areas subject to several market failures:

  1. Along with other tradable industries, they are exposed to overvaluation of the exchange rate. Australia’s chronic balance of payments deficit provides evidence that the exchange rate is, on average, overvalued and that, to correct this, trade-exposed (particularly export) industries should be encouraged vis-à-vis trade-sheltered industries. This applies to trade-exposed industries generally but is crucial in the remote areas due to their dependence on such industries.
  2. Not only is the exchange rate overvalued but it fluctuates unpredictably. In addition to the price fluctuations generated by international markets, the trade-exposed industries are further exposed to price fluctuations generated by movements in the exchange rate. Current policy is to welcome these movements for their contribution to short-term macroeconomic management but they have the serious side-effect of increasing the level of risk borne by long-lived investment in the trade-exposed industries. Much of the investment required by outback industries is long-lived, consisting as it does of property improvements and transport infrastructure. Once again, there is a case for policies to ameliorate this side-effect.
  3. This industry structure and low population density mean that the remote areas depend more heavily than others on government provision of infrastructure. For example, telecommunications are commercially highly profitable in high-density areas but not so in low-density areas.

These arguments will surface in various forms as we discuss the major outback industries. As shown in the discussion above, mining now dominates the outback export industries. However, it remains that pastoral production is the classic, and most widespread, outback export industry. We will consider it first.

 

Pastoral production

From first settlement the pastoral industries (wool and beef) were seen as the economic mainstay of the outback, as they still are in western New South Wales,Western Queensland, northern South Australia and much of the Northern Territory. Judged by employment, they dominate the economic base of shires such as Central Darling (New South Wales), Barcoo and Boulia (Queensland). In such shires pastoral production may be augmented by hunting (e.g. feral goats and kangaroos). Some of the coastal outback supports a fishing industry, which, like hunting, is run by small businesses.

When considering the importance of sheep and cattle in the outback it is important to remember that pastoral production also occurs elsewhere, including in the wheat/sheep belt and hilly pastoral areas such as New England and the Monaro. Is it reasonable to argue for zone rebates for the remote part of the pastoral industry while denying them to the same industry operating in closer-settled regions?

Managing a high-risk industry

Government policy towards the remote area pastoral industry is discussed in a companion article that deals with the position in South West Queensland. The experience in South West Queensland and, indeed, in the pastoral industry as a whole is that the industry is high risk as the succession of good and bad seasons interacts with fluctuating commodity prices and the risk-increasing effects of fluctuating exchange rates. For the best part of two centuries the pastoral industry has proved its resilience, not only to price fluctuations but to the sequence of good and bad seasons. Resilience involves prudent accumulation of reserves during the good times and maintenance of capacity during the bad: it is hard to take advantage of the next in the capricious series of booms without productive capacity in place.

Reserves can be accumulated in different ways. One way is through cash and off-property investments but another is by making improvements to property. The pastoral industry has traditionally used a combination of off-property and on-property investment to employ funds generated in the upswings of the seasonal and commodity cycles. Similarly, the maintenance phase can be financed by running down investments (and in dire necessity incurring debt) and by postponing on-property investment, but preferably in a way that does not threaten capacity.

At the regional level, these business strategies can be complemented by government action. When the pastoral industry is in a boom phase, the government can help to release local resources to participate in the boom by restricting itself to maintenance. When the pastoral industry is in a maintenance phase, it is appropriate for governments to attempt to take up the slack, investing in infrastructure as a contribution to readiness for the next boom. It is, of course, as difficult for governments as for businesses to make the necessary financial arrangements, exercising discipline during booms and countering despondency during periods of slack activity, but this is no excuse for not trying.

In this discussion it has been assumed that fluctuating commodity prices are inevitable. It has often been pointed out that steady capacity utilisation would be less wasteful than the current alternation between the costs of overcapacity production and the costs of underutilised capacity. While steady prices sufficient to generate a moderate rate of profit minimise costs, there is no known way to achieve this steadiness in commodity markets. The chief lesson from Australia’s long and sorry history of government schemes to stabilise 0agricultural markets is that intervention at the industry level is hazardous, to say the least, and that governments are best restricted to general countercyclical policy, including the maintenance of infrastructure and its extension during times when activity levels require support.

Case for remote area wage subsidies in the pastoral industry

Against this background, can a case be made for zone rebates to assist the remote area pastoral industry? Because the rebates have to be financed, it may be assumed that they (slightly) increase tax rates in non-remote areas and, therefore (slightly), reduce employment in these areas. Can a case be made for this?

We have already noted an argument on these lines: the claim, in 1981, that zone rebates compensated for the effect of tariffs on remote area industry costs. This argument has lapsed with the cuts in tariffs, and in any case it drew a long bow. However, it can still be argued that pastoral employment in remote areas should be encouraged through zone rebates, as follows:

  1. Remote areas depend on trade-exposed industries subject to volatile international prices. These industries are important for balance of payments reasons. Price volatility coupled with a finance sector that is unable to provide insurance against medium-term price fluctuations creates risks which, if not managed, will result in these industries having less capacity (and the non-tradable industries having more capacity) than desirable in the overall long-run allocation of resources. It is neither possible nor desirable that the price volatility should be removed. In lieu of removal of price volatility, other ways should be sought to ensure that capacity is maintained, particularly in downturns.
  2. The prohibition of direct industry-specific subsidies by World Trade Organisation rules means that indirect industry support measures are relevant. Possible indirect support includes skills training, subsidies to research and market development, government provision of infrastructure and wage subsidies available on a regional rather than an industry basis.
  3. The advantages of wage subsidies on a regional basis are stronger than they appear prima facie, in that such subsidies assist the maintenance and development of regional infrastructure (defined broadly to include support services) on which the pastoral industry depends.
  4. The case for regional wage subsidies is strongest in the remote areas, due to their high level of risk. Not only are the seasons more variable than in the closer-settled regions but the thin industry structure means that there is little flexibility to turn to alternative sources of income when the pastoral industry is suffering from a downturn.
  5. The case for wage subsidies is strongest when the industry is in maintenance phase but can be made generally, in that wage subsidies compensate across the trade cycle for the higher than average (and partly artificial) risks, which otherwise result in the pastoral industries attracting less investment than is economically efficient.

 

The market failure case for wage subsidies in remote areas where the pastoral industry provides the economic base therefore rests on these areas being much more dependent on a trade-exposed industry subject to volatile prices than the rest of the country. In addition, the residents as a whole contribute, through their social networks and support services, to the productive capacity of the pastoral export industry.

Providing wage subsidies to all outback employers, rather than just to the trade-exposed pastoral industry, strengthens the capacity of the region as a whole to support export production while avoiding interference with the market allocation of resources within the remote areas and interfering no more than marginally with the allocation of resources between the remote and non-remote areas. The capacity of local and state governments to maintain infrastructure and the capacity of local service suppliers (e.g. retail, equipment maintenance and social facilities) are enhanced along with the capacity of pastoralists to maintain their properties

 Mineral resource exploitation

Although the pastoral industry is the classic outback activity, the mining industry is currently very active in several outback regions.

Mineral resource exploitation and the pastoral industry: Similarities and differences

The mineral resource industry covers mining broadly defined to include production of metal ores, energy minerals and non-metallic minerals plus mineral exploration, services to mining and related manufacturing activities, such as ore beneficiation and heavy equipment repair carried out close to mine sites. This industry has several characteristics in common with the pastoral industry:

  • many of its operations, to the extent of a quarter of total industry employment, are in the outback as defined for this paper;
  • the industry is trade-exposed and has to cope with the vagaries of international commodity markets and the Australian dollar exchange rate; and
  • like the outback pastoral industry, the mining industry has the choice of making do with the levels of infrastructure provided by the Commonwealth, state and local governments, or providing its own.

Despite the likenesses there are major differences. First, most parts of the mineral resource industry are capital intensive and wages are a minor proportion of costs. Therefore, wage subsidies are unlikely to affect the location or level of industry activity. However, they may affect resource allocation decisions within the industry, particularly resource allocation to labour-intensive industry activities, such as site remediation.

Second, the exploitation of mineral resources is extractive whereas pastoral production is sustainable provided overstocking is avoided. The extractive nature of the mining industry is reflected in different financial arrangements: miners have to pay royalties to the state governments. The high profitability of the mining industry during the current boom has generated debate as to whether the states and territories are levying sufficient royalties to compensate future generations for the sale of the resource (see discussion in the companion article). Those who argue that the industry is being subsidised through low royalty payments are likely to argue that it should not receive any further benefits from wage subsidies.

Third, the exposure of the mining industry to fluctuating exchange rates is limited by the fact that the industry is largely overseas-owned, which means that its capital transactions are carried out in overseas currency rather than Australian dollars. This reduces risk and reduces the cogency of the argument for compensation for uninsurable risk.

Fourth, the financial strength of the large overseas-owned corporations which dominate mining lessens the case for wage subsidies.

Fifth, mining industry employment is concentrated in a small number of major outback centres. The four Pilbara shires plus Kalgoorlie and Mount Isa together account for nearly half of total outback mineral resource employment. These workers have access to reasonable urban facilities, which lessens the case for wage subsidies to ease recruitment.

Finally, as noted in the companion article, the mining industry has adopted a completely different employment strategy to the other remote area industries, one which may further reduce the case for wage subsidies. Many of the firms in the industry have adopted a policy of high wages, low expenditure on workforce development and low job security. A major element in this strategy is fly-in fly-out and the question raised is whether wage subsidies should apply to fly-in fly-out workers.

We will first consider fly-in fly-out and then return to the more general case.

Fly-in fly-out

Currently, whether a fly-in fly-out worker can claim a zone rebate depends on the 6-month rule. A claim can be made if the worker spends more than 6 months worth of nights in the zone during 2 successive financial years. It is not unknown for employment contracts to be drawn up with an eye to satisfying this requirement. It would be a simple matter to withdraw eligibility from fly-in fly-out workers by extending the residence requirement to (say) 10 months in each year or, alternatively, to reduce the residence period so as to include visiting professional personnel who stay for shorter periods.

The decision here depends on conceptualisation. If the wage subsidy is simply a wage subsidy to industries that are under-investing due to uninsurable risks arising from price and exchange rate volatility, it would be appropriate to extend it to all persons employed in such industries, whether in remote areas or no. If, however, the wage subsidy is a form of compensation to those who employ the residents of communities that are heavily dependent on the risk-exposed export industries and that contribute to the prosperity of those regions, it is not appropriate to extend the subsidy to fly-in fly-out workers. Looked at this way, fly-in fly-out workers should be seen as belonging to the labour markets of their region of primary residence. It is argued in the companion article that the mineral exploitation industry, with exceptions, has not been highly committed to regional development, and when it is committed to such development, it is likely to develop a resident workforce that would be eligible for remote area rebates under a 10-month rule.

A second argument for excluding fly-in fly-out workers from wage subsidies was also reviewed in the companion article: fly-in fly-out is perceived as imposing unnecessary costs on workers’ families. If this is the case, the least the Commonwealth can do is to refrain from subsidising it. Exclusion of fly-in fly-out workers while continuing to support resident employment provides employers with an incentive to the latter.

It should also be noted that, in so far as fly-in fly-out workers spend their incomes in their places of permanent residence and not in the remote regions, arguments for compensation for high living costs or for high costs of access to public services do not apply to them.

Finally, the extent to which remote area employers resort to fly-in fly-out is also influenced by fringe benefits tax. A review of this tax is beyond the scope of this article but would have to be incorporated into any considered review of the zone rebates.

Exploration and infrastructure

Mineral production sites (i.e. mines, quarries, oil and gas wells and processing facilities) generally have specialised infrastructure requirements that are, rightly, provided by the industry. However, one crucial part of the mineral industries depends more heavily on general infrastructure: mineral exploration. This is also a high-risk part of the industry because many mineral explorers find nothing. This risk is magnified financially since it arises well in advance of any resulting revenue.

Approximately 8,000 people are employed in mineral exploration nationally, which is a little over 10 per cent of the workforce employed in mining broadly defined. Of these, around 1,500 work in the outback and a further 900 or so work at no fixed address. Even if we add these numbers together, mineral exploration is responsible for less than 2 per cent of outback employment and many of these workers are likely to be flying-in and flying-out. Employment in mineral exploration is spread across the continent, with concentrations in the capital cities (particularly Perth) and the mining provinces.

Where mineral explorers are engaged in proving up and extending deposits that are already in production they may rely on purpose-built industry infrastructure, but where they are seeking new deposits far and wide they rely on the transport, supply and support facilities that happen to be in place. Support to the providers of these facilities, whether by wage subsidies or otherwise, assists mineral exploration, leading to a case for wage subsidies to infrastructure provision useful to mineral exploration.

The case for wage subsidies to the outback mining industry in general is less strong than for the pastoral industry, particularly in boom times such as the present, but is likely to become stronger when it becomes a question of maintaining capacity during a slump and when the industry is providing infrastructure of general benefit. Wage subsidies also reduce the cost of remediation, thus encouraging the industry to take this responsibility seriously. There is also a case for wages subsidies to outback resident workers as a way of lessening the advantages of fly-in fly-out to employers.

 Defence

Four significant defence complexes are located within the current tax zones A and B, at Cairns (Queensland), Townsville (Queensland), Darwin/Berrimah (Northern Territory) and Katherine (Northern Territory). In total, these installations account for 13 per cent of persons employed in the defence of Australia (compared with 16 per cent Canberra). However, only about 1,250 defence personnel are employed in the outback as defined in this paper and they constitute less than 1 per cent of total outback employment.

It may be argued that the Commonwealth does not need to provide itself with wage subsidies in order to employ its own employees: it could equally well charge full taxes and use the proceeds to raise employee wages. On this argument there is no need for zone rebates for Commonwealth employees, including defence personnel. However, zone rebates are only a wage subsidy if their eventual incidence benefits the employer; technically, they are a tax rebate claimed by employees. Therefore, It would be administratively inconvenient to deny them to Commonwealth employees while allowing them for other income recipients.

It is more important to note that the effectiveness of defence personnel depends not so much on the location of their bases as on the ease with which they can access the areas that they are to defend. Access is mainly by road, although also by air and sea. Local and state governments have substantial responsibility for roads and airstrips in remote areas. There are no explicit Commonwealth payments that recognise the defence importance of these assets, although this is partly taken into account in Commonwealth grants for roads and other local government expenditures. Wage subsidies assist in equalising costs so that similar amounts of grants yield similar amounts of road maintenance. The main defence argument for outback wage subsidies is thus an argument for infrastructure subsidies.

Tourism

A number of Australia’s major tourist attractions lie in remote regions, along with a considerable further number of potential attractions. Remote locations that have developed significant trade over the past three decades include Kakadu, Uluru, Broome and Shark Bay. Many less well-known remote locations have also developed tourism as part of their economic base.

Governments have acknowledged the importance of tourism as an economic activity through regulation to maintain standards and assistance with publicity. They also provide the transport infrastructure that underpins tourism. Remote area transport infrastructure is undergoing steady improvement, which has generated additional tourism activity. However, there are plenty of opportunities to develop the industry further.

The current high Australian dollar is proving that tourism is a trade-exposed industry with a claim on outback wage subsidies not dissimilar to that of the pastoral industry. Like defence, it depends on transport infrastructure, not to speak of basic social infrastructure. In this way, it generates an argument for wage subsidies to the provision of outback infrastructure broadly defined.

Lands in traditional ownership

Much effort has been expended over many decades to find an economic base for communities living on traditional lands, including experiments with agriculture, silviculture, pastoral production, tourism and mining. In some places these experiments have succeeded but, scattered across remote Australia, there remain many indigenous communities that depend on welfare payments and, hence, on remote area social security allowances.

Wage subsidies assist the states, local governments and non-profit agencies in provision of welfare-oriented employment (including health services and education). They also assist with the provision of physical infrastructure, including the transport and communication facilities without which there is little hope that ‘real jobs’ will become available. For example, it is sometimes argued that real jobs could arise in land conservation, including from such measures as the recent Carbon Farming Initiative. These developments will require local transport between communities and the places to be conserved, not to speak of transport facilities for tourists to come and admire conservation areas.

Service employment

The industries discussed so far (i.e. the outback export or economic base industries) account for roughly one-third of outback employment (Table 1). The remaining two-thirds comprises employment in various service industries, including transport, trade, education, health services and government services. In discussing the outback export industries, the importance of these service industries has been emphasised: the economic viability of outback export industries (including defence) depends on infrastructure; that is, on the adequacy of the services provided by the service industries. As a general rule these industries are labour intensive (particularly health and education) and stand to benefit from wage subsidies. Indeed, much of the economic case for outback wage subsidies rests on their contribution to infrastructure provision and the indirect contribution this makes to the export industries.

Contribution of zone rebates to outback development

It is argued above that zone rebates have a place in encouraging outback economic development and by this means underwriting the effective occupancy of the Australian continent, both by indigenous communities and by the general population. In particular, wage subsidies are helpful in two ways:

  • by assisting with the provision of infrastructure in the broad sense, so benefiting the economic base industries of the outback and enabling them to fulfil their role in utilising the resources of the outback to the national benefit; and
  • by countering high levels of uninsurable risk in the major outback export industries.

Additional benefits arise because the assistance to infrastructure helps with defence and will potentially contribute to the self-improvement of the remote indigenous communities.

Higher Education Contribution Scheme

We have so far considered zone allowances as primarily an income tax provision. However, the provision could be extended to the Higher EducationContribution Scheme (HECS). HECS has many virtues as a means of financing higher education. It is essentially a tax measure since it relies on income tax assessments to recoup loans, thus avoiding many of the problems of private-sector student loan schemes, although with the corresponding disadvantage that repayment can be avoided by emigration.

An incentive to young professionals to work in remote areas could be provided by the Commonwealth forgoing HECS repayments which would otherwise have been exacted from residents of remote areas.

Costs of living

We now turn to the equity arguments for zone rebates considered by the Cox Inquiry.

Remote area rebates have frequently been defended as compensation for higher costs of living in remote areas. This is most easily argued if one takes the view that the benefit goes to employees: the concession then goes to increase the taxpayer’s disposable income to compensate for higher prices. However, in a free labour market it is likely that price compensation has already been included in the wage package and that the benefit of the rebate goes to employers. In this case, the rebate (partly) compensates employers for the higher costs of labour hire in the remote regions, where these costs relate to the higher cost of living.

The Cox Inquiry took the simple approach. If the taxpayer rather than the employer benefits from the rebate, it is arguably fair that income received should be adjusted for geographic price differentials. Comparing two people on the same cash wage, the one who has to pay higher prices has the lower ability to pay taxes. However, as always, there is a contrary argument. If geographic differentials reflect different costs in service provision or different land costs, they have a function in providing incentives to the efficient location of economic activity. Compensation will blunt the incentives. A taxpayer who objects to the higher prices charged in the remote areas has the option of shifting elsewhere and the incentive argument says that this is exactly what he or she should do; the taxpayer should not be granted a concession. In this conflict of values the Cox Inquiry inclined towards the ‘real income’ or ‘horizontal equalisation’ view. Essentially they argued that the incentive effects were less important than the inequity of depressing the standard of living of outback employees.

It is one thing to claim that the cost of living is higher in remote areas than in some reference area, say the metropolitan areas. It is quite another to give this monetary expression. The following observations are more or less agreed:

  1. Transport costs add to the price of widely-distributed consumer goods in remote regions.
  2. In small remote towns there are further additions due to diseconomies of small scale, including less than truckload shipments and/or high warehousing costs for larger shipments. Consumers can avoid these costs only at the considerable expense of driving to a larger town.
  3. Remote area consumers are further disadvantaged by the limited range of goods and services on offer.
  4. Housing cost differentials are more complicated; in general, the unimproved value of the underlying land is less than in metropolitan areas but the costs of construction are greater.
  5. Construction costs are particularly high in small towns that lack resident tradespeople, since transport and accommodation costs have to be met.

The Cox Inquiry noted that the ABS had, in the late 1970s, prepared an experimental index of relative retail prices for food across Australia’s major metropolitan areas and a large selection of country towns. Where a weighted average of prices in the eight capital cities was set at 100 this index yielded values of 110 in Cunnamulla and Charleville, the only two centres assessed in South West Queensland. It was only in the Pilbara that larger and smaller centres could be compared, with an index value of 115 in Port Hedland and 136 in Marble Bar. Judging by this differential, Thargomindah would probably turn in a value around 125. The index was experimental and was not continued, but the differentials thus documented accord with current anecdotal experience in South West Queensland: not only for food but for consumer prices generally. The main exception is housing costs, which depend on the balance of supply and demand in each town.

A fundamental feature of price indices is that they cover the same ‘basket of goods and services’ for each comparison. This is a bold assumption over time (new commodities are constantly entering consumers’ shopping trolleys and old items exiting) and it is an even bolder assumption when comparing places. Consumers in remote areas have different opportunities to those in the metropolitan areas: less choice, perhaps, but also some choices that are not available in metropolitan areas (a rodeo perhaps). Again, restricted choice itself has benefits: there is no need to agonise over choice and perhaps there is more time for simple entertainment, like yarning over a beer or playing participant sport. Some remote area residents have rejected the rat race; they don’t have to keep up with the Joneses and consider that they pay less for a better life than they would have had in the cities. More generally, people confronted with different price patterns adjust to those patterns; they buy more of what is relatively cheap and don’t agonise over what is relatively expensive or not available. The resulting difficulties of measurement are known in economics as the ‘index number problem’, which means that comparisons apply to ‘typical’ people and not to those who have taken particular advantage of the opportunities available in different places or at different times. When metropolitan and remote areas are compared, the result regarding a ‘typical person’ is robust: the cost of living is, indeed, higher in remote areas.

Even so, the difficulties of measuring cost of living differentials and the lack of up-to-date evidence have caused people to appeal to an alternative differential (i.e. differences in access to government services) as a way of quantifying outback disadvantage. This does not mean that the cost of living argument has lost its force; rather, it has been supplemented with a related argument pointing in the same direction.

Isolation and services

In 1945 zone allowances were, in part, justified as compensation for isolation. This is a somewhat slippery concept. In so far as it was desirable to compensate for isolation so that it would be easier to recruit labour to the developmental task in the remote regions, the argument collapses back to populating the north, decentralisation and the exploitation of remote resources already discussed. However, the argument can take another tack: zone rebates can be seen as (possibly token) compensation for the reduced range of government services available to the residents of remote regions and/or as partial compensation for the transport and telecommunications costs occasioned in accessing essential services. Here the appeal is to another of the classic principles of taxation, the benefit principle, which argues that taxes should be related to the value of benefits received. Remote area residents receive less benefit and, therefore, should pay less. Alternatively, the private (mainly transport) costs of accessing government services are greater and there should be compensation for this. Those who make this argument tend to assume that taxpayers receive the benefit of the rebate, but like cost compensation the argument can also be applied when the benefit is assumed to go to employers. The rebate then compensates employers for the extra wages they have to pay so that their employees can access services.

In 1981 it was argued that zone rebates were an unfair way of compensating for service access costs because they were available only to taxpayers and not to people who fell below the tax threshold. This argument is no longer valid. The provision of remote area allowances to social security recipients in 1984 means that most remote area residents now gain compensation.

Remote area residents have two main ways of dealing with the problems of service access. These are:

  1. Bundling trips: Visits to service outlets, other than emergency visits, can be bundled together and satisfied in a single ‘trip to town’.
  2. Accepting a more limited range of choice and a concentration on the quality of local facilities. Thus, metropolitan residents who disapprove of the education provided in their local high school send their children somewhere else. Residents of towns that are not large enough to support multiple schools are much more likely to campaign for an improvement in standards in their local school.

By contrast with the lack of recent work on cost of living differences, two studies on geographic differences in service provision have been published since the Cox Inquiry.

In 1997 the Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care commissioned the National Key Centre for Social Applications of GIS to develop an accessibility/remoteness index for Australia. There are two main inputs to this calculation:

  • a list of urban centres classified into five population groups, 1,000–5,000, 5,000–18,000, 18,000–48,000, 48,000–250,000 and >250,000; and
  • a matrix of road distances.

For each ‘populated locality’ in Australia, road distances are calculated to the nearest urban centre in each of the five groups. This distance is divided by the average all-Australia distance for the category. The five scores thus obtained are added and used to define five ‘remoteness area classes’. (That there are five scores and five classes is coincidental: the researchers could have varied either number.) The remoteness area classes vary from ‘major city’ through ‘inner regional’, ‘outer regional’ and ‘remote’ to ‘very remote’. (Note the peculiar use of ‘regional’ in this nomenclature to mean neither metropolitan nor remote.) The ABS has adopted this index as a means of classifying the remoteness of localities throughout Australia.

The fundamental assumption underlying the remoteness index is that service availability depends on town size and that increments in service availability occur at the five population thresholds used in the classification. Using the same general methodology, a different size classification would yield different patterns. Similarly, different weights could be awarded to the size categories. Work by NIEIR for the Farm Institute provides a check on these assumptions, since this work did not take urban centre size as a proxy for service availability but instead plotted actual locations of service delivery and estimated the distances residents would have to travel to visit the nearest outlet for a standard list of services, mainly in the education, health and welfare fields. For some services, the second-nearest and third-nearest (and so on) facilities were included at reduced weight, to allow a modicum of choice. Not surprisingly, in view of the major differences between services provided in the heavily and sparsely populated regions, both the ABS and NIEIR studies supported two conclusions:

  1. The accessibility of services differs systematically between rural locations (defined as all settlements of less than a thousand population) and urban locations. (The ABS has been understandably reluctant to publish remoteness indicators for other than very small geographic areas because the typical larger area, say a local government area, contains a range of locations that often have significant differences in accessibility to services).
  2. The accessibility of services also differs systematically with distance from the major metropolitan areas. This differential is particularly marked if emphasis is placed on choice of service outlets; for example, only the metropolitan areas have multiple universities.

 The NIEIR study distinguished between widespread and centralised services. The former are available locally in most country towns complete with a choice of service providers where this is appropriate (it is not appropriate, for example, for police services), while centralised services are provided mainly in the metropolitan areas and not in the country. Centralised services include tertiary education and specialised health services, and also, surprisingly, secondary education, which is available in the typical country town but with very limited choice.

Judged by employment, centralised services account for roughly one-third of the public services provided in Australia. Because of their metropolitan concentration, they account for the way in which service accessibility declines with distance from the main cities. However, even if attention is confined to the widespread services and the micro-variation between towns and the countryside is averaged out, the NIEIR service accessibility index generates patterns that largely accord with the ABS remoteness index. According to the ABS the ‘very remote’ area comprises: the Australian north coast from Shark Bay nearly to Cooktown, except around Darwin; the coast of the Great Australian Bight; and all the country between these two coasts except for the immediate surrounds of Alice Springs and Mount Isa, which are merely ‘remote’. In South West Queensland all places west of Mitchell are considered ‘very remote’, while the ‘remote’ area is a strip between the ‘very remote’ area and a line running from roughly Dirrinbandi to Miles.

The NIEIR study helps to place these patterns in context. According to this study a typical journey from a residence to the nearest outlet of a widespread service (or nearest several outlets in the case of services like GPs where choice is important) will take more or less the following times:

  • 12 minutes in Brisbane;
  • approximately 12 minutes in Dalby but more like 40 minutes in the rural parts of Western Downs;
  • just under 2 hours in Roma (due to restricted choice in some services) and over 2 hours in the rest of Maranoa;
  • just under 3 hours in Charleville (again, mainly due to restricted local choice) and over 3 hours in the rest of Murweh and in Paroo; and
  • nearly 5 hours for residents of Quilpie and Bulloo Shires.

These estimates can be roughly translated into dollar costs. Without imputing any cost to residents’ time, the typical metropolitan service access trip costs around $3. It costs less in towns like Bundaberg due to less congestion and lower car parking costs. At the other end of the distribution, the typical remote area trip costs around $50. As already pointed out, remote area residents manage these accessibility costs by restricting choice, by bundling trips and simply by doing without (e.g. by forgoing education).

To a large extent the superior accessibility of essential services in the metropolitan areas and provincial cities is due to the inexorable logic of economies of scale. An approach that emphasises economic efficiency narrowly defined would leave it at that: services are cheaper to provide in large centres and if citizens want good services they should shift to these centres. (Never mind if the shift causes congestion and increases land costs.) However, the Queensland Government endeavours to guarantee equality of service access to all its citizens, if necessary by bearing transport costs and also by upholding service standards in remote areas to overcome the need for choice and duplication.

Given this policy, is there any need for zone rebates and the complementary social security allowances as contributions towards service access costs? Whatever the good intentions of the state governments, remote area residents bear significant service access costs that have to be met from their own pockets. The zone rebates can be interpreted as a contribution towards basic mobility (e.g. car ownership, assumed by service providers). In addition, accessibility costs for essential services can be taken as proxy for accessibility disadvantages more generally – those which we have already considered as cost of living disadvantages or, more broadly, the costs of a minimum level of engagement with society as a whole – those costs which, in the broad social welfare literature, are called the costs of belonging.

The Cox Inquiry argued that poor service accessibility and high costs of living together provided an equity argument for zone allowances. At the very least, accessibility calculations help to identify the affected areas and the size of the disability. Given that the prime purpose of social security is to provide minimum

incomes to people who have no other income source, equity arguments apply particularly strongly to the recipients of remote area allowances, but also apply to income earners in general.

Zone boundaries

When the system was inaugurated in 1945, the then Treasurer, Mr Chifley, said that the zone boundaries took into account latitude, rainfall, distance from centres of population, density of population, predominant industries, rail and road services and the cost of food and groceries. Unfortunately, the exact criteria used in the demarcation (if there were any) have been lost.

The only general change to date in the zone boundaries occurred in 1955 when the boundary of zone A was extended south to the 26th parallel, so conveniently including the whole of the Northern Territory within zone A. As noted above, special zones were introduced in 1981.

A comparison of the current zone map with the ABS remoteness/accessibility index broadly mapped, and similarly with the NIEIR/Farm Institute service accessibility index, shows several major divergences. We consider first the zone A/zone B differential:

  1. Although Darwin is somewhat disadvantaged (according to the ABS it ranks as ‘outer regional’) its level of remoteness is well short of that in the typical zone A location. It might be added that Darwin has now developed a broad industry structure and is no longer dependent on the prosperity of a limited number of export industries exposed to fluctuating world prices.
  2. Similar considerations apply to the Queensland coast between Mackay and Cairns, which is included in zone B despite ‘outer regional’ status.
  3. There is essentially no difference in remoteness between zone A and B locations either side of the 26th parallel. No remoteness gradient runs along this line, nor is there any noticeable difference in industry composition either side (although it is roughly the northern limit for sheep).
  4. Apart from Darwin and the Queensland coast, zones A and B taken together are remarkably similar to ‘very remote Australia’ as defined by the ABS and confirmed by NIEIR. This applies whether remoteness is defined in terms of distance from services, distances from towns or thin industry structure arising from a lack of arable land.

By contrast, apart from Mount Isa, Alice Springs, Kalgoorlie and Esperance, the special zones are not recognisable in the ABS remoteness map, nor are they to be found in the NIEIR calculations. For example, in Queensland, Charleville and Longreach are each responsible for large circles in which residents are not entitled to special zone allowances, but in both instances the typical trip to access a widespread service from within the town is rated at around 2 hours and from within the excluded circle is closer to 3 hours. Among the isolated centres in Queensland, only Mount Isa is large enough, and has a sufficient range of services, to produce a significant improvement in accessibility. This suggests two conclusions:

  1. A town population of 2,500 is too low to produce significant improvements in accessibility in an otherwise remote area. Judging by the populations of Alice Springs, Mount Isa and Kalgoorlie, the cut-off appears to be more like 15,000.
  2. The radius of 250 road km is too long. Accessibility drops rapidly with distance from urban centres.

 

There is a strong case for redefining the zones to take these findings into account. The exclusion of Darwin, Mackay, Townsville and Cairns and the adjacent coast, plus an extension of the eligibility period from 6 to 10 months, would go a long way towards financing the redrawing of zone boundaries. An outback zone could be based on ‘very remote’ Australia as defined by the ABS. A new fringe outback zone could serve as a transition area and also accommodate towns of 15,000 plus population which would otherwise be located within the outback zone. The special zones would be abolished. It is suggested that the rebate for the outback zone would be the current special zone rebate, updated, while the rebate for the marginally outback zone would be the current zone A rebate, updated. The social security remote area allowance would be available to permanent residents of the outback zone and possibly, at reduced rates, to permanent residents of the marginal outback.

Value of the allowance/rebate

When introduced the zone A allowance was set at £40 but in 1947 it was increased to £120, a considerable concession at a time when workers were typically paid around £500 a year (average earnings per railway employee were £477 in 1948–1949). In conjunction with the schedule of marginal rates, this increased disposable incomes by 3 to 4 per cent compared with charging the full income tax to workers in zone A. The zone A deduction was indexed sporadically and in 1958–1959, after an increase, produced increases in disposable income of the order of 6 per cent for workers on average weekly earnings. The additional deductions for dependants meant that the proportion was broadly similar for taxpayers with and without dependants. From 1959, however, there was a pronounced reluctance to index the allowances, later rebates, for inflation.

The Cox Inquiry failed to produce any indexation of the rebates but its recommendations to raise the loading for dependants and introduce special zones were implemented. As a result, in the 1981–1982 tax year zone rebates produced the following increases in real incomes (calculated, for convenience, on the assumption that the allowance benefits the taxpayer rather than the employer).

  1. For a taxpayer on average weekly earnings living in zone A, an increase in disposable income of approximately 1.8 per cent. Due to the dependant allowances, this increase was roughly the same for all levels of dependants.
  2. For a taxpayer on the minimum wage living in zone A, an increase in disposable income of approximately 2.7 per cent. Increases for taxpayers with dependants were somewhat less because they ran out of tax to offset the rebate against.
  3. For a taxpayer on average weekly earnings living in a special zone: an increase in disposable income of 6.3 per cent (9.4 per cent for a taxpayer on the minimum wage).

The two dissenting members of the Cox Committee would both have made more generous allowances available:

  1. Mr Kerr, a rebate sufficient to raise the disposable incomes of taxpayers earning average weekly earnings in the special zone by 12.6 per cent (18.8 per cent if on the minimum wage); and
  2. Mr Slater, a rebate sufficient to raise the disposable incomes of taxpayers earning average weekly earnings in a revised zone A by 16.8 per cent (22.2 per cent if on the minimum wage).

The rebates were increased in 1984, 1985, 1992 and 1993, but since then the zone A rebate has remained at $338 plus a 50-per cent loading on dependant rebates. Due to growth in earnings and lack of indexation of the rebate, its value has now been eroded to an increase of 0.8 per cent in the disposable income of a zone A resident without dependants receiving average weekly earnings. The value of the rebate for a taxpayer without dependants working in the special zone now stands at an increase in disposable income of 2.7 per cent.

The value of the remote area allowance for social security recipients stood in 2011 at an increase of 2.6 per cent in the disposable income of a single pensioner and 3 per cent in the disposable income of a couple.

The real value of zone rebates has been falling since

1993, which accords with Treasury’s preference for removing concessional tax offsets. Indeed, the failure to review the zone rebate might indicate satisfaction with the current non-indexed benefit: from Treasury’s point of view there is a risk that a review will defend the rebate and recommend that it be raised. The present paper has shown that there are, indeed, strong arguments for retaining and increasing the rebate.

Conclusion

It is 4 years since the release of the Henry Report into Australian taxation and its recommendation that remote area tax offsets be reviewed. The review has not taken place and, in the meantime, zone rebates continue to decline in real value.

There remain three arguments for the continuation and updating of zone rebates, including the related social security remote area allowances.

First, support is necessary for remote area economic development. Zone rebates provide partial compensation for the reduction in the competitiveness of remote area export industries, which has occurred as an unintended side-effect of the market-determination of the exchange rate coupled with heavy reliance on monetary policy to counter inflation. Zone rebates also assist in the provision of local infrastructure and support services in the remote areas. This infrastructure is important for the export industries, for defence and for the future of remote indigenous communities. (In discussions of public finance, this is essentially an economic efficiency argument.)

Second, compensation may be justified by the higher prices of necessities in remote areas, particularly food. This is especially important for social security recipients. (In discussions of public finance, this is essentially an ability-to-pay argument.)

Finally, partial compensation may be granted for the costs of accessing government services from remote areas. Although the primary responsibility here lies with service providers, the zone rebates recognise that remote area residents bear a share of these costs. (In discussions of public finance, this is essentially a benefit principle argument.)

This article provides a preliminary discussion of each of these topics and shows that zone rebates can be justified by arguments invoking each of the major principles of taxation. Following through from these arguments, the present paper also suggests that the zones should be updated and the levels of rebate revised. Zone rebates have not been reviewed for three decades. This article has shown that there is a strong case for updating the rebates, subject to a review of eligibility. It is time that the review recommended in the Henry report took place.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

References

Australian Bureau of Statistics (2001), ‘ABS Views on Remoteness’, cat 1244.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra.

Australian Bureau of Statistics (2001), ‘Outcomes of ABS Views on Remoteness Consultation, Australia’, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra.

Australian   Bureau   of   Statistics   (2003),   ‘ASGC Remoteness Classification: Purpose and Use’, Census Paper  No.  03/01,  Australian  Bureau  of  Statistics, Canberra.

Henry et al. (2009), ‘Australia’s Future Tax System: Report to the Treasurer’, December, CanPrint Communications, Canberra.

Hicks, P. (2001), ‘History of the Zone Rebate’, research note no 28, Department of the Parliamentary Library Commonwealth Parliamentary Library.

National Institute of Economic and Industry Research (2009), ‘A Comparison of the Accessibility of Essential Services in Urban and Regional Australia’, report for the Australian Farm Institute.

Public Inquiry into Income Tax Zone Allowances (P. E. Cox, Chairman) (1981), Report, Commonwealth Parliamentary Paper No. 149, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

 

The Macro Melbourne Initiative Discussion Paper

National Economic Review

National Institute of Economic and Industry Research

No. 61 March 2008

The National Economic Review is published four times each year under the auspices of the Institute’s Academic Board.

The Review contains articles on economic and social issues relevant to Australia. While the Institute endeavours to provide reliable forecasts and believes material published in the Review is accurate it will not be liable for any claim by any party acting on such information.

Editor: Dr A. Scott Lowson

© National Institute of Economic and Industry

Research

This journal is subject to copyright. Apart from such purposes as study, research, criticism or review as provided by the Copyright Act no part may be reproduced without the consent in writing of the Institute.

ISSN 0813-9474

The Macro Melbourne Initiative Discussion Paper – a response

Ian Manning, Deputy Executive Director, NIEIR

Abstract

In responding to the Macro Melbourne Initiative Discussion Paper, Ian Manning does not take dispute with it, but rather considers some of the same issues from a slightly different direction.

The professed purpose of the Paper, as indicated in its sub -title, is to develop strategic responses to disadvantage. Despite this, the Paper itself is less ambitious, aiming to describe disadvantage in a way which will “stimulate new thinking on strategic giving and point to possible strategic investments by philanthropic trusts and corporate organizations that would address disadvantage and help prevent social problems arising”. Local Government may be added to the list of interested parties, but neither State nor Commonwealth Governments, whose policies are taken as background.

This Initiative comes 23 years after the Commonwealth adopted broadly economic rationalist policies. Despite two bursts of economic growth in that time, punctuated by severe recession, Ian Manning concludes that such growth has redistributed, rather than alleviated, poverty while generating two new discontents – those arising from over commitment and the more subtle dangers of workaholism. Alarmingly, although there has been a decade of continuous economic growth, Ian manning concludes that the balance sheet has indications that this cannot continue forever.

Professor Henderson’s legacy

The study is firmly in the intellectual tradition of established in Australia by Professor Henderson in his studies of poverty three to four decades ago. It equates disadvantage with poverty broadly defined, and notes the association between disadvantage and membership of disability groups – using the word disability in a broader sense than is common today. The importance of disability groups is twofold. First, the opportunities for poverty reduction vary between disability groups. Different policies will be appropriate for each group, particularly as regards services. Second, disability group membership provides a proximate reason for people being poor, and hence a reason why they should be assisted through public policy and not left to their own devices.

The disability groups mentioned in the Macro Melbourne study follow much the same list as that established by Professor Henderson, though there has been some updating of euphemisms and considerable change in the relative size of the groups. Going back to Henderson’s disability groups, we find the following.

• Indigenous poverty remains as intractable as ever.

• The aged are growing in numbers and still have relatively low incomes, but in relation to the poverty line pension rates are a little more generous than they were in Henderson’s day.

• There are fewer large intact families than there were thirty years ago, and the financial position of large families has improved due to increased social security assistance.

• Recent migrants are much more strongly divided into a skilled group, who are prospering, and an unskilled, mainly refugee group, who face considerable difficulties in establishing themselves in Australia.

• The transition from childhood to adulthood has not become any easier, and significant numbers of young people are poor.

• The number of single parent families has increased, and there is still a high incidence of poverty among them.

• Deinstitutionalisation has increased the number of people with disabilities living in the community. To this group may be added the many who have acquired physical and mental disabilities due to prolonged unemployment.

• The number of unemployed workers has burgeoned. This group tends to have low cognitive and/or social skills, and overlaps with a new group of working poor, whose earnings are low and precarious.

In summary, compared to the era of full employment, much more trouble is being caused by unemployment and underemployment, most of which is associated with low skill and/or physical or mental incapacity. On the other hand, large families are no longer a major disability group.

Disadvantaged aspirationals?

Though the Macro Melbourne Initiative for the most part equates disadvantage with poverty, there has been a tendency to add two further disability groups to the list. Both of these are groups whose incomes place them well above the poverty line however updated, but who are in trouble despite this.

• People whose financial affairs are in disarray due to over indebtedness (usually on mortgage) and/or addictive spending (such as heavy gambling or expensive recreational drugs). Let us call these the financially over committed. The perceived needs of this group have received considerable political attention.

• A group which is less obviously in trouble – indeed, which is often held up for public admiration – comprises the workaholics. These are people who devote such long hours to paid work that other aspects of their lives suffer. Sometimes the consequences are born solely by the workaholic – he reaches retirement age and realises that he’s never lived. They become more serious when they are borne by others, particularly the workaholic’s small children. In Henderson’s time it was believed a neglected childhood was usually the result of poverty, but it is now argued that in addition to children neglected due to the stresses of poverty there are a troubling number of rich families in which workaholic parents fail to provide a stable and loving home. This group is likely to have considerable overlap with the financially over committed.

There is considerable prima facie evidence for growth in the numbers of both these groups. Household indebtedness in relation to incomes has risen to unprecedented levels, as has the proportion of the workforce working longer than standard hours and the proportion of married women in paid work. Much less is known about the significance of these phenomena, including

• What has been the relative importance of home purchase, purchase of other consumer durables, education expenses and purchase of current consumables in the generation of over indebtedness?

• What are the associations between over indebtedness and marital instability?

• What scope is there for households to manage over indebtedness?

And, on the much more sensitive issue of workaholics:

• In how many households is the priority given to paid work having negative effects on children? (We must acknowledge that there is lively debate on employer responsibility for the wellbeing of employees’ children, and on the effectiveness and adequacy of child care services.)

Answers to these questions would assist in determining the significance of the two proposed new disability groups. They would also assist in addressing their problems. Since they are not poor, raising incomes further is unlikely to provide much of a solution. It is more likely that their problems can be addressed though better management of resources, particularly time: efficiency in consumption, if you like, as distinct from the present emphasis on efficiency in production. In this context at least some poor people have much to contribute, since they are shining if enforced examples of efficiency in consumption.

 

Economic rationalism and the political incorrectness of poverty

Mention of efficiency in production introduces a further major change since Henderson’s time: the rise of economic rationalism, which has mounted a head-on challenge to Henderson’s strategy of using redistribution to direct portion of the benefits of economic growth to the abolition of poverty. Put baldly, the claim is that economic growth cannot occur without free play for market incentives, including the incentive to work provided by the reality of poverty.

Though it can be traced back to nineteenth century British utilitarianism and developments in economic theory in Britain and continental Europe a hundred years ago, the current main source of economic rationalism is the USA. Its current prominence in Australia has been assisted by American ownership of the media, and much of its attractiveness arises from the perception of the USA as the world’s most successful and powerful country. The Macro Melbourne study does not, however, deal with this big picture; it instead considers economic rationalism through an extended discussion of the definition and measurement of disadvantage, reflecting the debates over poverty measurement of the past three decades. These debates arose because economic rationalists, who extol free markets and deprecate government intervention, wished to counter the argument that poor people should be assisted by social security payments and government financed services. What better way to counter than with the argument that poverty is voluntary, the result of individual choice? They also argue that much poverty is bearable because it is temporary, and that poverty can even be attractive because poor people now are better off materially than the average citizen was a couple of generations ago.

It is a very small step from these arguments to the age old discussion of whether poverty is deserved or not; which also entails whether riches are deserved or not. Questions of the deservedness of riches and poverty have been the stuff of religious debate for millennia, with each religious system developing its own sophisticated account. However, these accounts have limited influence in Australian public debate, since Australia prides itself on being a secular country. Instead, with the adoption by the Commonwealth and, by and large, the state governments of economic rationalism as their guiding ideology, the view that whatever the market delivers is optimal has gained great currency. Both religious people and philosophers point out that economic rationalism has very shallow foundations as a moral theory, but that does not prevent its being used to justify two propositions: all riches gained by competition in the market place are deserved, and equally all poverty generated by unsuccessful competition in the market place is likewise deserved.

The economic rationalists’ stress on individual responsibility for poverty has an undeniable plausibility, at least in some cases. Charity workers have long known that people who aren’t good money managers can easily get themselves into financial difficulties, and that addiction, whether to alcohol, drugs or gambling, makes money management impossible. Direct financial assistance to such people can be problematic. The economic rationalists, living as they do in a world of incentives, go further and argue that people should never receive something for nothing, for to give is to encourage laziness and dependence on handouts. The traditional reply to this is that people can find themselves members of disability groups through no fault of their own, or through understandable fault (there, but for the grace of God, go I). This reply, and the benefits of adjusting assistance to the needs and opportunities of people in their disability groups, accounts for the prominence of such groups in social policy.

Moving outside the traditional disability groups, what is to be said about people who are in financial hardship due to over commitment? The economic rationalist answer is that their over commitment is the result of their free choice to borrow and buy, and that they should work harder and meet their commitments, or, if this is impossible, take advantage of the law of bankruptcy. However, what if over commitment results from people succumbing to the blandishments of sophisticated advertising to spend and to borrow, much of it cleverly designed to exploit common psychological weaknesses, and none of it countered by equally persuasive advertising in favour of saving? This claim strikes at a founding assumption of economic rationalism, which is that consumer desires are autonomous, and consumers accordingly know when to stop. Economic growth, which economic rationalism claims to maximise, is a poor bargain if in the process of pursuing it we develop insatiable desires, and so make ourselves miserable.

Another test case for economic rationalism is the neglected child of workaholic parents. Economic rationalism places high value on paid work, almost to the point where it claims that nothing bad can result from hours spent earning. Further, in the name of freedom it places great emphasis on the importance of personal choice in the labour market: if a parent chooses to work long hours, this is his or her valid choice. Unfortunately, this choice has the potential to result in failure to provide children, particularly small children, with the security and love that they need, with the consequence that the children become socially, and economically, incompetent adults. When people turn out to be unemployable, perhaps this is due to their being the victims of parental, or community, neglect when they were children. Once again the autonomous individual of economic rationalism turns out to be a chimera.

None of these critical observations on economic rationalism denies that people respond to incentives – both gross material incentives and incentives of a more subtle social kind. Kept within its limits by people whose values and priorities do not derive from it, economic rationalism can work wonders in fulfilling needs; but adopted as a primary value system by people who allow it to generate their wants, economic rationalism can result in a downward spiral into misery.

This raises the interesting question of the role of philanthropy in a country committed to economic rationalism. It is worth noting the mainstream economic rationalist view that individual decisions to be generous are legitimate exercises of choice. This is modified by advice that individuals should be careful in their giving, lest they undermine the self reliance of the recipients of their charity. This is good advice, and the disagreements do not begin to arise until the economic rationalists claim that any interference with the pattern of market rewards constitutes an unacceptable incentive.

The Macro Melbourne initiative can be interpreted as aligning philanthropy with the priorities of the prevailing ideology: there is a strong flavour of the economic rationalist pursuit of efficiency in the survey of disadvantage followed by the allocation of assistance to the groups where it can most speedily reduce disadvantage, or even followed by its allocation to the neediest groups. The initiative seeks to increase the efficiency of giving both in targeting and in the selection of strategic projects which will yield high returns in disadvantage allayed. However, there is an aspect to giving which is not economically rational. That occurs where the giver heeds traditional morality and does not count the cost, and certainly does not count the benefits. There is a contradiction between the gift which expects no reward – let not your right hand know what your left hand is doing – and the economically rational mind, with its self centredness and its obsession with a quid pro quo for every transaction. It could well be that the chief value of philanthropy lies in its witness to values other than the self seeking exchange values of economic rationalism.

We have so far covered some fairly fundamental criticisms of the prevailing ideology. There is also a rich vein of criticism based on market failure, and we will now take two examples from the Macro Melbourne Initiative, poor accessibility and the (in)affordability of housing. The Initiative treats these as two dimensions of disadvantage, but does not make a strong connection between the two.

Accessibility and housing affordability

From a geographic point of view, accessibility is best defined as the ease with which one can reach a specific kind of destination from a specific place of origin. The usual place of origin is home, and the usual destinations are workplaces, shops, schools, health services and the like. Sometimes the nearest destination is the most important – say the nearest hospital emergency department – but more often it is important to have access to a variety of similar destinations: a variety of shops, different schools and health services. Variety of possible destinations is most important when one is looking for work: the greater the number of accessible jobs the better. Following these two approaches, accessibility is sometimes measured by distance to the nearest opportunity (this house is 200 metres from a playground; it is 500 metres from a convenience store, and so on), but it can also be measured by the number of possible destinations within a convenient travel time or distance (a house in a trendy suburb may have ten latte bars within walking distance, and, more important, is likely to have several hundred thousand potential workplaces within half an hour’s drive).

In this context, it does not make much sense to speak, as the study does, of the accessibility of public transport. Public transport is not a destination in itself. Rather, in combination with walking, it is a means of transport. Because public transport involves walking and waiting, it is necessarily slower than motoring for all trips bar those where motoring is slowed by severe congestion and parking difficulties. When one measures accessibility by counting potential destinations which can be reached within a given time, the walking and public transport version is inevitably less. It reduces even further if the streets are not perceived as safe for pedestrians. At the limit, nothing is accessible by walking or public transport when one is unwilling to venture beyond the front gate without the protection of a car. This is, perhaps, the position of quite a few children and some old people.

Setting aside such cases of fear, the continuing importance of walking and public transport derives from the following.

• There are people who cannot, or should not, drive. Such people are disadvantaged if they are unable to access important destinations by walking and public transport.

• Motoring is costly, though for decades its cost has fallen relative to average earnings and relative to the social security pension, and it has for many years been included on the list of Australian necessities. However, with indications that fuel costs are beginning to rise, households which can access employment and services by walking and public transport are likely to be increasingly advantaged.

• Walking is healthy. Households are advantaged when they can access destinations on foot, with or without a little help from public transport. By contrast, motoring is dangerous and has a poor crash record.

• En masse, motor vehicles cause congestion. The public costs of providing road space to ease congestion are considerable, as are the public costs of providing car parks. In addition, it has become very difficult to build major activity centres served solely by motor vehicles. An important argument for public transport is that it can support activity centres which are larger and more diversified, yet more compact, than the typical suburban shopping mall, technology park or campus university.

Accessibility from residential areas to various kinds of destination can be enhanced by the following means.

• Shifting to faster transport. The obvious way is by buying a car, but even if one sticks with public transport improvements are possible through more frequent, more direct and more connective services.

• Making sure destinations are near residential areas. The retail sector has been adept at this, though it tends to assume that the only worthwhile customers are those who travel by car. Service administrations have also been conscious of the need to provide outlets that cover Melbourne.

• Conversely, making sure homes are near destinations.

A particular problem area has been the relationship between residential areas and employment opportunities. In the 1950s and 1960s Melbourne added both housing and jobs to its outer suburbs. Many of the jobs were in manufacturing and warehousing, attracted to the outer suburbs by low cost land and good truck roads. The resulting jobs were accessible only by car, but provided valued work opportunities within acceptable time distance for many outer suburban residents. From about 1975 the trend reversed. The emphasis on the knowledge economy resulted in job growth in the CBD and the inner suburbs. Despite the effort to decentralise universities, no significant knowledge hubs have been created in the middle or outer suburbs – a failure which is perhaps related to the policy, noticeable particularly at Commonwealth level, that public investment in transport should concentrate on roads with public transport reduced to a ‘social service minimum’ level. This prevented its being used in the promotion of employment centres. The result was that the difference in job accessibility between the outer and inner suburbs became more acute.

This failure of urban strategy was exacerbated by the deregulated financial sector, which in the 1990s found itself with unlimited funds for lending on residential mortgages. The banks borrowed overseas in Australian dollars at rates which compensated the lenders for the risk of devaluation and were accordingly high by world standards. They were on-lent to Australian households plus a profit margin. Households borrowed willingly, partly because the rates seemed low to people who had been paying two digit interest rates less than a decade before. One result of debt financed demand was a house construction boom, which as usual extended the perimeters of Melbourne. However, poor accessibility to jobs, particularly from the outer suburbs, directed much of this boom into redeveloping the inner and middle suburbs. The result was a classic land boom. One need only add that the land boom was an essential element in the Commonwealth’s economic strategy in the late 1990s. It was the only way in which deregulated markets could deliver economic growth.

The Macro Melbourne Initiative has much to say on housing affordability, but does not trace it to the land boom. Indeed, productivity improvements in house construction have reduced the cost of the built component of housing. The increases in house size which was a public response to this reduction in cost contributed a little to the rise in house prices, but the main component was the cost of land. As always when there is a rise in the price of an asset in widespread ownership, there was a complex pattern of capital gains, all at the expense of new entrants to the market. There is a long tradition in economics that landowners do not deserve the capital gains they make from changes in accessibility patterns.

The result of this double failure – a failure of accessibility planning compounded by macroeconomic policies focused on the short run – is now ensconced in household balance sheets across Melbourne. Some households have achieved capital gains, which they can potentially cash in by retirement migration to some place where housing is cheaper – though demand from people Sydney and Melbourne has raised house values in many of the favoured destinations. Other households have achieved high debt to income ratios, making them vulnerable to even the slightest increase in interest rates or decline in earnings. Again, were there to be a downwards correction in the urban land market, some of these households will find themselves with negative net worth. Their best hope is for a burst of inflation, such as benefited the post war generation of home buyers. Needless to say, inflation is not in fashion at the moment, though it is quite probable that Australia will suffer from it as its dollar slides in value in order to correct the balance of payments deficit.

Given present imbalances, a relatively benign macroeconomic scenario would be one in which nominal Melbourne urban land values are maintained while inflation reduces real household indebtedness. Household consumption is likely to be restrained while people save to repay their debts, but overseas demand, from people seeking property ownership in what remains a liveable city, could be important. A much less pleasant scenario would have interest rates rising, which could lead to a classic recession complete with non-performing loans and the resulting financial institution instability.

From the point of view of young people seeking affordable housing, the second of these scenarios would have the benefit of undoing some of the 1990s increase in land prices. For a while this would be offset by higher interest rates – there could even be a return to the 1980s housing affordability problem, which arose out of deposit gaps and high repayments in the early years of borrowing. Higher unemployment would also make life unpleasant, but the eventual result would be land prices no longer out of kilter with household incomes. The alternative is more of a ‘soft landing’ scenario, where the necessary realignment of prices takes longer. Over this longer period, there would be more scope for government policy on urban development to start affecting relative accessibility, with possible reductions in the location rents so prominent in the recent land boom.

The examples of accessibility and house affordability both contain elements of market failure. The inability of the land market to carry out strategic town planning complements the tendency of financial markets to create financial assets and liabilities which are out of kilter with the underlying ‘real’ position. Both land and financial markets perform well in the allocation of resources at the microeconomic level, but can generate great trouble at the macroeconomic level.

Conclusion 

The Macro Melbourne Initiative comes 25 years after Mr Keating’s conversion to economic rationalism. During that period Australia has experienced two bursts of economic growth, punctuated by a severe recession. This growth has redistributed rather than alleviated poverty, and has generated at least two new discontents: the discontent arising from over commitment, and the more subtle danger of workaholism. Despite these discontents, economic rationalist polices are being pursued with vigour, in the belief that they guarantee steady economic growth. A more sober judgement is that the trade cycle is too fundamental a feature of capitalist economies to claim that it has been eliminated on the basis of a ten year absence.

Even if the trade cycle stays its hand, in the 22 years to 2030, the Melbourne Community Foundation is likely to have no shortage of disadvantages to address. These include both the traditional disadvantages of poverty and the newer discontents which have arisen where economic rationalism has exceeded its boundaries. The Macro Melbourne Initiative is to be commended for charting the territory.

Energy and Environment (NER 66)

National Economic Review

National Institute of Economic and Industry Research

No. 66               September 2011

The National Economic Review is published four times each year under the auspices of the Institute’s Academic Board.

The Review contains articles on economic and social issues relevant to Australia. While the Institute endeavours to provide reliable forecasts and believes material published in the Review is accurate it will not be liable for any claim by any party acting on such information.
Editor: Kylie Moreland

National Institute of Economic and Industry Research

This journal is subject to copyright. Apart from such purposes as study, research, criticism or review as provided by the Copyright Act no part may be reproduced without the consent in writing of the relevant Institute.

ISSN 0813-9474

Energy and environment

Graham Armstrong, NIEIR

Abstract

This paper reviews the global and Australian developments during the months leading to the Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference in Cancun, Mexico (COP-16) in December 2010. The legislation progress and climate action developments of Brazil, Indonesia, Africa, New Zealand, the United States and Australia are reviewed.

Introduction

In the year following the Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) Conference in Copenhagen (COP-15) and the associated disappointments, a range of UNFCC subsidiary bodies and non-UNFCC organisations met to advance global negotiations leading up to COP-16, Mexico.

Some progress has been made in relation to the major issues, including: the future of the Kyoto Protocol, the positions of China and India, the status policy after the mid-term elections, the financing of reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), the prospective roles of regulations, carbon taxes and emissions trading systems, the 2020 and beyond targets, the adaptation strategies and the outlook for abatement technologies.

Prospects for Cancun

As this paper was being finalised (1 December 2010) there had been very little discussion on COP-16, Cancun, Mexico, particularly compared to the lead up to Copenhagen the previous year.

On a recent (August–September 2010) trip, Graham Armstrong held discussions with two respected climate change observers on the prospects for Cancun.

Erik Haites, Margaree Consultants, Toronto, Ontario, Canada

Erik is an economist with a long-established (30 years) consultancy based in Toronto. Over the past 15 years, Erik has been involved in climate change policy at both national and international levels. Erik is a principal advisor to the UNFCC and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and, as such, is in an excellent position to comment on global climate change policy trends.

Approaching COP-16 in Cancun, Mexico in December 2010, Erik sees the global institutional structure for addressing climate change developing along some promising lines. Erik recognises the divergent views of the groups involved: the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, the Small Island States, Africa, China, Brazil, Russia, India, China, the United States and the European Union (EU).

Erik believes that despite much pessimism over Copenhagen and the potential outcomes from Cancun, there are drivers for some progress at Cancun:

  • There will be a desire, overall, not to have two successive COP failures.
  • Actions, agreements and negotiations outside the UNFCC, for example in China, sub-national progress in North America and Australia, and developments on energy efficiency improvement (EEI) and renewables, are progressing greenhouse gas abatement (GHGA) and there is a trend towards concensus on the need for and forms of a global agreement.
  • There is growing acceptance, albeit grudging by the EU, and others, that there will need to be a differentiated approach to obtain ‘approval’ from the United States.

Perhaps Erik is too optimistic, as indeed he must be as an advisor to the UNFCC/IPCC, but he is deeply involved with the global process and, accordingly, his views are very important.

Erik emphatically believes that China has the most progressive and aggressive climate change policies, despite the general view that China’s growth in emissions is out of control. He views Chinese policies, for trade and overall environmental disruption concern reasons, as having a significant impact on reducing emissions growth in China and globally.

On overall energy policy and trends Erik believes that, in line with the 2010 International Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy Outlook:

  • energy use is stable or declining in the OECD;
  • energy security is of major concern in most parts of the world;
  • China/India energy use will continue to grow, although not as rapidly as GDP;
  • excess supply capacity is exerting downward pressure on energy prices; and
  • energy infrastructure requirements are increasing in the United States (declining market) due to ageing assets compared, on an energy use basis (i.e. investment compared with energy use), with China (an expanding market), where infrastructure is overall of a newer vintage.

On technologies, Erik sees carbon capture and storage (CCS) and nuclear costs as increasing in real terms compared with solar, for which costs are declining in real terms.

Rod Janssen, Energy/Climate Change Consultant to the European Union, Brussels and to the European Council for an Energy Efficient Economy

Rod is a Canadian who worked for the Federal Energy Department in Ottawa and for the IEA. Since 1982 he has been an independent consultant. He is now based in Paris.

Rod recently acted as rapporteur for the European Capacity Building Initiative (ECBI) funded by Sweden to encourage dialogue and action on climate change action in developed and developing (e.g. African) countries. At an ECBI meeting in Oxford, UK in early September, Rod’s general impression was that no agreement was likely in Cancun in December 2010 or even in South Africa in 2011. Rod believes that an agreement might not be reached until 2020! He sees the United States as the major problem due to the lack of concensus in relation to political action. However, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) CO2 regulations starting with power stations might provide some progress. In contrast to the United States, China has taken considerable climate change GHGA action even though China is wary of political action at a global level.

The EU is becoming more aggressive in relation to coal phase-out, renewables and aviation, but has been slower to act on EEI. There has been increased emphasis on energy security (gas from Russia), and on CCS and renewables.

Reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation

One positive outcome of the COP-15, Copenhagen in December 2009 was the pledge by some wealthier countries to provide US$4–5 billion by 2012 for REDD in developing countries. Much more support will be needed for a significant REDD result, but beyond 2012 the funding mechanism is uncertain. Currently, forest carbon credits are not accepted in the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS), but this is likely to change as REDD develops stringent, credible and audited credits.

The Informal Working Group on Interim Financing for REDD estimates that a REDD investment of US$100 billion by 2025 could cut deforestation by 25 per cent: this is the equivalent of 3 million ha of forest saved and 7 Gt of carbon emission reductions a year, approximately 17 per cent of total global emissions. The estimated cost was US$2.4/tonne of CO2e.

However,  Indonesia’s  National  Council  on  Climate Change puts the opportunity cost of foregoing oil palm plantations at US$30/tonne of CO2e, still a relatively low cost. For example, CCS is probably not viable at under US$75–115/tonne of CO2e.

Concerns

Avoided deforestation might not be permanent, particularly where there is a risk of climate-induced forest dieback.

In addition, REDD funds will inevitably go to the most ‘avid’ deforesters, such as Indonesia, which might create an incentive for other countries to engage in deforestation. Hence, REDD will have to be applied on a large comprehensive scale, even if the payments vary.

Brazil

Brazil has been developing REDD for 2 years and has received US$1 billion in funding from Norway. The payment formula favours Brazil’s Amazon states with higher deforestation rates. However, a state’s record on meeting REDD commitments is also taken into account when determining payments.

In Brazil, REDD faces substantial challenges, including, for example, forest title issues. Unowned forests are unprotected, leading to Brazilian grileiros (land grabbers) turning rainforest into pasture.

In the Brazil State of Para in 2009, 20 ranches were identified as operating on illegally cleared land, and selling meat to well-known retailers, such as Wal-Mart and Carrefour. The ranchers were fined US$1.2 billion in total and the retailers were threatened with fines, unless they were able to verify legal supply chains.

As a result, abattoirs in the region only deal with legal suppliers. Greenpeace has also acted on a report on Amazon beef and deforestation, linking beef and leather from the region with companies such as Adidas, Nike, Toyota, Gucci and Kraft. Many of these companies have agreed to work with Greenpeace, thus putting pressure on developing countries’ to adopt developed world standards in the supply chain, and thereby raising the prospects for an effective REDD program to reduce global emissions.

Indonesia

Even where governments own a forest, the degradation results can be similar. An estimated 63 per cent of Indonesia’s West Kalimantan national parks were illegally cleared by loggers between 1985 and 1990.
Unclear ownership is a barrier to the effective land use planning necessary for REDD. For example, in Indonesia, palm oil can be produced on degraded land (40 million ha available) rather than on forested land. Between 1990 and 2005, Indonesia planted over 3 million ha of oil palms, with over half of it on freshly cleared land.

When forests are on peat deposits, the problems are substantial as peat land can store over 5,000t CO2e/ha and, when drained for cultivation, greenhouse gases are emitted for over 20 years.

Indonesia’s peat area plantations contribute less than 1 per cent of GDP but nearly 20 per cent of emissions. With Indonesia planning to double the area for oil palms, emissions could increase greatly, but this provides a REDD opportunity through palm oil expansion on degraded land. A 2-year moratorium on commercial deforestation resulted in US$1 billion in funding from Norway for REDD in Indonesia.

Corruption also poses a threat to REDD success. Indonesia’s forest ministry, claiming control of over 75 per cent of the country’s area, is suspect. In the 1990s, over US$5 billion disappeared from the national reforestation fund: saving trees is not a priority at the national or state level.

Africa

In Africa, the problems are even greater. National forest is virtually non-existent, land titles are vague and corruption rife. However, aerial surveillance can help and REDD payments tied to improvement in practices can provide an incentive to improve performance. REDD dollars can be partly provided for improved land use control and inventory programs, and to encouraging local forest management. Overall, the prospects for REDD are not encouraging, but there are some grounds for optimism for REDD to contribute to reducing global CO2e emissions.

New Zealand climate change policy

On 1 July 2010, the New Zealand Government introduced an ETS. The ETS is expected to cost New Zealand households an average A$2.45/week. This cost will be derived from of an increase in petrol prices of A$0.025/litre and an increase in average electricity prices of 5 per cent.

A major reason for introducing an ETS was concern that without it New Zealand could have been subject to trade sanctions, a concern that appears to be absent from the Australian climate change debate. Revenue from the ETS will be used for reforestation.

The ETS covers emissions from six greenhouse gases: CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFC and SF6. The ETS will eventually incorporate all sectors of the economy, and, by 2015, all greenhouse gases will be included. The ETS is internationally linked and conforms to current climate change rules. Self-assessments will be undertaken for monitoring, reporting and verifying emissions produced by liable parties.

During a transition phase between 1 July 2010 and 31 December 2012, liable parties will be able to buy emission permits from the government for a fixed price of NZ$25/t CO2e. Also in this period, parties in the energy, industrial and liquid fossil fuel sectors will only have to surrender one emission unit for every 2 tonnes of emissions they produce, effectively halving the costs. Parties can surrender international permits, such as Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) carbon emission reductions (CERs) and EU assigned amount units. The ETS will eventually cover the following sectors: forestry, transport fuels, electricity generation, industrial processes, synthetic gases, agriculture and waste. Forests planted after 1989 can produce emission units for CO2 stored or removed from the atmosphere.

Most participants are required to meet their obligations under the scheme by surrendering emission units. Surrendering a unit means it cannot be used again: for example, it cannot be also given to another participant.

Some participants, such as those with forests planted after 1989, are able to earn emission units for carbon dioxide stored or removed from the atmosphere by their activities.

The liable party is not necessarily the business at the actual point where emissions are produced. For example, a coal producer would be required to surrender units for the coal it sells, even though the actual emissions will occur when the coal is burned.

Alongside those who are required to participate in the scheme and those who can opt in, other people may also hold and trade emission units. These parties are commonly referred to as ‘secondary market traders’.

Businesses participate in the ETS in different ways.

  • Some have a legal obligation to acquire and surrender emission units to cover their direct greenhouse gas emissions or the emissions associated with their products. These participants are generally ‘upstream’ operators: for example, transport fuel producers or importers of products.
  • Some have the choice to apply to opt into the scheme if they carry out a relevant GHGA activity.
  • Some receive free emission units that can be used to meet their own obligations or to sell to other firms: for example, landowners with forests planted before 1990.
  • Some do not have to take part in the ETS, but can trade emission units in the same way that stockbrokers or real estate agents trade in their respective markets. These are secondary market traders. They may have specialist expertise in linking those who can reduce their emissions and have spare emission units with those wishing to buy these units.

Liable parties are required to:

  • monitor, record and report activities that produce or remove greenhouse gas emissions; and
  • surrender to the government emission units to cover emissions associated with their activities each year.

Secondary market traders, such as brokers, can also hold and trade emission units, but do not have to monitor and report emissions and are not required to surrender emission units. They can hold and trade emission units to take advantage of opportunities in the financial market.

Examples of emissions trading scheme participation

  • Firm A is an oil company. It needs to buy emission units to cover the greenhouse gas emissions it is responsible for.
  • Firm B is a large forestry company that receives emission units for land it is planting in forests. It is also cutting down some trees, leading to emissions for which it has to surrender emission units. Initially, Firm B has a shortfall of units,
  •  Firm C is a major industrial user of electricity for which it has to surrender emission units. To help Firm C adapt to these higher costs, the government gives Firm C a free allocation of emission units, which Firm C can sell to offset its increased electricity costs.

Under the ETS, Firm A and Firm B can both buy Firm C’s units in the short term to cover their emissions.

Because it now has to pay higher energy prices, Firm C finds it has lower costs if it invests in energy efficiency.

Over time, as its forest matures, Firm B has spare units available and can sell them to Firm A.

Some participants will be eligible to receive a free allocation of emission units from the government to cover some of their emissions.

The New Zealand Emission Unit Register (NZEUR) will record:

  • who holds emission units and the number of units that they hold;
  • transfers of emission units between holders both within the NZEUR and between international unit registers; and
  • emission units surrendered by participants to meet their obligations under the ETS.

As with a share registry, the NZEUR does not record information about the price or financial value of emission unit trades, nor does it provide a mechanism for exchanging cash for units traded.

Sectors will be introduced to the ETS gradually over a period of 7 years, starting in 2008.

The transport fuels, electricity production, industrial processes and waste sectors are able to start voluntarily reporting their greenhouse gas emissions 2 years before their obligations to surrender emission units begin, and are required to report their emissions 1 year before. Those in the agriculture sector can voluntarily report emissions 4 years before their obligations to surrender emission units begin and are required to do so 3 years before.

Table 1 E and E NER 66

 The Ministry of Economic Development manages the day-to-day running of the ETS. It is the main compliance and enforcement agency. It also runs the NZEUR.

The  Ministry  for  the  Environment  administers  the Climate Change Response Act, which established the ETS. It is also responsible for developing emission unit allocation plans and regulations under the Act, except for those relating to the forestry sector, which are managed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

The ETS will be reviewed once during each international commitment period: the review must be completed 12 months before the end of each period. The review will consider impacts of the ETS on the economy, how it links with other trading schemes, and any social, economic and environmental impacts, such as the effects on biodiversity. The review will be conducted by an independent panel of experts.

Penalties will be imposed on liable parties for incomplete and incorrect emissions data or if all required permits are not surrendered, at a rate of NZ$30/t CO2e plus a requirement to acquire and surrender liability permits.

Progress of the New Zealand ETS should be closely followed in Australia.

United States climate change policy

The United States Administration has abandoned efforts to limit United States greenhouse gas emissions through a cap and trade ETS. Instead, at this stage, the 27 July Energy Bill only includes measures such as subsidies for home insulation and natural gas vehicles due to the seeming impossible task of gaining Senate approval for the comprehensive Bill passed in the House last year.

Like Abbott in Australia, Republicans and some Democrats view carbon pricing as detrimental to the economy, especially when economic recovery is weak. In addition, representatives from coal states are concerned about the impact of carbon pricing on their constituents. Polling indicates low levels of belief in the seriousness of the impacts of global warming.

However, despite the demise at this time of a United States ETS, there has not been complete United States inaction on climate change. Under the Clean Air Act, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that regulations could be applied to greenhouse gas emissions and, therefore, that the United States EPA could decide on their public health impacts.

The EPA has determined that there are considerable negative public health impacts of greenhouse gas emissions and is now working on regulations to apply to large stationary emissions sources, such as generation plants. Such regulations will include the introduction of minimum efficiency standards, and the use of renewable/green technologies will be promoted.

In addition, agencies, at the government’s discretion, can set fuel efficiency and appliance standards. Again, states are developing measures to restrain greenhouse gas emissions: for example, north-eastern states have a cap and trade ETS in place for power stations. The World Resources Institute has studied the potential for emission reductions using the existing federal and state regulations and has concluded that emission reductions of 13 per cent below 2000 levels could be achieved by 2020 (below the 17 per cent reduction pledged at Copenhagen).

However, indications are that United States action over the next 5–10 years will fall far short of 2009 expectations, unless international pressure is applied through sanctions and/or competitiveness in domestic and global markets. Inaction is likely over the next 2 years as a result of Republican Party (members of which are mainly opposed to climate change policies) success in the November 2010 mid-term elections. One surprising climate change outcome of the elections was the rejection of the referendum proposal in California to defer the state climate change action plan until the state economy recorded 3 per cent annual growth.

Carbon markets

Under the CDM, destruction of HFC-23 can be eligible for CERs, which are tradeable in the EU ETS. HFC-23 has a global warming potential 14,800 times that of CO2. HFC-23 is produced as a by-product of HFC-22 manufacture, an ozone depleting refrigerant. HFC-22 is banned in developed countries but will not be banned in developing countries until 2030.

Wind and solar energy and other low greenhouse gas intensive projects are eligible to create CERs under the CDM, but destroying HFC-23 is much lower cost for the creation of CERs and has, therefore, become the main source of CDM credits. In the EU ETS in 2009, 55 per cent of CERs came from HFC-23 destruction, representing approximately US$700 million in credits. HFC-23 production/destruction is limited to HFC-22 plants operating in 2000–2004 so as to avoid setting up HFC-22 plants to produce HFC-23 credits.

Clean Development Mechanism Watch, monitoring the offsets market, has found that some plants reduced their HFC-22 production during periods in which they were ineligible for CERs and increased production when they became eligible. Since the CDM Watch report by the CDM Executive Board, eight HFC projects have been placed under review and the HFC-23 methodology is being reassessed. As a result, the supply of CERs from this source is likely to decline, putting upward pressure on CER prices, possibly from €15 in August 2010 to €25 by January 2011.

Increased price pressure could result from any CDM Board decision to retroactively invalidate some HFC-23 credits, causing entities responsible for invalid CER issuance liable for replacing those CERs.

Australian developments

Overview

Before the 21 August 2010 federal election, neither the Australian Labor Party (ALP) nor the Coalition planned to introduce carbon pricing, the Coalition with no carbon pricing plan (but with policies that would have a price impact: see Energy Working Paper, August 2010) and the ALP with no price before 2013 and some incentives (particularly for renewables). However, both parties aimed to reduce 2000 emissions by 5 per cent by 2020.

The Greens, with a 25–40 per cent below 2000 emissions by 2020 target, wanted immediate introduction of carbon pricing at around A$20–25/t CO2e.

In the aftermath of the election, the support of two Independents and a Green enabled the ALP to form government, but in the Senate, the Greens will hold the balance of power after 1 July 2011. The Greens’ electoral success put early carbon pricing back on the agenda and the two Independents supporting the ALP, together with the Greens, want increased support for renewables and EEI. A further climate change policy ‘twist’ was the release of the Victorian Climate Change White Paper in late July 2010 (see below).

Two ‘round table’ consultative/advisory bodies were set up, one comprising business and one non-government organisation, reporting to nominated Ministers to consider options: a limited ETS, a carbon tax and incentives/regulations.

Post-election, several senior business leaders came out in support of carbon pricing, while other business identities (e.g. mining industry) continued to oppose carbon pricing.

In  another  development,  the  Prime  Minister’s  (then Rudd) Task Force (TF) on Energy Efficiency released the TF’s report, which strongly supported a major energy efficiency effort. The TF also released a study (commissioned by the TF) on design, costs and benefits of a National Energy Efficiency Obligation Scheme. Thus, since the election, the Australian Climate Change debate has been reinvigorated and carbon pricing is firmly back on the policy agenda.

Whether it will be introduced, and its timing, depends on support in the House of Representatives (and the Senate before 1 July 2011) from the ALP, Independents and possibly some dissident Coalition members. Support from some powerful business interests (e.g. BHPB, AGL and Origin Energy) and a majority of community support suggests to us that carbon pricing will be introduced in 2012 (the consultative committees are not due to report until the end of 2011). Accordingly, NIEIR is building carbon pricing into modelling, commencing with $10/t CO2e in 2012 (revenue raising, minimal GHGA impact) rising to approximately $45/t CO2e in 2015–2020.

A CO2e tax/price of <$20/t CO2e would have a low price response impact, but would raise revenue that could be applied to GHGA incentives.

National Institute of Economic and Industry Research analysis indicates that a price of at least $30/t CO2e is needed before there will be significant incentives to shift towards gas for base load generation. The prospect of such a price would remove much of the uncertainty surrounding electricity generation investment, a major reason for business support for early introduction of carbon pricing.

Removal of this uncertainty is urgently required as although electricity demands are, overall, increasing slowly (<2 per cent per year) and spare capacity remains, by 2015 there could be significant electricity supply security concerns.

Grattan Institute study on emissions trading scheme/Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme free permit compensation

In a study released in April 2010, the Grattan Institute argued that Australia would gain from letting its aluminium smelters and oil refineries close rather than providing them with free carbon permits under an ETS. The study argues that free permits undermine emission reduction, which is the purpose of an ETS. Issuance of free permits to these industries would remove the incentive for them to shift to lower emission operations.

Regarding job losses through industry relocation, the study states that a carbon price would leave most emissions intensive sectors relatively healthy. Where there were noticeable negative effects, permits should only be issued if a closure would not noticeably reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The money saved by not issuing free permits could be spent on support for communities affected by plant closures.

The study, ‘Restructuring the Australian Economy to Emit Less Carbon’, is based on A$35/t CO2e. Some assistance would be justified to prevent steel and cement production shifting to countries that did not penalise carbon, but this would be best done by rebating the carbon cost on exports and imposing tariffs on competing imports. This would be allowable under World Trade Organization rules, provided imports were treated the same as local production.

In the study, it was estimated that free permits would have an average cost of A$59,000/employee, highest for aluminium at A$161,000/employee and A$103,344/employee for LNG (see Table 2). At a price of A$35/t CO2e, the study found that there would be little impact on the profitability of the Australian LNG industry, as Australia has fewer establishment and operating risks for developers and customers. With respect to aluminium, the study argues that higher Australian electricity costs without carbon pricing is still directing investment towards lower electricity price locations (such as Qatar) with or without carbon pricing.

table 2 E and E NER 66

The ETS (Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme) legislation did not eventuate and the policy debate appears to have moved away from carbon pricing compensation (although it is likely to reappear with any carbon pricing) and towards, at least initially, a carbon tax, regulation and incentives.

Business supporters of carbon pricing

Given the advantages of carbon pricing to gas industry players such as Origin Energy, AGL and Santos, their support is not surprising. However, the support by BHPB’s Marius Kloppers changed the balance of industry support for carbon pricing because of the potential impact on BHPB’s investment in a range of commodity sectors. On 20 September 2010, the Australian Financial Review put the impact on BHPB’s net present value at 21 per cent, assuming a carbon price of A$25/t CO2e in 2012 rising to A$50/t CO2e in 2019. Note also that the Business Council of Australia acknowledges that it is inevitable that implementing some form of ETS is the lowest cost way to cut carbon emissions.

In September, AGL analysts indicated that the cost of a delay until 2013 in regulatory uncertainty is A$2.1 billion a year to 2020. The rationale is that wholesale electricity prices would be 13 per cent higher ($8.6/MWh) in 2020 than if certainty on carbon pricing were delivered in 2010.

Energy Supply Association of Australia data indicates that the generation sector’s forecast of capital expenditure over 2010–15 has fallen by more than 50 per cent, from A$18 billion in 2007 to A$8.2 billion, due mainly to uncertainty on climate change policy. For example, TRU Energy has A$3 billion in gas fired power in Victoria and New South Wales on hold and Origin cannot, in this situation, commit to upgrading Mortlake from essentially a gas peaking plant to a combined cycle gas turbine base load plant.

Any plant, coal or gas, requires more than 5 years from decision to commissioning, and risk of power shortages is increasing as investment decisions are not taken. AGL suggests consideration of an ETS for generation, whereas BHPB suggests a combination of carbon tax, land-use measures and a limited ETS.

A recent (August 2010) survey of 1,000 members by the Australian Chamber of Commerce indicated 75 per cent believed policy should focus on renewable energy and EEI rather than placing a direct price on carbon.

Garnaut Climate Change Review update

In October 2010, Greg Combet, the Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, commissioned Garnaut to update significant elements of his 2008 Garnaut Climate Change Review (the 2008 Review), and to report on the update by 31 May 2011.

The review update will update elements of the Climate Change Review:

  • where significant changes have occurred, or the sum of expert knowledge has increased, since the original analysis of the 2008 Review was undertaken; and
  • where these changes or improvements in expert knowledge could have significant implications for the key findings and recommendations of the 2008 Review, such that they should be updated.

The Review update should consider:

  • international developments in climate change mitigation efforts;
  • developments in climate change science and understanding of climate change impacts;
  • previous proposals to develop a carbon price in Australia and the ensuing public debate;
  • domestic and international emissions trends;
  • changes in low emissions technology costs and availability;
  • the potential for abatement within the land sector; and
  • developments in the Australian electricity market.

Throughout the Review update, consultation with key stakeholders will be required to understand views and inform analysis. A series of publicly released papers is to be prepared between November 2010 and March 2011. A final report is to be presented to the Government by 31 May 2011. The Report will embody the independent judgments of its author.

 

Victorian Climate Change White Paper,

July 2010

The Victorian Climate Change White Paper, ‘Taking Action for Victoria’s Future’, while not detailing how plan proposals are to be implemented, goes further than any other Australian Government in drawing up a climate change strategy. A White Paper Implementation Plan is due to be released before 2011. The Paper outlines 10 Action areas (see Table 3).

Note that following the Victorian 27 November election the future of the Climate Change Policy is very uncertain.

Targets

From 2008, emissions of 122 Mt CO2e to a 2020 BAU of approximately 130 Mt CO2e, the White Paper proposes a target of 20 per cent below 2020 BAU emissions by 2020: a reduction from BAU of 34 Mt CO2e, or 24 Mt CO2e below 2000 emissions.

This is a significant challenge. In August 2010, NIEIR projected an average 1.25 per cent increase per year for electricity (GWh) over 2010–2020 (without considering the potential White Paper impacts).

Clean energy

There is a commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from brown coal generation by up to 4 Mt CO2e/year, a cumulative saving of 28 Mt CO2e by 2020. This is generally seen as closing 25 per cent of Hazelwood capacity. Financing and compensation are significant implementation issues. There is an emissions target level of 0.8t CO2e/MWh for any new brown coal plant. This compares with 0.8t CO2e/MWh for new black coal stations and 0.4t CO2e/MWh for gas CCGTs.

Solar

The target for large-scale solar (+100 MW) is approximately 5 per cent of electricity supply by 2020 (approximately 2,500 GWh), derived from 5–10 large-scale plants. This target will be supported by a Large-scale Solar Feed-in-tariff (FIT). The tariff might also be available for other low emission technologies, such as geothermal energy. A Medium-scale Solar Working Group has been established, and FIT could also be available for medium-scale plants. There will be funding of A$5 million provide for up to 10 solar energy hubs, generating approximately 8.6 MW of community-based solar power.

Homes

From May 2011, a 6-star standard will be required for new homes (as per a Council of Australian Government’s decision).

The goal is to improve the energy efficiency of existing housing stock to an average 5-star equivalent energy rating by 2020.

Also included are:

  • a doubling of the Victorian Energy Efficiency Target (VEET) and expansion of VEET activities;
  • a comprehensive household retrofit program;
  • extended solar hot water rebate scheme;
  • mandatory disclosure of residence energy performance on sale and lease, in 2011; and
  • promotion of Green Power (GP), aiming to increase GP homes from 300,000 to 500,000.

Business

Goals for Victorian business include VEET expansion to small and medium enterprises. The government will encourage energy efficiency in businesses though the Climate Tech Strategy and the Clean Business Fund. The Environment and Resource Efficiency Plan is to be expanded.

Transport

Transport initiatives include an electric vehicle program. The government has committed to improving fuel efficiency in the Government fleet to reduce emissions by 20 per cent emissions by 2015. They will purchase 2,000 Camry hybrids.

Government

Additional 20 per cent in EEI in all government buildings and facilities by 2018:

  • further $100 million in Greener Government Building Program;
  • study installation of 50 MW of cogeneration in Victoria’s existing hospitals (36 MW at present);
  • increase Green Power commitment to 35 per cent by 2015 and 50 per cent by 2020 (said to be equivalent to output of 100 MW of wind); and
  • support for local government initiatives.

Overall, the Victorian Climate Change Strategy is impressive (although relatively weak on initiatives in the business sectors, both commercial and industrial), but success will depend on effective implementation plans and the monitoring, review and evaluation of initiatives as they proceed.

Coalition plans for energy and climate change include:

  • review of Smart Metering: (impacts, costs, in-house display);
  • review of wind farm guidelines;
  • $1 billion Regional Growth Fund, including a $100 million natural gas distribution expansion;
  • review of brown coal phase-out and transition strategy (road map) for the Latrobe Valley;
  • ‘apparent’ support for carbon pricing and natural gas replacement of brown coal generation;
  • support for cogeneration, tri-generation and standby generation;
  • support for consideration by VCEC of gross FIT design, including tariff PV policies and low emission sources and expansion of size limit;
  • support for CCS, algae research and doubling of ETIS for low emission R, D, D and C;
  • support for 5 per cent solar generation by 2020, doubling of VEET (to SMEs) but review of VEET compliance; and
  • review of VCEC of barriers to distributed energy (renewables, cogeneration/tri-generation).

The Economic Impact of Public Events

National Economic Review

National Institute of Economic and Industry Research 

No. 67 November 2012

The National Economic Review is published four times each year under the auspices of the Institute’s Academic Board.

The Review contains articles on economic and social issues relevant to Australia. While the Institute endeavours to provide reliable forecasts and believes material published in the Review is accurate it will not be liable for any claim by any party acting on such information.

Editor: Kylie Moreland

© National Institute of Economic and Industry

Research

This journal is subject to copyright. Apart from such purposes as study, research, criticism or review as provided by the Copyright Act no part may be reproduced without the consent in writing of the relevant Institute.

ISSN 0813-9474
The economic impact of public events

Ian Manning, Deputy Executive Director, NIEIR

Abstract

The present paper examines a small and ill-defined area of government–private sector interaction: the organisation of public events. In particular, events that receive subventions from the public purse and that draw patrons from outside as well as within the subsidising jurisdiction are considered. Neoclassical economics asserts that economic policy should concentrate on leaving decisions to markets. As applied to the analysis of events, the neoclassical policy recommendation is for reliance on user charges except where there are non-economic reasons for free or subsidised provision. However, NIEIR’s analysis of event provision shows that this recommendation relies on assumptions that have not applied in most parts of Australia over the past 30 years. Instead, subventions to events that increase tourist visitation can increase incomes and employment. Thus, the case for subventions becomes one of priority against other expenditures, preferably exercised in the context of a coherent strategy for the future.

 Mixed economies and government– private sector interaction

When the United States went into ideological overdrive following the end of the Cold War, it let loose a wave of propaganda for market economics. Soviet central planning and government ownership of business enterprise were discredited. Economies should, therefore, be reformed to the opposite extreme, with government curtailed to providing law and order and all else left to the private sector. Some of the most effective propaganda involved the promotion of sophisticated neoclassical economic modelling, which purported to show that a completely privatised economy delivered the best of all worlds. In countries dominated by the American way of thinking, this modelling became the standard by which economic policies were assessed. Its intended target was not the Soviet-style centrally-planned state but the mixed economies inherited largely from the wave of socialist reforms that followed the Second World War.

In Australia’s case, it was conveniently forgotten that the economy had been mixed ever since the 19th-century colonies found that private enterprise was unable to provide them with the infrastructure they required. For the most part, academics and treasuries influenced by the neoclassical wave of thought deliberately assumed away the insights of Keynes’s generation, which supported mixed economies. One of these was the finding that markets are generally ‘imperfect’, which is a polite way of saying that they cannot be relied upon to generate an optimum allocation of resources as described by neoclassical theory. This is not to claim that government action can be relied on to improve matters: far from it. However, there are occasions when governments have opportunities to increase employment and incomes. It is arguable that they should be on the lookout for such opportunities and take advantage of them when they arise.

Since its foundation in 1984, NIEIR has remembered the findings of the economists of Keynes’s generation and, accordingly, has stood apart from the neoclassical economic models favoured by the American economic evangelists. The intellectual problem with the neoclassical models is their high level of abstraction and the plethora of assumptions, many of which contribute directly to their pro-market findings. It should not be surprising that when attempts are made to apply them to policy problems, highly abstract models can generate misleading results. It is inevitable that economic models should simplify the intricacies of the mixed economy in which governments, privately-owned business and non-profit organisations have basically complementary tasks but can sometimes be in (necessarily imperfect) competition, but important that the simplifications capture the major causes and effects rather than being assumed from ideological principle.

The commitment to the vision of a purely private market economy has diverted attention from the realities of government–private sector interaction. These differ industry by industry. Although all industries rely on government for the enforcement of contracts and property rights, the dependence of the mining sector on the administration of exploration and mining licences differs from the dependence of the finance sector on the administration of debtors’ and creditors’ rights and its ultimate dependence on government as lender of last resort. Again, there is general reliance on governments for the provision of an educated workforce but skill requirements are frequently industry-specific. Despite the targeting of government-provided physical infrastructure in privatisation campaigns, one major industry, road transport, is, to this day, completely dependent on infrastructure owned and managed by the three levels of government. Others depend on infrastructure that is to various degrees government provided, guaranteed or assisted. The mixed economy refuses to go away.

 

Event organisation as an activity

This article looks at a small and ill-defined area of government–private sector interaction: the organisation of public events. In particular, the paper considers events that receive subventions from the public purse and that draw patrons from outside as well as within the subsidising jurisdiction. Public events in this sense include sporting, cultural and business-oriented events, such as trade fairs. The event may be as brief as a few hours or last for a season and may take place on a single site or a range of sites. Events can be organised by government agencies, non-profit organisations or commercial businesses. Event organisation includes the production and marketing of the event itself and the coordination of a range of suppliers, including (in various proportions) venues, entertainment, security, accommodation and transport.

The production of events is not recognised as an industry in standard industrial classifications. If anything, it would be a subsector of tourism, which again is not recognised as an industry in the standard classifications, although the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has a definition of the sector and from time to time releases statistics about it. Persons employed putting on events may be classified as working in sport, the arts, business services, religion or,if all else fails, in entertainment not elsewhere classified.

An important distinction is that between events themselves and associated economic activity. Although accommodation, meals and transport may be arranged as part of an event, they are provided by recognisable related industries. There is also a distinction between events and event venues, sometimes expressed as arm’s length transactions (the event organiser hires the venue). However, events are frequently organised by venue operators while, in the opposite direction, organisations that are primarily event promoters may branch out into venue ownership. In the closely-related field of tourist attractions, venue and events may coalesce.

 

The predilection for user charges

Economic theory distinguishes between excludable and non-excludable events. The latter, exemplified by street parades and fireworks displays, are conducted in public spaces where it is impractical to charge for entry and where, indeed, some of the attendees may be unwilling witnesses rather than beneficiaries. Because it is not possible to charge attendees directly, the source of finance preferred in neoclassical economics, user charges, is not available and non-excludable events must, therefore, be financed from sources such as public culture and recreation budgets, business advertising budgets or the demonstration budgets of groups wishing to apply political pressure. Neoclassical economics allows that where governments finance a non-excludable event, they cannot be faulted for failure to impose user charges, although (as with all government expenditure) their priorities may be criticised.

Excludable events are those where it is practical to charge entry fees. The neoclassical principle is that both the event and the venue should be financed from user charges or, if available, by the use of voluntary labour. However, it is common practice for governments to contribute to the staging of excludable public events, sometimes by way of direct subventions, sometimes through more limited assistance (e.g. for marketing) and quite frequently by contributing to the infrastructure cost of venues. These contributions are contrary to neoclassical principle, but have been defended in two major ways.

A government may decide that an excludable event has such merit as a community occasionthat entry should be free, an approach often taken for events with educational, cultural or commemorative content. Short of this, it may decide that the event should be available at subsidised prices, either through a subsidy paid to the event provider or indirectly through venue subsidisation. A great many arts events fall in this category.

It may be argued that the event generates spin-offs for businesses that justify the subvention. In the extreme case, it may even be argued that the addition to business activity generates increased tax revenue such that the subsidising government actually gets its money back.

The first of these arguments is not particularly amenable to economic analysis because the benefits can only be measured indirectly. This is the domain of cost–benefit analysis, which specialises in the imputation of market-derived values to costs and benefits that are not directly valued by market transactions. Sometimes reasonably satisfactory surrogates are available, but sometimes they are not: for example, it has proved very difficult to put a market value on biodiversity. Where such values are important, difficult decisions have to be made as to how to evaluate mixed bags of market, near-market and distant-from-market values. In some studies, particularly those with environmental costs and benefits, NIEIR has included non-market costs and benefits, but other studies have concentrated on the second, purely economic effects of events. This may be termed economic impact analysis, as distinct from cost– benefit analysis, and concentrates on effects on employment and incomes.

Approaches to economic impact assessment

The economic impact of subventions to events can be estimated by economic modelling. Assessment using neoclassical models produces predictable results: events are assumed to absorb resources that would otherwise be employed in other types of production and, therefore, have negligible overall effects. Given the underlying assumption that the economy is subdivided, without remainder, into a series of perfectly-competitive price-equilibriated markets and is therefore fully employed, this result is inevitable. There is no need to have recourse to models if these assumptions are made, except to identify which areas of production contract in order to expand the production of events.

The position is rather different if the industries impacted by the event have spare capacity. This requires that markets be imperfectly competitive, including that production can be marginally increased without affecting price. A typical case would be a chef who does not increase prices just because his or her restaurant achieves 95 per cent occupancy for a night or two. Whether or not production can be increased without affecting prices is a practical matter, and cannot be solved by assumption. NIEIR has frequently been contracted to estimate the economic impact of events where it can be argued that the concerned industries have spare capacity and production is, for a range of capacity utilisation, demand-determined. The institute has evaluated both events where the existence of spin-off benefits is the primary defence of a subsidy and events whose primary justification is cultural or educational but where spin-off benefits are welcome and help to justify the subvention. Impacts may be calculated in advance (as part of advice as to whether the event should be supported) or in arrears (as part of an audit process and also for reference in deciding future applications). Either way, the calculation requires a comparison of two scenarios: a scenario in which the event is held (in the ex-post case what actually happened) and a scenario in which the event is not held. The impact of the event is estimated by differencing the scenarios.

The construction of formal scenarios requires both geographic and time definitions. These are adopted primarily according to client requirements but might also reflect data availability. The geographic area impacted may be limited to the immediate surrounds of the venue(s) but may be expanded to include their Local Government Area (LGA), the state or the whole country, while time definitions may include the run-up to the event, the event itself and its lasting effects. NIEIR can match these definitions to its datasets and models and, hence, provide assessments at the LGA, state and national levels (the sub-LGA level generally requires additional data collection) and for time periods defined by quarters (with the peak day or week a possibility subject to additional data collection).

Because the argument for subsidisation from spin-offs is expressed in economic terms, it is appropriate to measure the impact of the event by the addition to gross income obtained by differencing a scenario that includes the event and one which does not. (Gross income, in this context, means cash income before deduction of depreciation.) Some clients are also very interested in benefits in terms of employment generation and governments are sometimes interested in estimates of the amount of additional tax revenue generated by the event. The benefits thus calculated can be related to the size of the subvention and different subventions can then be compared for effectiveness and (with a little further modelling) can also be compared with the benefits of equivalent tax cuts.

Measuring benefits in terms of changes to income and employment does not provide a full cost–benefit analysis. Two elements are missing:

  • assessment of additional external benefits, such as the educational value of the event or environmental benefits; and
  • assessment of additional external costs, such as environmental costs and alternative leisure foregone to participate in, or work for, the event.

The simplest approach to these costs and benefits is to limit assessment to market values. This approach is regularly accused of ignoring much that is relevant. However, attempts to be all-inclusive can end up giving excessive weight to shadowy and elusive effects. NIEIR prefers to err on the market-value side but includes major external costs and benefits where it assesses them as relevant and assessable.

In evaluating events, it is not common to spend much effort on environmental effects. This is because few events have the primary purpose of generating environmental benefits and for most of them environmental costs are incidental. There is a substantial literature on environmental costs and benefits and defensible conventional values are available for many environmental costs, such as noise and carbon emissions. If these are considered significant they can be included in the assessment.

When events have educational value, it is theoretically desirable to include a value for this benefit. Various methodologies have been suggested, such as estimates of the cost of providing the same education by alternate means or estimates of the capital value of the addition to earning power resulting from the education. Educational and entertainment values are sometimes hard to distinguish, and attempts have been made to tie them down by surveys of willingness to pay over and above the actual admission charge and documentation of how much people have spent travelling to the event. These types of evaluation can quickly become subjective. Similar arguments apply to health effects.

A category of cost sometimes put forward is the cost of leisure foregone by people who work as a result of the event, to which one might add alternative leisure foregone by those who attend the event. As with all allocations of time, the basic point is simple: if people didn’t do one thing, they would do something else. The problem is that evaluation is necessarily subjective. Take the case of those who forgo leisure to work. At one extreme, the foregone leisure may have been, for example, a family occasion that the worker would much rather have attended but forgoes in order to retain a reputation for reliability with his or her employer. At the other extreme, the foregone ‘leisure’ may have been moping around for want of anything better to do or money to do it with. In this latter case, hours worked are not a cost but rather bring the benefit of approved social participation. The cost of ‘reservation wages’ is further discussed below.

Event assessment methodology

A decision to concentrate on income generation as the measurable benefit of subventions to events has the great advantage of bringing assessment into the realm covered by the National Accounts and, hence, of economic models based on the National Accounts. Thus, additional income resolves into additions to wage and salary income and gross profits within the selected geographic area. Remembering that the income and expenditure sides of the National Accounts are, by definition, equal in aggregate, the increases in gross income are conveniently measured as net additions to expenditure. There are two dimensions to this: direct expenditures that would not have taken place in the absence of the event (with an offset for direct expenditures curtailed by the event) and indirect expenditures that arise as a multiplier result of the direct expenditures.

Direct expenditures for the geographic area that includes the event venue comprise, primarily, expenditures to the area by visitors who came to attend the event and also, pro rata, expenditures by people who visited partly because of the event and partly for other reasons. There may be other additions: for example, a trade fair will generally receive additional income from the local expenditures of out-of-region exhibitors and may generate income from additional sales of local products, while the accommodation and other expenditures of a visiting sporting team, its officials and visiting media may be offset against the share of the gate revenue that the team takes home.

Sources of information on the direct impact vary from event to event. Subject to judgements as to relevance, NIEIR has used the following sources.

Surveys of attendees are conducted face-to-face at the event. All attendees are asked their age and gender and, depending on the study, they may be asked about their marital status, number of dependent children, occupation, household income and ticket type. Where events run for multiple days or cover multiple venues, the questionnaires cover days and places of attendance. After asking normal place of residence, local attendees (those who live in the geographic area or region defined for impact assessment) are asked their expenditure at and associated with the event, whether they would have travelled elsewhere to attend a similar event had the event not been held locally and whether they ran down savings to attend. Visitors from outside the region are asked whether the event is a major or merely contributing reason for their visit, their expenditure associated with the event (including its broad composition) and the means of transport and type of accommodation employed. Data are also collected on satisfaction with the event and the likelihood of attendance at subsequent similar events, but these data are for market research purposes and do not affect the assessment of benefits.

Similar data may be collected from event participants themselves. At trade fairs these include exhibitors and buyers, at sporting events the competitors and visiting officials and at cultural events the performers. However, for sporting and cultural events, information from the organisers may be substituted for direct interviews with participants.

At trade fairs, locally-based exhibitors may be asked to estimate the value of additional sales generated at the event. It is admitted that such estimates are necessarily approximate, if only because sales concluded after the event can only be anticipated.

Information provided by the venue owner and the event organiser and their subcontractors generally includes the event budget (particularly cash flows into and out of the region) and total patronage (so that survey data may be expanded to total coverage).
Interviewers are supervised and endeavour to question a random selection of attendees. Participant data may, however, be collected by distribution and later collection of forms. Data are compared to the results for other events as a check on validity and also to dimension particular events in relation to others in the same region.

Although local visitors are asked various questions for market research purposes, their only contribution to the economic analysis is the amount they spend financed by reductions in savings or by forgoing travel outside the region. All other spending is, by their own admission, financed at the expense of other local expenditures and, hence, does not alter demand within the region.

Greater attention is paid to visitors from outside the region. The number of net additional visitors from outside the region (typically interstate and overseas) who would not have come apart from the event is estimated, as is the number of visitors who extended their visit because of the event. The resulting addition to visitor days is estimated along with the number of bed-days of additional accommodation, by accommodation type. (Overseas visitors tend to stay in hotels or backpacker hostels, but interstate visitors frequently stay with relatives or in a caravan.) Crucially, an estimate is made of additional expenditure in the region, divided into: event entry fees and other revenue to the event organiser or venue; meals, food and drinks; entertainment; accommodation; transport; additional sales by local businesses resulting from trade fair or similar exposure (if any); and other.
The estimate thus prepared may be termed the addition to the exports of the region promoting the event. The estimates will vary according to geographic definition: as the geographic boundary is broadened from local through state to national, a higher proportion of expenditure becomes local and exports diminish.

None of this has proved particularly controversial. It is the next step that brings out the difference between neoclassical and post-Keynesian approaches.
Neoclassical assumptions to minimise assessed impact
We must first dispose of the neoclassical trump card, known technically as the reservation wage. The underlying assumption is full employment, meaning that all people who want paid employment are at work for precisely their desired number of hours. In these circumstances, increases in employment are not possible without increases in wage rates. People who take on work as a result of the increase in wage rates are accordingly giving up leisure to the value of the previous wage rate (because by the full employment assumption they would have worked at the previous wage had they not valued their leisure more highly). Therefore, the benefits of any additional employment are negligible. However, it has been noted that the value of leisure foregone is highly subjective and can even be negative, and will argue below that the full employment assumption is questionable. Reservation wages are irrelevant when the focus is on income and employment, and even in a strict cost–benefit context their value is highly debatable.

We now turn to the main point at issue, which is the valuation of expenditures curtailed by the event: expenditures which would have been made in the absence of the event but are not made due to the event. As already noted, the neoclassical analysis depends on the assumption of full employment and means that curtailed expenditures are similar to event-generated expenditures. Two variants of the neoclassical story have been proposed, both of which depend on labour being fully employed.

One story runs as follows. An event transfers expenditure from the regions of visitor origin to the region holding the event. In all regions, labour is fully employed. Increased expenditure in the region holding the event causes wage rates there to rise, while reduced expenditure in the regions of visitor origin causes wage rates there to fall. These changes in wage rates precipitate a flow of labour from the regions of origin to the region of the event. The transfer of expenditure is matched by a transfer of labour. This prediction is easily tested in practice. For no event that NIEIR has examined has there been any evidence that the required changes to wage rates have taken place or that the event has been staffed (either directly or indirectly) by labour migrating from the visitors’ home states.

A more plausible version of the neoclassical story runs as follows. As in the first neoclassical story, visitor spending raises the demand for labour in the region that holds the event and workers can only be attracted to provide for the demand by offering increases in wages. However, in this story, the response to the increased wages comes not from different geographical regions, but from the effect of the increased wage rates in reducing profitability in all other local industries. These industries sack employees who promptly transfer to the industries serving the increased visitor demand. The net effect on employment and the total value of output depends on price responses, but it is normally claimed that they more or less balance out: the increase in production to meet the increase in visitor demand is countered by a decrease in local production. Thus, a subvention to an event, even when it increases income earned from outside the region, does not increase net income except perhaps marginally where the price responses fail to balance out.

In theory, similar reasoning could be applied to capital capacity. Neoclassical economics includes the concept of the ‘short run’, defined as a period in which capital capacity cannot be altered. Because events are ephemeral, this would appear to be the relevant assumption. If capital capacity is fully employed, no changes in real output can take place in the short run and the capital capacity required to service visitor expenditure can only be made available by shifting it from alternative production, the same result as for labour.

Realistic assumptions

The neoclassical analysis depends heavily on two assumptions:

  • labour supply is very nearly fixed, although labour can be found to service additional demand at the cost of transferring it from alternative production and/or from valued leisure; and
  • capital is fixed, although capital can be found to service additional demand at the cost of transferring it from alternative production (although this is the strict neoclassical position, some analysts assume that capital utilisation can vary and put the weight of their analysis on the labour supply assumption).

Whether or not capital capacity is assumed to be fixed, the operative assumption is that marginal costs are rising and translate into rising supply curves, not only in the industries serving visitor demand but generally. This assumption is made on purely theoretical grounds, without any investigation of labour market conditions applying in the area affected by the event at the time of the event. NIEIR does not contend that this assumption is always irrelevant: there can be times and places where additions to demand in one industry raise wage rates generally, and, more frequently, where they raise wage rates for particular skills; similarly, there can be times and places where additions to demand in one industry run slap into infrastructure or other capacity constraints. For example, mining booms raise wage rates generally in the remote mining regions and specifically for particular mining-related and construction skills, where they increase wage rates not only in the boom zones but across whole countries and, indeed, worldwide. Mining booms also crash against capital capacity constraints in the mining industry and for related transport, energy and water infrastructure. But is this universally true for events?

The obvious capacity constraint affecting events concerns venues. However, unlike mining booms, events are planned in advance with meticulous attention to venue availability. Only in the case of very large events, such as the Olympic Games, is venue availability a potentially limiting factor. Impact analysis for very large events is complicated by the need to evaluate the costs of the resulting planned construction program and to assess the benefits of the resulting assets after the event has taken place. Most events that NIEIR has been called upon to evaluate utilise existing venues. Where this is the case, the opportunity cost of the venue is reasonably represented by arm’s length venue hire charges. NIEIR includes these with the costs of staging the event.

Having dealt with venue and staging costs, the major question concerns the capacity of the local economy to service the addition to visitor expenditure, where visitors are defined as people coming from outside the region in which the venue is located. Judging by the composition of additions to demand revealed by the surveys conducted by NIEIR at events, these additions to demand chiefly concern accommodation, restaurants and other eateries, entertainment (not only the entertainment provided by the event itself) and transport. Except for the additions to transport demand, the additions are concentrated near the event venue.

The additions to expenditure on entertainment and private motor vehicle transport caused by a typical event (in size up to a Commonwealth Games or a papal visit) are minor in relation to total demand, even at the LGA level, and are likely to be within existing capacity: a few extra seats are sold and the average delay in the queue to pay the cashier at the petrol station increases by a minute or less.

Events can impose significant demand on local public transport. However, the transport authorities have the great advantage of fairly accurate estimates of likely demand and have shown themselves capable of marshalling their resources to meet the demand. Similarly, large events generate surges in air traffic, but the airlines have sophisticated demand management systems in place. If a surge in traffic is anticipated, their first step is to withdraw discount fares and the second is to schedule additional flights. If these flights require aircraft placement flights in the contrary direction the airlines may offer discounted fares to take people away from the event rather than to it. Additional flights are usually provided from reserve capacity in the existing fleet, including flying at unattractive times of day, and are manned from existing personnel resources. The increase in the demand for air transport that results from an event does not, therefore, withdraw labour from other industries. However, there may be an offset to the increase in demand from attendees at events from two sources:

Travellers who would have visited the event location in the absence of the event but who are put off by the increased fares (a group that also includes travellers who are put off by increased accommodation charges). Not all of these potential visitors are completely put off; some (helpfully) reschedule.

Residents of the event location who are persuaded to leave the area, either by discount airfares or simply to avoid being at home when the event is held. Once again, these departures may be opportunistic and merely rescheduled departures that would have taken place in any case.

For events significant enough to affect airfares, NIEIR estimates the offset to demand.

A stronger case can be made that events strain capacity in the hospitality industries: accommodation, restaurants and related services. Any event that is worth assessing will cause an increase in local demand for hospitality services sufficient to raise the demand for labour in these industries. The additional demand is met from two main sources:

  • the offer of additional hours of work, either to existing part-time employees or to persons otherwise not in employment, at standard rates of pay; and
  • the offer of additional hours of work at enhanced rates of pay.

Where additional employment is taken, at standard rates of pay, by people who would otherwise be in paid work there is no reason why rates of pay in other industries should be affected or that labour should be withdrawn from these industries. Whether or not labour can be recruited to an event on this basis is a matter of practical observation. The evidence that it can be includes the following:

The hospitality industries rely heavily on part-time workers. There is ABS evidence that, for most Australian locations and for most times since the end of full employment in the 1970s, many part-time workers desire additional hours at the going rate of pay.

The hospitality industries also rely quite heavily on low-skilled and semi-skilled workers. There is ABS evidence that, for most Australian locations and for most times since the end of full employment in the 1970s, many persons are available who would be happy to work at the going rate of pay were more jobs available at these levels of skill. Such workers include many more than those who are unemployed as officially defined. The surveys confirm the presence of significant numbers of people who do not meet the official definition of unemployment in terms of work search but who would, nevertheless, happily take on paid employment were it offered to them. We may also note that Australian labour-force participation rates are below those of many OECD countries, which would indicate the presence of potential employees to take jobs made available.

This said, some employers may prefer to meet the extra demand by raising wage rates. The obvious strategy is to employ existing staff on overtime, which raises costs in the hospitality industries but does not threaten to withdraw labour from other industries. If the increased costs are passed on in terms of increased prices there may, however, be a small offset to real demand in the form of reduced patronage by local residents who have to pay more to eat out.

Finally, demand may be met by the neoclassical mechanism of offering higher wage rates to attract workers who are already employed. In view of the excess supply of low and medium skill workers, increased wage rates are likely to be offered only to skilled personnel such as chefs. The point here is that hospitality skills are industry-specific; an increase in wage rates for skilled hospitality personnel cannot be guaranteed to generalise across all industry as required by the neoclassical hypothesis. However, as with overtime, there is a possibility of increased prices in hospitality reducing the real incomes of local residents and, hence, their real expenditures.

It can be concluded that an increased demand for labour in hospitality is unlikely to generalise to general increases in wages affecting all industries unless the region concerned is closer to full employment than has been the case in most Australian regions over the past three decades.

The position is similar with capital capacity. Event organisers generally organise hospitality at the same time as they organise the event and hospitality providers have shown themselves capable of a flexible response, much like the public transport providers and airlines. Hospitality providers customarily work with a level of excess capacity and also use flexible pricing. This means that a lack of discount accommodation reduces casual visitation during the event, although some of this is rescheduled. NIEIR makes an allowance for visitors who would have visited but for the event, deducting their estimated expenditures from those of the visitors who come because of the event.

For significant events occurring in the capital cities, it is possible to check whether an event was associated with price increases in the hospitality sector. The relevant indicator is the relationship between the price index for hospitality and the consumer price index in general. For several reasons it is expected that hospitality prices will trend upwards more rapidly than consumer prices: productivity increases in services are generally less than in manufactured goods; there is no competition from low-priced merchandise imports; and the hedonic price adjustment for information technology slows the rate of increase of the general index. Given these expectations, price increases for hospitality have been low and have not corresponded with surges in the demand for hospitality: indeed, the reverse has been the case, and periods of high increase in demand have tended to be associated with low increases in prices, as would occur if hospitality were an industry subject to increasing returns to scale.

It is argued by NIEIR that the supply of labour and capital to the hospitality industry in response to events has been cordoned off from the supply to other industries in most Australian locations at most times during the past three decades. This conclusion applies even in places like seasonal tourist resorts because the resorts draw on labour from the nearby cities or from sources such as young overseas tourists with 2-year work permits. If this is the case, additions to demand translate directly into increases in income. The offsets that neoclassical analysis assumes are, indeed, possible, but under typical conditions do not apply.

 

Multiplier effects

The stage is then set for multiplier effects. In traditional Keynesian fashion, an increase in demand generates an increase in incomes, the spending of which generates a further round of increased demand. The process continues subject to ‘leakages’, in the form of savings and capacity constraints, although we have checked the hospitality industry and noted that these are unlikely, and in conditions of generally less than full employment they are not particularly likely in other industries. However, it is admitted that skill supply and capital capacity constraints apply in some places at certain times, and when they do they limit multiplier effects as surely as leakage into imports.

NIEIR models these multiplier effects using:

  • input–output tables, concentrating first on income generation in industries that supply the hospitality industry and then in second and subsequent rounds being more general;
  • data on industry employee characteristics, to determine the kinds of household into which the additional incomes will flow, again concentrating on the hospitality industry in the first round;
  • data on the characteristics of households receiving capital incomes;
  • household expenditure patterns, to determine the directions of spending of households with increased incomes; and
  • data on commuting patterns and trade matrices, to determine the locations of spending.

The results of this analysis are directly contrary to the neoclassical analysis. Instead of the initial increase in export demand being whittled away by reductions in production in other industries, it is expanded by increases in demand for the products of those industries. The result is that public subventions to events that attract visitor expenditure from outside a region generally benefit the region, the exception being where they hit capacity constraints. The returns to public expenditure can be attractively high, although there is no guarantee: NIEIR has come across events that have failed to attract non-local visitors and where the economic impact has been negative. Subventions to such events may still be justified on cultural or other grounds, but not on grounds that the events generate income or employment.
Should generally positive returns guarantee priority in public budgets?

The finding that, under present circumstances of less than full employment, events are often effective means of translating public funds into employment increases is good news for event organisers but less to the taste of those in Treasuries whose unenviable but worthy task is to balance the public budget and to ensure that public spending yields value for money. Rather than rely on spurious neoclassical arguments that event subsidies cannot, by assumption, yield positive economic impacts, Treasuries would do better to rely on the following arguments.

First, the assessment that a subvention to an event yields increases in income and employment does not give the event an absolute claim on government funds. Technically speaking, the rate of return on each event should be compared with the rates of return on the following: subventions to other events; other government expenditures; tax cuts; and increasing government saving. These comparisons depend on the macroeconomic circumstances of the day and also rely on similar assessments being available for alternative government expenditures. Needless to say, this is a rather tall order, but the principle remains that governments have the unenviable task of deciding the relative urgency of different expenditures. Although rates of return are helpful in determining priorities, they do not do away with the necessity to choose.

A second argument sees event promotion as a zero-sum competitive game between the Australian states. According to this view, event promotion is as pernicious as local preference in awarding manufacturing contracts and it simply encourages inefficiency. This argument is incomplete in that it fails to recognise that events increase national exports as well as interstate exports; competition by states to stage events is not a zero-sum game. Competition between places goes beyond competition for the tourist dollar; it is, in part, competition for identity and recognition. Success in such competition brings intangible benefits to residents, which have not so far been mentioned in the analysis. Turning to a visitor point of view, competition between cities and towns increases the range of visitor experiences available: efficiency arguments that assume that events are homogenous miss the point of this type of competition. Also note that the Australian states not only compete for interstate tourism, but combine to promote international tourism. There may be a point where competitive tourism promotion by the Australian incurs diminishing returns but it is unlikely that this point lies at zero expenditure.

Third, events are not the only ‘industry’ to benefit from public support. For example, subventions for events and capital investment in venues are small compared to government expenditures on road construction and maintenance. Both provide direct consumption benefits to citizens and both generate benefits to private businesses. This is the exact point of calculating the income generation benefits from different forms of public expenditure. Instead of assuming benefits away, as they do when they adopt the neoclassical assumptions, Treasuries should compare the benefits of alternative spending patterns and adjust their spending accordingly.

Fourth, the benefits from event subventions need to be placed in the context of general macroeconomic policy, which in Australia for several decades has favoured the generation of demand by the encouragement of bank lending, and, more specifically, the encouragement of mortgage lending to households. The Commonwealth was so anxious to pursue this policy that it was unwilling to increase real taxes and limited government borrowing, thus limiting the flow of funds available for event subventions and for all other forms of government spending. The tragedy pointed out in recent State of the Regions reports was that the policy of high mortgage lending has failed to generate either full employment or affordable housing, the ultimate culprit being the constrained supply of accessible urban land, which is partly due to the constraints to government investment required to create an enhanced supply.

This brings us back to the question of constraints more generally. While it is argued here that there are no constraints that prevent the operation of income multipliers arising from visitor expenditure, there may be constraints at a more general macroeconomic level.

As described in the National Economic Review as far back as June 1987, Australia suffers from a number of serious macroeconomic constraints:

  • a public sector constraint – broadly, the unwillingness to pay sufficient taxes to finance desirable public expenditure, particularly public investment;
  • various capital capacity constraints, including shortages of highly specialised skills and an inability to make the public investments required to alleviate these shortages, and various infrastructure inadequacies arising again from low public investment; and
  • a balance of payments constraint, arising from reliance on an exchange rate that has failed to settle at rates justified by the economic fundamentals coupled with industry policies that pay insufficient attention to investment in export industries – not merely the mining industry, but industries that are capable of generating jobs that match the skills available.

In view of these constraints, the high benefit–cost ratios commonly observed for subventions to events should be assessed in the context of a long-term strategy for Australian economic development. Event assessments are but a tiny part of the analysis required to develop and implement such a strategy.

 

Conclusion
Neoclassical economics purports to show that economic policy should concentrate on leaving decisions to markets. As applied to the analysis of events, the neoclassical policy recommendation is for reliance on user charges except where there are non-economic reasons for free or subsidised provision.

NIEIR’s analysis of event provision shows that this recommendation relies on assumptions that have not applied in most parts of Australia over the past 30 years. Instead, subventions to events that increase tourist visitation can increase incomes and employment. Thus, the case for subventions becomes one of priority against other expenditures, preferably exercised in the context of a coherent strategy for the future.

An Overview of the National, State and Regional Modelling System

 National Economic Review

National Institute of Economic and Industry Research

No. 66 September 2011

The National Economic Review is published four times each year under the auspices of the Institute’s Academic Board.

The Review contains articles on economic and social issues relevant to Australia. While the Institute endeavours to provide reliable forecasts and believes material published in the Review is accurate it will not be liable for any claim by any party acting on such information.

Editor: Kylie Moreland

© National Institute of Economic and Industry

Research

This journal is subject to copyright. Apart from such purposes as study, research, criticism or review as provided by the Copyright Act no part may be reproduced without the consent in writing of the relevant Institute.

ISSN 0813-9474

An overview of the national, state and regional modelling system

Peter Brain, Executive Director, NIEIR

Ian Manning, Deputy Executive Director, NIEIR

Abstract

The present paper provides an overview of NIEIR’s national, state and regional modelling system. NIEIR’s forecasting methodology provides a strong and realistic basis for policy evaluation. An economic projection incorporating a policy change is compared with an otherwise similar ‘base case’ projection without the policy change.

Although using general equilibrium models is exceedingly fashionable in policy analysis, based as they are on a fundamental assumption that economies can usefully be divided into autonomous markets and analysed in terms of price-mediated balances of demand and supply in each market, NIEIR’s models are significantly closer to reality. They do not assume away mathematically inconvenient aspects of the economy and, hence, are less likely to deliver counter-productive advice.

 Introduction
The National Institute of Economic and Industry Research (NIEIR) originally entered the field of economic modelling as a forecaster. It maintains this role, preparing regular forecasts and checking them against actual forecast realisation, a process that results in learning from experience. However, NIEIR’s forecasting methodology provides a strong and realistic basis for policy evaluation. The concept is simple: an economic projection incorporating a policy change is compared with an otherwise similar ‘base case’ projection without the policy change.

After more than 25 years experience in economic forecasting and analysis, NIEIR has confirmed the value of dealing always in time sequences. This allows not only for the modelling of causation involving driver and driven variables but for the insertion of response lags and for the inclusion of lagged feedbacks. This time-driven structure of causation means that considerable complexity can be handled without major problems in ensuring analytical consistency.

A second benefit of experience is that NIEIR has developed a sense of relevance and used it to identify the drivers that have influenced the major forecast variables over the past six decades and more. These drivers have all been incorporated into the forecasting and analytical models in ways that reflect their perceived causative role. This is not to claim that a new wild card might not emerge (NIEIR continually scans the horizon in case one does) nor is it to claim that influences are constant in direction or strength, but it is to claim that the Institute has incorporated all historically-relevant drivers into its models and, furthermore, has endeavoured to ensure that their influence is determined by the data and not by assumption. Incorporation in the model is not the last word: historical behaviour is never completely replicated, especially the capricious historical behaviour of exchange rates and other variables strongly influenced by speculative financial markets. Again, although econometric relationships can provide evidence of the direction of causation, this evidence is never conclusive and the estimates of the strength of influence are not always stable. However, model specification emphasising lags and feedbacks provides a structure in which the complexities revealed by econometric analysis of historical experience can be formalised and brought into a logical relationship for forecasting purposes.

In the course of model development, NIEIR has learnt the benefit of a major simplifying device: the geographic layering of forecasting models. Some of the prices, flows and balance sheet values relevant to Australian forecasts are determined primarily on world markets, some are determined primarily at the all-Australia level, some at the level of large city-regions (which approximate to states in Australia) and some at the regional level. The Institute has thus evolved a tiered structure of models: the world is represented formally by the LINK models, to which NIEIR adds its own scenarios of world economic growth; the primary model is the National IMP model (from NIEIR’s IMP modelling suite), which is of particular importance in determining the values of variables influenced by imports, exports and the balance of payments and variables influenced by Commonwealth policy: broadly, the variables emphasised in the National Accounts.

It is also important as a means of ensuring that all-Australia markets add up; the state models include their own range of National Accounts variables and have their own city–region dynamics, but are individually constrained to national values for variables such as the exchange rate and inflation rate, and (subject to feedbacks) are constrained to national totals for a wide range of macroeconomic variables. Within these constraints there is scope for divergence from national trends, some brought about by differences in demography or by differences in industry mix, some by policy effects (particularly state government policies) and some by differences between states in the operation of markets, particularly such markets as housing; and the regional models again have their own dynamics, but are even more constrained by state and national values for variables, and state and national totals. When operated in ‘top down’ mode the regional models determine the local consequences of state and national forecasts. However, the modelling system can also be configured so that regional model results feed back to the state and national level.

All models are disaggregated by industry, with an emphasis on inter-industry relationships. Where a particular forecast or policy study emphasises a particular industry, the modelling of that industry is reviewed to ensure that the peculiarities of the industry are accurately represented. This can apply to industry modelling at national, state or regional levels.

The Institute originally developed two sets of models: annual models based on detailed annual data and projecting in 1-year increments, and stripped-down quarterly models. However, the modelling system has recently been rebuilt on a quarterly basis, this being the minimum time interval used in the National Accounts. Although this creates problems due to seasonality, it has major advantages in the treatment of causation.

The National (IMP) model

For operational and conceptual convenience, NIEIR’s integrated system of forecasting models is divided into modules. The most convenient point of entry to the system as a whole is the national model, because this model is most readily explained in relation to academic economics. It is also important to understand the national model because it determines many of the drivers that operate at the more detailed levels, and also guarantees the coherence of results at those levels.

Macroeconomics

The main data source at the macroeconomic level is the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) System of National Accounts. The National Accounts comprise three main segments:

estimates of national income, expenditure and production;

financial or flow-of-funds accounts; and

the national balance sheet.

Although there is a tendency to regard the first of these as the most important, the other two provide information that is essential to forecasting growth in national income, expenditure and production. In particular, the national balance sheet includes important information on assets and liabilities.

The National Accounts are of fundamental importance for economic forecasting, for several reasons. They provide the following:

a guide for average or typical experience – if aggregate income is rising, individual incomes will also rise on average; consistency checks not only (by definition) within the National Accounts themselves, but checks useful in more detailed analysis, often expressed as column and row totals;

driver variables for more detailed analysis; a variable set within which a number of important dependant variables can be determined, particularly such variables as GDP, inflation, the exchange rate and the unemployment rate (these variables are also the subject of multiple feedbacks from the variables they drive: e.g. GDP drives energy use but any resulting changes in the efficiency of energy use feedback to GDP); and

a set of variables that is very attractive for econometric analysis, because data quality is high and virtually all the variables are the product of highly decentralised decision-making (the major variables affected by centralised decisions are government expenditure and taxation).

A disadvantage of the National Accounts is that they are published after a delay, and are subject to revision for many quarters after publication. This means that projections inevitably take off from a mixture of estimates of varying quality. NIEIR has tackled this problem and emphasises ‘lead indicators’ in its treatment of the latest published observations.

Forecasts of National Accounts variables provide invaluable background to forecasts at the industry and regional level and to policy-oriented analytical projections. NIEIR approaches the task of forecasting the National Accounts with the utmost seriousness. By longstanding practice, National Accounts forecasts have been ‘top down’; that is, the National Accounts variables, which are either aggregates or conceptually broad indices, are forecast in terms of other aggregates and indices, most of which also occur in the National Accounts or are easily related to the Accounts (e.g. national population). When forecasting in top-down mode, more detailed forecasts are largely driven by the national totals and, as a methodological principle, are reconciled to these totals, although not always completely: differences that can be highly significant at the industry and regional level are not always significant nationally, where they might lie within the acceptable range of forecast errors.

Although the top-down approach is standard, it is possible to move in the opposite direction, working from forecasts at the industry and regional level back to the national aggregates. and then down again to a further round of industry and regional detail.

Keynesian macroeconomics

National Accounts were first prepared after the Keynesian revolution and their basic structure continues to support Keynesian analysis. The familiar categories of aggregate demand are documented, including consumption, investment (fixed capital accumulation), government demand and net exports. Therefore, the National Accounts lend themselves to forecasting using the simplest of Keynesian models in which national income and GDP are determined by the sum total of consumption, investment and net export demand. As explained in university classes in elementary macroeconomics, this model is inherently dynamic. The consumption multiplier, which raises GDP following an exogenous increase in (say) investment demand, is usually explained as taking place in a series of steps, each step following one time period after its predecessor. This model is far too simple to yield useful forecasts, but it reveals two important points.

Demand is a very important underlying concept in economics. Marketed goods and services will not be produced unless they can be sold somewhere. Demand limits production.

Although the Keynesian multiplier can be explained as governing the transition from one steady state to another, it does not take much imagination to see it operating in conditions where exogenous shocks are occurring continuously. These do not prevent the multiplier from operating, but do prevent it from ever yielding a steady state.

Crude demand-dominated Keynesian models were common in the early days of National Accounting, in the 1950s and perhaps the 1960s. However, the

Institute’s forecasting model was never in this crude category. From the beginning it recognised the importance of Keynesian microeconomics and also the importance of explicit growth theory.

 

Keynesian microeconomics

Keynesian macroeconomics is founded on Keynesian microeconomics, summarised as import parity pricing for trade-exposed goods and services and cost-plus pricing for all others. Where market structure indicates that monopoly or oligopoly pricing are present, these can be handled by varying the cost-plus mark-up.

The microeconomics of import-parity and cost-plus is not standard economics as taught in first year courses. Economic doctrine privileges pricing at the equilibrium of demand (which increases as price falls) and supply (which reduces as price falls). The fundamental reason for teaching this doctrine is its association with the normative defence of competitive markets. This apart, the equilibrium theory of price formation has been variously defended, for example on the grounds that it follows from the logic of optimisation in conditions of diffused economic power, or that it is approximated in at least some markets. The reasons that it is not assumed in NIEIR’s models are as follows.

The demand/supply concept is closely bound up with the concept of perfectly competitive markets. In practice, very few, if any, Australian product and service markets meet the onerous conditions required if competition is to be perfect. Instead, competition is generally restricted to a limited number of firms, each of which has incentives to adopt strategic pricing behaviour. In these circumstances, cost-plus subject to an import-parity maximum provides a reasonably accurate approximation to actual price formation.

A particular case where demand/supply pricing is inadequate is that of increasing returns to scale, which generate downward-sloping supply curves and indeterminate price. This is no small problem, because increasing returns to scale are endemic in manufacturing and possibly in other industries such as retailing. Once again, the import parity/cost plus theory yields determinate prices.

Even if competitive equilibrium provides a reasonably accurate account of price formation in some of the markets of an economy, the existence of cost-plus import-parity pricing in significant sectors is sufficient to generate Keynesian macroeconomic behaviour.

The fundamental reason for not using competitive equilibrium in forecasting models is that equilibrium is timeless and, therefore, unhelpful in a forecasting context.

Although the general import parity/cost plus approach remains, the disaggregation of the Institute’s modelling system by industry has made it possible to vary the approach to price formation by industry. For manufacturing industries, NIEIR’s developed models use the cost-plus approach with the mark-up a function of unit capital costs and export and import prices. Demand in relation to capacity is included as a short-period influence to allow for profit-taking during booms and price-cutting to generate cash flow during recessions.

Although NIEIR avoids the assumption that prices vary to bring markets into equilibrium, it respects the National Accounts identity: aggregate demand must equal aggregate supply. The difference is that this equality is generally unsatisfactory to the economic actors. It is a temporary accommodation rather than a lasting balance of forces.

 

Growth theory and inflation

In the 1950s, Keynesian macroeconomic theory was developed into a series of growth models (Harrod, Domar, Hicks and Robinson). These models recognised that investment (in the Keynesian sense of gross fixed capital formation) not only adds to current demand but also adds to the capital stock, resulting in increased productivity of labour and increased incomes for both workers and the owners of capital. Because the Institute forecasting model was designed to yield policy analysis over a time horizon of a couple of decades, it included these relationships, by contrast with a great many contemporary Keynesian forecasting models, which are limited to a time horizon of a few years.

This explicit treatment of the capital stock was of great importance in meeting the challenge of the 1970s: the failure of simple Keynesian models to predict the stagflation of those years. As Keynesian economics developed, it was quickly realised that demand was not the only determinant of GDP. There were also constraints on the supply side, and it was possible for ex-ante aggregate demand to exceed the aggregate supply capacity of the economy. Three relationships were posited

quick-working relationship by which demand which could not be satisfied due to limits to productive capacity spilled over into inflation,conventionally known as excess demand inflation;a quick-working relationship by which demand spilled over into imports and, less spectacularly, into reductions in exports (these relationships raised the whole question of the incorporation of international trade into economic analysis); and

a slow-working relationship by which excess demand for goods and services created additional demand for capacity-creating investment (this ‘accelerator’ relationship further increased capacity utilisation and initially worsened inflation, but to the extent that investment demand crowded out consumption it increased the capital stock, raised capacity and eventually dampened inflation).

Further investigation and experience transformed the accelerator into a relationship between investment and business retained surpluses: the greater the surplus, the greater the level of investment. Further investigation also transformed the account of the relationship between capacity and inflation. Current modelling allows for inflation resulting from the following:

excess-demand;

cost-push (fundamentally a result of incompatible income claims);

imports (reflecting the net effect of inflation overseas and movements in the exchange rate); and

monetary sources (fundamentally a result of lack of control in the financial sector, public and private).

Capacity was gradually transformed from a near-engineering concept to one much more closely related to levels of activity above which inflation was likely to accelerate, and which itself depended on such variables as workforce skills.

Although long-run growth analysis is conveniently carried out in values adjusted for inflation, it is still important to include the inflation rate in forecasts, partly because it is a policy target (hence, a determinant of RBA behaviour and in some policy eras of Treasury behaviour as well) and partly because of its influence on economic behaviour, for example the behaviour of firms when assessing investment in fixed capital. NIEIR keeps in mind the various types of inflation, and makes an assessment of the strength of each mechanism. In the immediate wake of the global financial crisis the following assessments applied:

excess demand inflation was reasonably under control, but could break out if there was a reduction in the supply of imports;

cost-push inflation was initially defeated by the 1980s Accord and the probability of recurrence was further reduced by the Commonwealth’s moves to weaken the unions and transfer wage bargaining to the enterprise level;

a break-out of imported inflation will accompany any devaluation of the Australian dollar but was not a threat at current exchange rates, given the world outlook; and

monetary inflation was not a threat, given that the banks were more likely to be trimming their balance sheets than expanding them.

However, with the world economy in turmoil nothing should be taken for granted.

 

The overseas sector

There is a sense in which the overseas sector fits neatly and naturally into the Keynesian variables of the National Accounts. Exports add to demand and imports add to supply. Australian export earnings can be modelled as essentially demand-driven, industry by industry, from projections of world growth. Allowance can also be made for domestic supply constraints. Imports can likewise be modelled, industry by industry, by estimating domestic supply at the world-parity price and calculating imports as domestic demand less domestic supply and exports.

In this context, NIEIR has benefited as the Australian representative of the United Nations LINK project. Under this project, NIEIR annually prepares forecasts of Australian economic activity, including exports and imports by commodity. Along with its colleagues in other countries (most UN members participate), NIEIR submits its forecasts to the LINK secretariat, which reconciles the national forecasts using the requirement that one country’s exports are another country’s imports. The revised estimates are published and contribute to NIEIR’s forecasts.

Turning to the financial components of the balance of payments, earnings on Australian overseas investments can be calculated from the value of these investments and the rate of return, which is influenced by world growth and monetary conditions. Likewise, the earnings of overseas investors in Australia can be calculated from the value of their investments and the rate of return, as influenced (for equity investments) by the profitability of businesses in Australia and (for debt) by the Australian interest rate. As a consequence of Australian net indebtedness to the rest of the world, Australian interest rates are reliably above world rates, a requirement that limits the RBA’s capacity to influence interest rates.

It is agreed by all analysts that imports and net debt servicing have to be paid for and the ultimate source of foreign exchange with which to pay is export revenue. However, imports can also be paid for from capital inflow, known as a deficit on the balance of trade. Capital inflow results in net debt servicing costs and the addition of these to the balance of trade yields the balance of payments. The question for forecasters contemplating the typical Australian balance of payments deficit is how long it can be sustained by continued capital inflow and how far it will blow out. This involves forecasting both overseas willingness to lend to Australia and Australian willingness to borrow on the terms offered by overseas lenders.

Analysing Australian experience up to 1990, NIEIR employed the concept of the balance of payments constraint to growth. When the balance of payments deficit threatened to become excessive, three mechanisms came into play. First, the high interest rates required to attract overseas loans cut into Australian demand, reducing incomes and so reducing imports. Second, when alarmed over the deficit, the Reserve Bank imposed credit squeezes: quantitative controls over borrowing that acted to reduce incomes and imports. If these were not enough, the Treasury would tighten fiscal policy, further reducing incomes and imports. In the era of exchange and interest rate controls, up to the 1980s, the Commonwealth institutions alternated between periods when they used ‘high’ interest rates to support a ‘high’ exchange rate in the hope that low-priced imports would curtail inflation and periods when they used ‘low’ interest rates to support a ‘low’ exchange rate to encourage export and import-competing industries.

At deregulation the Reserve Bank forswore the quantitative regulation of the banks and the Treasury forswore active fiscal policy. The balance of payments constraint seemed to evaporate as the banks demonstrated a hitherto unsuspected capacity to absorb overseas loans, which they on-lent to the household sector. Successive national balance sheets chronicled an increase in bank liabilities to overseas and in household liabilities to the banks. The policy authorities regarded the resulting balance of payments deficit as benign: it was incurred between private parties and imports of low-cost consumers’ goods were welcome because they kept inflation down. The question for economic analysts is how long this pattern of household and bank debt accumulation can last. There was a severe wobble during the global financial crisis and the indications are for a return to balance of payments constrained growth, but when, and with how much of a bump, is one of the current conundrums of forecasting.

When deregulation was being pursued, one of its expected benefits was that market determination of the exchange rate would ensure appropriate pricing of imports and exports and so equilibriate the balance of payments. In the event, since 1990, the AUD/USD exchange rate has fluctuated between parity to AUD2 for each USD without any commensurate relationship to economic fundamentals. The exchange rate matters for forecasting – it affects the AUD values of all entries in the balance of payments and so finds its way into GDP – but has turned out to be very difficult to forecast. This would not have surprised Keynes, who had sufficient experience of financial markets to know their speculative jitteriness. In its forecasts, NIEIR takes into account commodity prices (which seem to influence the exchange rate far more than their significance for the economy) and interest rate differentials.

 

Investment

In neoliberal economics, finance for fixed capital investment is distributed by a cool and rational finance sector. By contrast, in the macroeconomics of Keynes’ General Theory, investment depends largely on animal spirits. NIEIR makes use of the Flow of Funds statistics, which show that there is very little net flow of funds from Australian financial intermediaries to businesses making major investments in fixed capital: funding is generally from internal sources backed up by direct access to international equity markets. In these circumstances, the Taylor rule is generally appropriate: fixed capital accumulation depends on industry retained surpluses with inflationary expectations taken into account through a downward adjustment when the inflation rate rises. This rule has the technical advantage of ease of econometric estimation at the industry level. 

It has been argued in economics that forecasts of real capital accumulation should be forward-looking, emphasising the expectations of investors. For many years, NIEIR experimented with the data from surveys of investment expectations but found that realisation rates varied cyclically except for large-scale committed projects. NIEIR continues to use project lists to forecast expenditure for committed construction projects but otherwise argues that recent retained profits are as good a proxy as any for profit expectations. They accordingly exercise a strong influence on both the ability and willingness to invest.

Although based on the National Accounts and macroeconomic theory, NIEIR’s models have been extended from the world of Keynesian aggregates to include inter-industry accounting as pioneered by Leontief. As perceived by Leontief, the industries of any region take inputs and create outputs. The inputs comprise capital, labour and ‘materials’, the outputs of other industries in the region plus imports from other regions. The outputs of each industry are divided between inputs to other industries in the region, exports to other regions and consumption of final products by households in the region. This classification elaborates the Keynesian aggregates. For example, aggregate consumption is the total of industry outputs sold to consumers plus imports sold to consumers, while gross domestic product is the sum across all industries of the cost of capital and labour inputs. For this reason, it fits very neatly into NIEIR’s modelling system.

For reasons of data availability, this scheme is most readily actualised at the national level. Data are required on the values, by industry, of output, labour inputs, capital inputs, inputs from each other industry, inputs from imports, outputs sold to each other industry, outputs sold as exports, outputs sold to consumers and taxes paid less subsidies received. Price series are also required for all inputs and outputs. At the national level, all of these values are either directly estimated by the ABS or can be derived from ABS data. The input–output matrix is a central element. Unfortunately, it is not produced as frequently as the other data but after allowing for this it is possible to develop time series for all the variables required to describe activity in Australian industries as classified by the ABS: over 100 in the input–output table.

A crucial element in the analysis of this plethora of data is the functional form of the relationship between inputs and output. Because there are several inputs, the functional form must be able to deal with the choice of inputs. Assuming standard qualities for each input, this amounts to the rate of substitution of input for input when the ratio of input prices changes. Leontief responded to this problem by letting the data speak for itself. He specified a relationship in which outputs increased with inputs, but inputs could be either substitutes or complements: substitutes when purchases increased when relative price fell; and complements when purchases increased when the relative price of the complementary input fell. Apart from these limited priors, Leontief allowed the data to determine the parameters, including lagged changes. Applying this approach to Australian manufacturing industry data, NIEIR found that the response to an increase in demand is indeed dynamic, with inputs tending to be harder worked initially followed by an adjustment as capacity was increased. The effect of working inputs harder shows up as a short-term increase in productivity, or returns to scale, and the effect of increasing capacity is to remove at least some of these economies of scale. However, even after 5 years of adjustment, there were many industries in which increasing returns to scale persisted. Similarly, industries were identified in which at least some inputs were complementary: most commonly capital and inputs purchased from other industries (‘material’ broadly defined to include services). All of these estimates, including the dynamics, were well suited to incorporation into the model outlined above. Incorporation allowed the drivers of many of the macroeconomic variables (demand for labour, capital accumulation, value of output, imports and exports) to be calculated by aggregation from the industry level, subject to consistency conditions (e.g. total sales of consumption goods must equal total demand for consumption goods as determined by household incomes, wealth and the like).

 

The generalised Leontief cost function

Underlying the generalised Leontief production function is a cost function that has the desirable property that it can be regarded as a second-order approximation in prices to any arbitrary cost (and, hence, production) function.

The general form of the desired factor input function can be derived from the generalised Leontief production function as follows:
i=1

+ bj,n+1 fj(Q) + exogenous variables}

(j,k = 1, 2, …, n)

where fj(Q) and f(Q) are unspecified, monotonically increasing functions in output. For the equation to describe an underlying production technology, the regularity condition summarised above must be satisfied, for which bj,1 … bj,a+1 must be zero or positive for all j.

The generalised Leontief cost function is comprehensive, because it describes all the types of production technology that produce positive outputs. There will be a variable elasticity of substitution between factors j and k if at least one bj,k, j ≠ k, is non-zero. The function also allows for complementarity between factors, which exists if bj,k is negative: if bj,k is positive, the traditional substitutability assumption applies.

Although this approach to the data is straightforward, it requires a certain amount of unlearning by those who have previously encountered input–output tables only in the context of equilibrium theories. The first difference is the introduction of dynamic instead of instantaneous adjustment, the second the unrestricted form of the relationships (hence, for example, increasing returns to scale can occur), while the third, and more subtle, difference is that changes in outputs and inputs are not so strongly driven by prices. Instead, quantity adjustments can occur, in the same way as they occur in the macroeconomic model.

As an example, the energy industries are identified in the national model complete with input–output relationships with other industries and with their own internal relationships by which inputs are transformed into outputs. In the energy industries, inputs of capital are particularly important, reflecting not only the capital-intensive nature of the industries but the importance of technology in governing the transformation of fuels and other energy sources into useful energy. At the broad level, the various transformation technologies are represented by coefficients that reflect the productivity of capital embodied in succeeding vintages of the various technologies employed. The system thus describes the changing sensitivity of costs to the prices of fuel and capital. This summary account of the energy industries is incorporated into the model at the national level; however, much more detailed modelling of the demand for energy is required when preparing forecasts for particular energy industries.

The national model is complemented by state and local models, to which we now turn.

 

The state and regional models
Australia is geographically a large country, and the growth rates of economic variables generally diverge regionally. A first step in analysing these divergences is to move from the national to the state and territory level.

State activity

The ABS estimates and publishes most of the National Accounts data at the state and territory level, so providing the basis for constructing similar models to the NIEIR national model at the state/territory level. The main differences are as follows:

A number of drivers are determined at the national level and applied across the board to the states. These include the exchange rate, financial variables, such as the interest rate, and variables reflecting Commonwealth policy.

Capacity constraints are a little more flexible. For example, a state that is growing faster than the others will be better able to attract skilled labour, allowing its skilled labour supply to grow more rapidly than the national total.

Some of the statistical detail used in the estimation of the national model is not available at the state level, and has to be estimated. This is particularly true of the input–output table, which NIEIR estimates at the state level using a methodology similar to that used by the ABS for the national table, subject to national-level constraints.

At the state level, particular construction and investment projects increase in prominence in relation to the general flow of economic activity. Because they result from individual decisions, these are unsuited to econometric modelling. Instead, NIEIR maintains project lists and decides on the basis of such information as is available when listed projects are likely to be undertaken. Care is taken to avoid double counting.

When preparing general economic forecasts, which to a large degree are driven by world and all-Australia trends, NIEIR runs the national model and then estimates state impacts using the state models. This involves operating the state models in top-down mode, in which state estimates of macroeconomic variables are derived from the national estimates by applying ‘shift-share’ functions. These functions might be simple

(e.g. allocation by state in proportion to a single driver) or sophisticated (multiple drivers, feedbacks or lags). The simplifying assumption underlying this methodology is that national trends are experienced pro-rata by the states, without any interaction between the states. If interaction is expected, it is necessary to go to much more detailed modelling that covers the dynamics of each state and its effects on the other states and territories.

Although state models remain relevant to the assessment of state-level policies, their main role is to provide control totals for the regional modelling system. These align the regional models with National Accounts data, the state being the smallest jurisdiction for which these data are published.

 

Regional models

Reflecting the structure of Australian governments, NIEIR generally defines local regions as local government areas (LGAs). However, other definitions are possible: virtually any geographic area can be defined as a region for modelling purposes.

As at the state level, reasonably accurate business-as-usual forecasts can be prepared with relatively little effort using top-down methods, applying shift-share functions to allocate national and state totals to LGAs. Similar methods are appropriate for most policy changes at the Commonwealth level, such as the effect on regional incomes of a change in tax rates. It is even appropriate to use top-down methods in the case of major investment projects that impact particular LGAs, one or a small number, provided there is no direct impact on their neighbours. In this case, the projects can be added to the LGAs concerned, to the state concerned and to the national total. The revised national forecast, excluding the effect on the directly affected LGAs, can then be allocated to the remaining LGAs by shift-share.

This approach is inadequate for the assessment of developments where regions interact with each other.

Interaction can only be described using ‘bottom-up’ modelling, in which each region is modelled in its own right as though it represents a country in a world model. This requires replication of the structure of the national model for each region. The national model then disappears from forecasting, national totals being calculated by summing the regional totals.

Replication of the national model at the regional level requires that each region should have its own household sector, its own industries and its own inter-industry relationships, all joined to other regions by explicit trade links (imports and exports) and explicit financial flows (including transfer incomes and commuter incomes and expenditures). The data requirements for this approach are very large, because for each region the following datasets are needed:

– aggregate household income and expenditure accounts showing income received, income outflows, savings and aggregate housing and consumption expenditures;

– basic aggregate household balance sheets, including property values and debt;

– input–output tables or inter-industry flows for industries operating within the region;

– foreign trade flows showing how each industry in a given region allocates exports to overseas markets and purchases imports from overseas;

– inter-regional trade flows showing how each industry in a given region sells goods and services to, and buys them from, industries in each other region in Australia;

– income flows showing how incomes flow between regions due to commuting, property incomes, government benefits and government-financed services; and

– expenditure flows showing how expenditures flow between regions due to taxes, superannuation contributions and out-of-region shopping.

 

The main problems in estimating models at the LGA level are due to data availability. Therefore, we name the major sources:

at 5-yearly intervals the Census provides detailed information on household demography, incomes, occupations, industry of employment and even basic information on asset ownership and indebtedness;

the Census also provides detailed information on the location of employment by industry and occupation. This is derived from the Census

‘journey to work’ question, and requires manipulation before it can be reconciled with Census data on employment by place of residence;

the Taxation Office provides detailed information on taxpayer characteristics by postcode, which NIEIR converts to LGA using a concordance produced by the ABS;

Centrelink likewise provides postcode data on the take-up of pensions and benefits;

at a variety of time intervals (generally getting longer) the ABS has conducted censuses of tourist accommodation, retail activity, manufacturing, mining and agriculture. For many years the ABS conducted a very basic census of businesses, known as the business register. This has been partially replaced by data from Dun and Bradstreet; sample surveys rarely yield valid data at LGA level, the partial exception being the labour force surveys of employment and unemployment produced by the Commonwealth Department of Education Employment and Workforce Relations. However, data from a variety of ABS surveys have been incorporated into NIEIR’s regional modelling; building approvals data are a source; the Real Estate and Stock Institute provides data on dwelling sales and values; and various other sources, mostly administrative data from state and local governments, are relevant from time to time.

Many of these data are costly and their use is limited by agreements to safeguard privacy and commercial confidentiality.

The model estimated for each LGA is structurally similar to those estimated at the national and state levels. However, the small size of LGAs results in a number of differences:

projects undertaken and decisions made by large employers (e.g. plant closure, plant upgrading) can completely dominate local economies and leave them open to idiosyncratic business and investment decisions. Where this is known to be the case, data on the particular project or employer decision is substituted for model-based forecasts; and LGAs, being small, are particularly open economies. Typically, a large proportion of total output is exported (to other LGAs, to overseas) while a large proportion of total supply is imported.

The lack of self-containment of LGAs also expresses itself in the flow of incomes from outside the LGA. These include commuter incomes (earnings of residents who work outside the LGA), private asset incomes and government pensions and benefits. LGA residents also contribute to taxation, and receive health, education and other publicly-financed services. These, in turn, generate employment, which is located at the discretion of governments. Although fixed capital capacity constraints apply strongly at the LGA level, labour can be imported readily, subject only to national constraints. However, labour imports may require incentive payments, particularly if the regional housing market is tight.

The household sector in the National Accounts includes households in their domestic activities plus family businesses and not-for-profit organisations. The incomes of the household sector are estimated from a combination of sources, including the Census, the Taxation Office and Centrelink, plus Institute calculations for the activities of unincorporated business. Consumption expenditures are estimated through microsimulation by matching the Household Expenditure Survey with the characteristics of local households. Consumption expenditures are initially classified by consumption item as in the Expenditure Survey, but these are translated into industry outputs (including imports from overseas by industry). Balance sheets are estimated by microsimulation from the balance sheet portion of the Household Expenditure Survey coupled with the limited Census data on assets and debts and data from other sources on dwelling prices and household debt. 

Estimates of the quantum of agricultural output are available by LGA. For modelling purposes, past agricultural production is normalised to standard weather patterns, after which the quantum can be converted to a value by application of price indices (which themselves might require normalisation for weather). For other industries the value of output is estimated primarily from employment data by industry multiplied by regional labour productivity differentials based on postcode income tax data. The estimates for knowledge-based industries are further modified to take into account the productivity effects of regional industry clusters.

A separate input–output table is estimated for each LGA by matching industry input requirements to industry outputs in the same LGA, given the total outputs of each and the patterns revealed in the national input–output table, which, incidentally, restricts disaggregation to 106 industries.

The first step in the estimation of trade flows is the construction of household accounts for each region. On the income side, regional household income is known reasonably accurately from the Census, taxation and social security data. Microsimulation models are used in conjunction with information about house prices, rents, mortgages and survey data to estimate total financial assets, financial liabilities, savings and consumption expenditure of households resident in each region. Microsimulation modelling involves matching survey data at unit record level, principally the ABS Household Expenditure Survey, to Census and regional activity data (such as retail sales) to estimate household consumption expenditure by region. The estimates are highly disaggregated. Expenditures are constrained so that the sum of expenditures by commodity equals the total regional household expenditure estimate. This process ensures that income and socio-demographic factors are reflected in the estimates of regional expenditure patterns.
Households do not necessarily spend their incomes in their LGA of residence. Expenditures are accordingly allocated to local and nearby retailers by a gravity model. Similarly, households do not necessarily earn their incomes in their LGA of residence. The Census ‘journey to work’ question allows accurate allocation of work incomes received in each LGA to the LGAs in which they were generated.

The foundation for production estimates is the Census estimate of four-digit Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification employment in each LGA. Given the employment base, the value of production can be estimated by multiplying employment for each industry by regional productivity differentials based on postcode income tax data. Farm income is also checked from agricultural output data. The estimates are checked for consistency with state-wide industry output data and the National Accounts state-level estimates.

Aggregate demand in each region totals net consumption (after allowance for sales to residents of nearby regions balanced against cross-border purchases by residents of the region), government expenditure, tourist expenditure (estimated from employment structure), investment expenditure and industry demand. Investment expenditure by households is mainly on housing and is modelled with reference to household formation, the supply of dwellings and household balance sheets (which document the capacity to borrow). Business investment covers both construction and equipment and is modelled (as in the national model) on the basis of business cash flow. Industry demand comprises investment demand and the demand for business inputs, which are calculated from regional input–output relationships.

 

Regional input–output

At the national level, the ABS publishes input–output tables that represent the flow of goods and services between industries. This information for the Australian economy as a whole can be adapted for regional use by taking four steps.

A national indirect allocation of imports table is prepared, showing the overseas import content of supply in each industry, the destination of supply (either inputs into various industries or final demands) and the mark-up between import costs and the prices charged to purchasers.

The information already described on industry output and consumption expenditure spent in the region is gathered. From the national input–output table, the region’s input requirements by industry are estimated given its industry outputs and consumption. How much of this input requirement is likely to be sourced locally is determined. This requires not only that local supply be available but that it be competitive with outside suppliers. The indicator used to assess likely local competitiveness is the import share in national supply as estimated in step 1.

For each industry, an increase in sales to other regions (exports) will yield increases in demand for the outputs of local industries, either directly as purchases of inputs or indirectly through the generation of household incomes which are spent locally. Dividing the resulting increase in local production by the increase in exports yields an estimate of the Type 1 multiplier: the increase in local output as a result of increased local sales, all other factors held constant. In further analysis there might be feedbacks: for example, increases in local wage rates that cause wage-sensitive local production to be curtailed, thus offsetting the initial stimulus. Whether or not this or other offsets occur depends strongly on local circumstances.

In addition to this basic analysis, regional input–output estimates can be strengthened by the addition of data, including details on employment, incomes and the extent to which profits generated in the region are retained within the region.

 

Freight flows

For each industry, data on overseas exports and imports is available by port and by state of origin/destination in both dollar value and tonnes. Given these constraints, a cost minimisation algorithm is used to allocate international exports and imports by port to the industries of each region. This assignment is iterated until a consistent balance is achieved across all regions and ports. Once international imports and exports by industry have been allocated by region, inter-regional exports and imports can be estimated as a residual. This is done using a gravity model. The gravity factors in the model are adjusted for variations in the substitutability of the items included in the output of each industry in a given location. The lower the substitutability, the greater will be the tendency of production in a given location to sell to the national market. Over time, increasing specialisation in production will tend to lower the degree of substitutability between plants in the same industry in different locations. The substitutability factors for each industry were estimated on the basis of differentials in net interstate imports by industry and by state.

A similar gravity model approach is taken with services, on the grounds that many services involve physical travel, which causes friction of distance, as with freight.

Although the basic unit of calculation is monetary values, trade flows in industries with physical outputs (as distinct from services) can be converted to tonnes using estimates of $/tonne. These can be compared to data on truck movements and reviewed if necessary.

Regional forecasting and analysis using the integrated regional model structure

Forecasts are prepared at the LGA level for the major economic indicators: population (including migration as a result of economic incentives), business value-added (or gross regional product, by industry), employment, income (by source) and consumption (by good or service purchased). The main factors driving the forecasts in each LGA include the following:

the dynamics internal to the LGA, including local demography, local holdings of wealth and debt, dwelling prices, local productive capacities of both capital and labour and local accumulation of capital and skills;

the effect of specific local changes, such as investment projects where the decision lies outside the forecasting model proper;

the local effect of changes in other LGAs through inter-LGA trade and income transfer mechanisms (these include the local effect of changes driven at the national, and occasionally state, levels, and these drivers are applied in each LGA-level model); and

in practice, and depending on judgement concerning the closeness of LGA relationships, changes in peripheral LGAs might be estimated by calculating a national total then cascading down from the national and state models through the effect of drivers determined in these models (e.g. interest rates and prices) and through the pro-rating process.

 

The regional modelling system is updated annually (with a special update after every Census). The update involves calculation of variables, such as regional value-added, which are not otherwise published. NIEIR groups Australia’s LGAs into 67 regions, and values for these regions along with short-term forecasts for each region are published annually in the ‘State of the Regions’ report for the Australian Local Government Association.

 

Modelling in practice

The NIEIR modelling system comprises a family of interacting, mutually-compatible econometric models adapted for both forecasting and analysis. Forecasting and analytical tasks are carried out using appropriate subsets of the family of models.

Because they are inherently dynamic, the models by their nature generate forecasts. These forecasts are driven partly by relationships internal to the models, but also by factors treated as exogenous, of which the most significant are world trade and finance. Exogenous variables become less and less reliable as they recede into the future, and so do endogenous relationships embedded in the models; therefore, beyond a decade or so, projections should not be regarded as forecasts, but rather as exploratory scenarios: business as usual perhaps, but not really business as expected.

Because the models cover all industries and all parts of the country, they can be used to prepare detailed forecasts for quite specific variables. A major area of forecasting expertise concerns energy demand, where the usual economic drivers have been supplemented by meteorological probability functions to predict peak electricity demand.

The models have also turned out to be powerful for policy analysis, using the simple methodology of dual projection: a business-as-usual or base case compared with a policy case. Welfare judgements can be made by a variety of variables, such as the effect on GDP, the effect on disposable income, the effect on sustainable consumption and the effect on the distribution of disposable income. Policies modelled can involve changes to prices, changes to technology, particular project investments variously financed, and changes to taxes, regulations and expenditures at all three levels of government. There is no difficulty in accommodating differences in timing.

Despite this general usefulness, when analysing particular proposals it has usually proved desirable to review and if necessary reconstruct the parts of the model(s) directly relevant to the proposal. This can include detailed attention to the local economy of an LGA, detailed review of the economics of an industry or perhaps detailed work on skills or finance. In these studies the general modelling provides background to the sector or region examined in detail. Lessons learnt at these detailed levels are fed back into the general modelling.

In the construction of forecasting models, the general methodology used by NIEIR has no serious competitors. However, in policy analysis it has been fashionable to resort to general equilibrium models, which claim to cover the whole ground of relationships relevant to economic policy assessment but in practice do so largely by assumption. General equilibrium models are exceedingly abstract, based as they are on a fundamental assumption that economies can usefully be divided into autonomous markets and analysed in terms of price-mediated balances of demand and supply in each market. NIEIR claims that its models are significantly closer to reality. They do not assume away mathematically inconvenient aspects of the economy and, hence, are less likely to deliver counter-productive advice.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Energy and the Environment (NER 63)

National Economic Review

National Institute of Economic and Industry Research

No. 63               March 2010

The National Economic Review is published four times each year under the auspices of the Institute’s Academic Board.

The Review contains articles on economic and social issues relevant to Australia. While the Institute endeavours to provide reliable forecasts and believes material published in the Review is accurate it will not be liable for any claim by any party acting on such information.
Editor: Kylie Moreland

© National Institute of Economic and Industry Research

(Australian Farm Institute for the first article)

This journal is subject to copyright. Apart from such purposes as study, research, criticism or review as provided by the Copyright Act no part may be reproduced without the consent in writing of the relevant Institute.

ISSN 0813-9474

Energy and environment

Graham Armstrong, Consultant, NIEIR

Abstract

This paper reviews the global and Australian developments during the months leading to the Copenhagen COP-15 commencing 7 December 2009. As of 20 November it seemed unlikely that a consensus on emissions caps and the role of developing countries (non-Annex B) would be reached. Cuts below 1990 emissions are being sought from developed nations, as well as a slowing of emissions growth by non-Annex B nations. The investment costs to reduce emissions levels below 1990 levels will be huge. In addition, to achieve these reductions more stringent policies are required. The legislation progress and climate action developments of Australia, the USA, China, Japan, Russia, India and Canada are reviewed in the present paper.

Introduction

The 6 months prior to Copenhagen COP-15 saw considerable activity on climate change policies both internationally and in Australia. As this chapter was being finalised, the fate of the Australian carbon pollution reduction scheme (CPRS) was undecided. Set out below are reviews of the global and Australian developments.

Climate change policy options: Senate requests for further modelling

On 22 June 2009, the Senate Select Committee on Climate Policy released a report. The first recommendation was that Treasury be directed to do more modelling of the effects of the CPRS, including considering transition costs, effects on jobs and the environment and effects on regional Australia, allowing for the deterioration in the Australian economy.

The committee recommended Treasury be directed to model five policy alternatives:

  1. a ‘baseline-and-credit’ scheme;
  2. an ‘emissions intensity’ model;
  3. a carbon tax;
  4. a consumption-based carbon tax; and
  5. the McKibbin approach.

Options 1–3 and 5 target Australia’s production of emissions, including those exports that do not affect Australia’s emissions imports. Option 4 targets spending on emissions (embodied and use emissions consumption) and would apply to local spending, including imports and excluding exports. All options involve pricing carbon, whether applied to production or consumption. Another recommendation was that a CPRS-40 (cap of 40 per cent below 2000 emissions in 2020) be modelled.

The Treasury modelling report stated on page 84 that: ‘Emissions allocations based on production are likely to result in higher welfare costs for Australia than allocations based on consumption’. This implies that a consumption-based policy is lower cost than a production-based emissions trading scheme (ETS).

In a draft report open for comment, Climate Strategies provides climate policy modelling results for selected emissions intensive trade exposed industries (cement, steel and aluminium) operating in the European Union (EU). The modelling evaluates ‘carbon leakage’ under six policy options for dealing with trade exposed industries:

  1. full border adjustment (BA full), roughly equivalent to a consumption base;
  2. BA import (BA only for imports);
  3. BA direct (adjustment of exports and imports but only for direct emissions);
  4. BA EU average (adjustment for imports based on the EU emissions average);
  5. BA import direct; and
  6. full auction of permits.

The first five of these options are more or less comprehensive versions of the consumption -based carbon tax identified as option 4 by the Senate select committee. The sixth option is a particular variant of a production-based approach: a pure ETS. For cement, steel and aluminium, the first option, BA full (closest to a consumption-based carbon tax), delivers the lowest carbon leakage. The sixth option (full auction of permits to producers) generates the highest carbon leakage. A consumption-based ETS/tax would reduce the carbon leakage reason for not acting now on climate change.

Carbon pollution reduction scheme: 4 May revisions

2011–2012

Fixing a $10/t CO2e price will:

  • raise revenue (approximately $400 million);
  • not change generator merit order as brown coal generators with <$5/MWh short-run marginal cost (SRMC) and with greenhouse gas intensity at 1.2–1.5t CO2e/MWh would have SRMC increased by $12–15/MWh, to $17–20/MWh. Black coal $8–15/MWh SRMC would have SRMC and 0.8–1.0t CO2e/MWh increased by $8–10/MWh, to $16–25/MWh (lowest in Millmerran and Kogan Creek, Queensland, and Victoria protected due to transmission costs); and
  • have very low impact on electricity use due to low demand elasticity.

2012–2013 on

From 2012–1213, a $46/t CO2e cap will rise at 5 per cent plus inflation until 2020. New forest plantations can generate permits from July 2010.

Carbon pollution reduction scheme: 24 November adjustments

After prolonged negotiations with the opposition, the Federal Government announced several adjustments to the CPRS, outlined in Table 1. As the present paper was finalised, many details were not available.

The net budgetary impact over 10 years was estimated to be $769 million due to, it was stated, accounting procedures and a lower permit (CO2e) price (reason not stated: probably exchange rate assumption changes). Why the permit price would be lower was not explained, but the lower price reduced compensation to households by $916 million. Lower permit prices are probably due to higher exchange rate assumptions and, hence, lower Australian dollar prices of international credit purchases.

The total CPRS assistance package to industry to 2020 now amounts to approximately $120 billion. Whether CPRS-5 will be attained through a mix of domestic actions and purchase of international credits or through external balance effects is yet to be determined.

NIEIR’s current CO2e price scenarios

Following the Garnaut Review paper in June 2008, the Green Paper of the Federal Government in July 2008, the White Paper in November 2008, the 4 May 2009 revisions to the CPRS, and our analysis over the past year of likely Australian climate change policies, a CO2e pricing schedule was developed (see Table 2).

As emphasised above, analysis and projections have to be developed in the absence of emissions caps announcements, and detailed design announcements of an ETS (CPRS). The ‘base’ scenario is considered to be the most likely at this time (November 2009). A lower CO2e cost projection is considered very unlikely (P < 0.2), but a higher CO2e cost projection is a possibility (P = 0.3) post-2020.

In the base CO2e price scenario (essentially under CPRS-5) a higher cap is set and in the ‘high’ CO2e price (essentially CPRS-25) scenario a lower cap is set. The prices actually resulting over the period will depend on caps finally set, actual CPRS design, coal and gas prices, renewables costs, emission reduction technology developments and effectiveness of energy efficiency improvement (EEI) policies.

Table 1 E and E NER 63

 Table 2 E and E NER 63

Emission caps and reductions from business as usual (BAU) to 2020 are presented in Table 3.

Table 3 E and E NER 63

Sources of emission reductions

Domestic actions would largely fall on the stationary energy sector but international permit purchases could limit the domestic actions required, depending on the relative costs of international permits and the costs of domestic greenhouse gas abatement (GHGA).

The base scenario results in lower GHGA permit prices and electricity price impacts, and the high scenario produces higher GHGA, permit prices and electricity prices. We regard these two scenarios as covering the likely range of permit prices to emerge over the next 25–30 years. However, very stringent targets, for example the 40 per cent emissions reduction below 1990 levels by 2035 suggested at Bali COP 13 in December 2007 and Garnaut’s ‘necessary’ cap of a 90 per cent reduction by 2050, could see permit prices rise to much higher levels. In practice, in any scenario there could be significant volatility in CO2e prices as the system adjusts to the CPRS.

Impacts of the two scenarios on energy prices

In the electricity generation area there is relatively good data on generation SRMCs and long-run marginal costs (LRMCs) . Thus, it is reasonably straightforward to estimate the impact on SRMCs and LRMCs of permit price, the main caveat being future gas and black coal prices. There is less reliable data on the costs of reducing emissions from generators (e.g. via carbon capture and storage) and from emissions in other greenhouse (National Greenhouse Gas Inventory) sectors where abatement could contribute to attainment of a given cap. Over time, generator energy efficiencies will improve and reduce the impact of CO2e pricing on new generation entering the market. Accordingly, it is difficult to predict the permit price that would produce the abatement required to attain a given cap (EEI and generator mix responses) and to estimate the impact of permit prices on electricity prices.

In addition, demand responses to increased energy prices and to complementary measures that contribute to GHGA will reduce the permit price required to attain a given cap. In the EU ETS, and proposed by the Australian state/territories work on an ETS as well as the White Paper and Garnaut, complementary measures to cover EEI, renewable energy (RE) targets and support for R&D, demonstration and commercialisation are seen as desirable. Federally, there appears to be some ambivalence on EEI and RE complementary measures. Effective EEI measures such as minimum performance standards, rebates and targeted business sector programs can provide significant GHGA at lower costs per tonne of CO2e than can be delivered by reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from fossil electricity generation.

Higher mandated renewable electricity targets, although delivering relatively high cost abatement (>$30/t CO2e), reduce the contribution from fossil generators of delivering a national greenhouse gas abatement target from an ETS because this RE GHGA contributes to the cap outside the ETS. The mandated contribution from RE increases electricity prices until CO2e inclusive fossil generation costs rise to RE cost levels.

For NEMMCO and Transgrid in April 2008, NIEIR estimated impacts of an ETS on generators in the inter-connected NEM regions based on ACIL-Tasman (for NEMMCO, 2007) SRMC estimates and NIEIR LRM/AC estimates. For Western Australia the resulting electricity prices are likely to be similar as the generation mix (black coal and gas) is broadly similar to that in the NEM. In the Northern Territory, which has a gas-based system, the impact will be lower. Again, we emphasise that without details of the final ETS design and modelling of these details, it is only possible to develop broad estimates of future electricity prices under an ETS.

Note that the estimates for existing and new gas plants depend on the price at which gas can be sourced (there are low and high views on future gas prices) . In addition, for new gas plants the capital costs are escalating as demand for gas turbines increases globally. New coal plants are also subject to cost (capital and operating) pressures but not to the same extent as new gas plants.

Note also that coverage of fugitive emissions as proposed in the CPRS increases the fuel costs for gas and black coal generators and for gas use in water heating. That is, the sent out costs of gas and black coal generators increase relative to brown coal generators (very low upstream emissions) because of the carbon cost of transport of the fuels to generators and the fugitives (methane, CO2) from production and processing. In New South Wales, these indirect (Scope 3) emissions for large users of gas (generators etc.) are 0.013t CO2e/GJ and for coal depend on the actual coal source, but average approximately 0.009t CO2e/GJ. In New South Wales for gas each $10/t CO2e would add approximately $0.13/GJ to the price of gas, for a CCGT would add approximately $0.80/MWh and for ‘gassy’ black coal approximately $0.85/MWh.

If these emissions are covered in the CPRS design (as proposed) they would raise the costs of gas and black coal generators if, as expected, the fuel price impacts were passed on in fuel prices purchased by the generators.

Peak and off-peak electricity prices

Currently, in most regions, off-peak electricity (10.00 pm to 7.00 am) is met by coal plants. The exceptions are the Northern Territory and, to some extent, South Australia and Western Australia (in Tasmania, with Basslink in place, hydro water is conserved for peak operation and off-peak power is mainly imported from Victoria).

Under the CPRS, as permit prices rise, a level (approximately $30/t CO2e) will be reached where only very efficient coal plants (Millmerran and Kogan Creek) can compete with gas plants in off-peak periods. Gas plants will have to operate at higher capacity factors and coal plants at lower capacity factors at the projected permit prices required for the emissions cap to be attained. To maximise net revenues, coal plants will run in periods where pool prices are higher.

Demands in peak and off-peak periods will be met at a price where the marginal bidder, whose bid is necessary to meet demand, has an SRMC (including CO2e costs) lower than the spot price (in addition, some off-peak power is, and will continue to be, met by intermittent generators). Currently, peak electricity (i.e. outside off-peak) may be broken down into several periods (e.g. intermediate/shoulder, daily peak and summer peak). Currently, demands in these periods are met by a combination of coal, gas and renewables. In high peak periods (mainly on hot summer days), the marginal generators (those providing the last MWhs required to meet demands) are generally open cycle gas turbines (OCGTs) with perhaps some scheduled hydro generators.

Under the CPRS, OCGTs will still be (with hydro where/when available) the high peak suppliers because of their quick-start capabilities (coal generators cannot respond to rapid demand increases). When the spot price exceeds the CO 2e price adjusted SRMC of these generators, bids will reflect the prices these OCGTs need to cover their long- run average costs (LRACs) at their anticipated capacity factors.

The conclusion of the above discussion is that electricity prices in each period will rise to at least the level at which the marginal generator required to meet demand will cover that generator’s SRMCs. The marginal generators will, over time, have to meet their LRACs by operating in periods where the price of SRMCs gives them enough net revenues to enable their capital as well as operating costs to be covered. However, their capital costs will depend on their asset values: the lower the asset value, the lower will be the excess net revenues over SRMCs to service the asset value (capital costs). Asset values will drop if these excess (over SRMCs) net revenues are insufficient to service current asset capitalisation. Asset values may drop towards zero, at which point if revenues cannot cover SRMCs the plant will cease operation.

Average wholesale percentage price increases for CPRS-5, CPRS-15 and CPRS-25 estimated in the Treasury modelling are presented in Table 4. Higher wholesale electricity prices flow into the retail prices that are faced by households. In the initial years of emission pricing, average Australian electricity prices faced by households increase by 20 per cent for the CPRS-5 scenario and 38 per cent for the Garnaut-25.

The effect on households is muted by rising real incomes over time.

It is very important to note that underlying ($0/t CO2e) average retail prices have risen by approximately 25 per cent over the past 5 years (2004–2009), through increases in wholesale prices and through higher network charges. Similar, probably higher, underlying price increases are likely over the next 5 years, mainly due to higher network charges as networks are refurbished, augmented and extended. Currently, average residential prices (peak) in Victoria are approximately $180/MWh and in the absence of a CPRS could reach $230/MWh or higher by 2020 (2009 dollars). CPRS-5 would increase this price to approximately $275/MWh; off-peak prices would be approximately $185/MWh ($80/MWh in 2009).

Opposition modelling, emissions trading scheme design suggestions

The Coalition opposition commissioned Frontier Economics to model suggested CPRS amendments. Among these, the main amendments were as follows:

  • fugitive emissions from coal mining be excluded;
  • permanently excluding the agricultural sector from the CPRS but allowing the sector to create and trade accredited offsets;
  • reducing emissions through improved soil management, better grazing practices, increased forestry planting and maintenance and use of technologies such as biochar;
  • making power generators only liable for emissions that exceed an industry benchmark, rather than all their emissions (marginal CO2e tax); and
  • trade exposed industries to receive permits for all their emissions provided they conform to world’s best practice.

The Greens proposed (October 2009) a program of $22 billion to EEI retrofit all Australian residences (an approximate average of $2,750/house) and to limit purchases of international credits to 25 per cent of required emission reductions.

Table 4 E and E NER 63

United States climate legislation progress

A Senate Bill (Boxer–Kerry), the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, is similar to the Waxman– Markey Bill: it calls for a 20 per cent reduction on 2006 emissions by 2020, which translates into a 7.3 per cent reduction below 1990 by 2020 (similar to CPRS-5 targets/caps). Seventeen per cent below 2005 (Obama/Boxer/Kerry) would be approximately 5 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020.

There are three main steps that remain to be taken before climate change legislation in the United States comes into force. First, the Senate will have to agree on the ‘Climate Bill’. Second, once approved, the Senate version of the text must be reconciled with the version that passed the House of Representatives. Third, the bill needs to be signed by the President.

China: Climate change action developments

Chinese emissions continue to increase significantly as economic growth continues, electricity generation based on coal soars, emitting industries continue to expand and personal consumption increases rapidly. However, there is also substantial action on GHG emission reductions through investments in EEI, RE and replacement of other greenhouse gases such as hydrofluorocarbons.

In China’s 2008–2009 stimulus package of A$650 billion, approximately 40 per cent was dedicated to sustainable initiatives. In the United States stimulus of A$850 billion, 12 per cent was allocated to such initiatives; of the Australian A$27 billion, 9 per cent; and the South Korea A$45 billion, 80 per cent.

Chinese initiatives

Chinese initiatives include the following:

  • solar water heaters: 50 per cent of global production, 65 per cent of installations;
  • photovoltaics: 40 per cent of global supply;
  • energy efficiency: energy intensity down 60 per cent since 1980, and a further reduction of 20 per cent by 2010; 240 million tonnes of coal equivalent reduction by 2010;
  • new building standard: 50 per cent savings compared to current standard;
  • subsidies to photovoltaic (PV) production;
  • installation of 25 MW of solar PV in 2008; 100 MW since 2000;
  • 6,000 MW of wind installed by 2008; 3,000 MW in 2007 increasing by over 40 per cent per year (doubled in 2008 to 12,200 MW) and could reach 100,000 MW by 2020; and
  • 15 per cent renewable electricity target by 2020.

China went to the Copenhagen conference with an offer of a significant (40 per cent) intensity (tCO2e/GDP) reduction by 2020.

Japan’s commitment

Japan’s Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, pledged to cut GHG emissions by 25 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020. However, this proposal is contingent on similar ambitious goals by other major emitters. In 2008, emissions were 16 per cent above Kyoto targets for 2008–2012. Major initiatives to attain the Japanese target are an ETS and a feed-in-tariff for production of electricity from renewables. It is not clear what the domestic/international offset balance for emission reductions would be in meeting the target.

Japan’s largest business association, Keidanren, opposes cuts of greater than 6 per cent by 2020.

Russian situation

In 2007, Russia’s actual emissions were almost 34 per cent lower than in 1990. Since Kyoto, many experts have expressed concerns about these surpluses flooding the international carbon market, thereby lowering carbon prices.

It will be interesting to see what Russia’s position will be in a post-2012 climate regime. Russia has the legal right under the Kyoto Protocol to use its surplus assigned amount built up during 2008–2012 for complying with follow-up commitments after 2012 (conservatively assuming that Russia’s emissions will remain constant at 2007 levels, a tradeable surplus of well over 1 billion assigned amount units could emerge).

Russia has officially announced a 10–15 per cent emission reduction target compared to 1990 levels to be achieved by 2020. According to a study by Anna Korppoo and Thomas Spencer (The Dead Souls: How to Deal with the Russian Surplus?, 2009), this target ‘neither reflect[s] the country’s efficiency potential, nor modelled trends’. Korppoo and Spencer argue that Russia could commit to a target of approximately –30 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020.

Indian position

The Indian Government stated on 29 November 2009 that it would not commit to binding emission cuts, but would sign onto a deviation from BAU. India has taken significant steps towards increased penetration of renewables and EEI. Over the past 10 years there has been an average of 8–9 per cent economic growth, with only 3.8–3.9 per cent growth in energy use.

China, Brazil, India and South Africa agreed to a draft statement on climate change for COP-15 as a basis for negotiations. India might follow China in setting an energy intensity reduction target without jeopardising a 7–8 per cent growth continuance.

Global emissions market

In 2008, it is estimated that the global emissions market was worth approximately US$126 billion, of which approximately US$92 billion was trading in EU abatement allowances. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) certified emission reduction (CER) credits were valued at US$26 billion, five times 2007 levels. European utilities are the most significant players in the market. They also use derivatives as an instrument to hedge against energy prices.

Credit prices dropped in 2008 and 2009 as the economy declined, reducing CO2 emissions, thus reducing the demand for allowances. EU abatement allowance prices in the third quarter of 2009 were €13– 15/t CO2e (A$21–24/t CO2e). CDM CER prices were slightly lower.

 

Canada

Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions keep on rising

Canada’s National Inventory Report for 2007 emissions was filed with the UN on 17 April 2009 in compliance with its reporting obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. The report shows that there has been a 4 per cent increase in GHG emissions in Canada since 2006 and more than a 26 per cent increase since 1990. This increase makes Canada the G8 nation with the most significant rise in GHG emissions. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Canada pledged to reduce emissions to 6 per cent below 1990 levels. This latest report confirms that as of 2007, Canada was 33.8 per cent above its international commitment. The report indicates that transportation and energy production are primarily responsible for the rise in emissions as these sources account for approximately 143 million tonnes of the 155 million tonne increase since 1990.

On 18 November 2009, the Canadian Government declared that it would not announce new climate change policies until 2010.

Alberta (Canada)

Alberta’s Climate Change and Emissions Management Act and its associated Specified Gas Emitters Regulation set province-wide emissions reduction goals and provide the framework and regulatory enactment authority for the regulations that set out the details of Alberta’s emissions reduction and trading regime.

Alberta has set targets based on emissions intensity (emissions reductions per unit of output) . Its legislative regime requires mandatory reporting for all releases of specified gas (the term used to define GHGs and their global warming potentials) from facilities that emit more than 100,000 tonnes of GHGs per year (referred to as Large Final Emitters). There are approximately 106 Large Final Emitters in the province. By sector, these Large Final Emitters are power plants (45 per cent), oil sands (21 per cent), heavy oil (7 per cent), gas plants (7 per cent), chemicals (6 per cent) and other (14 per cent).

Large Final Emitters were required to apply for the establishment of a ‘baseline emissions intensity’ by 31 December 2007. The baseline is calculated based on the ratio of total annual emissions to production. A Large Final Emitter must not exceed 88 per cent of its baseline emissions intensity (i.e. 12 per cent below the facility-specific baseline). Reduction amounts are currently static, but more stringent targets are contemplated in the future. The regime contemplates that all new facilities will be subject to gradual reductions from the fourth year of operation, reducing emissions by 2 per cent per year until a 10 per cent reduction is achieved. Those found to be out of compliance may be subject to a $200/tonne fine. Other penalties for contravention of specified sections of the regulation could result in penalties of up to $ 50,000 in the case of an individual and $ 500,000 in the case of a corporation (e.g. failure to submit the required compliance report: s.11). Emitters can also be subject to administrative penalties.

If they are unable to make the mandated reductions on-site, Alberta’s system allows regulated entities to buy credits from other regulated entities, to purchase offset credits or to make a payment into the technology fund. Payment into the technology fund is currently set at $15/tonne of CO2e. Offset project assurance occurs after offset credits are created. Offset credits do not have to be pre-approved before they are used; however, they must be verified by a third party and the reduction must:

  • occur in Alberta;
  • not otherwise be required by law;
  • have a project start date not earlier than 1 January 2002;
  • be real and demonstrable; and
  • be quantifiable and measurable.

Alberta offset projects use government approved protocols to establish the scientific basis for the ultimate assertion that GHGs have been reduced or removed as a result of the project. In Alberta there are currently 24 approved protocols and approximately 14 more are in the review process.

Verified offsets (‘emissions offsets’) can be registered with the Alberta Emission Offset Registry and sold to Large Final Emitters in Alberta. Offset owners may also choose to register and sell their emissions offsets inter-provincially and internationally. In such cases, trading occurs through bilateral contracts outside the Alberta Emission Offset Registry. The Alberta system does not allow offsets from any source outside of Alberta. Large Final Emitters that emit less than their allocation can trade their emissions performance credits or bank them for future use.

Payment into the technology fund was a popular method of compliance in the first round of the program, ensuring that the price of carbon would not move much higher than $15/tonne. In the first compliance period, 1.5 million emissions offsets were created and over 2.6 million tonnes worth of payments into the technology fund were made. In 2007, 1 million emission performance credits were created, but only 250,000 were used for compliance purposes. In 2008, 1.9 million tonnes of emission performance credits were generated and 1.3 million of those were banked for future use. 2008 also saw 5.47 million tonnes worth of payments deposited into the technology fund and 3.4 million offset credits generated, 2.7 million of which were used for compliance purposes.

There have been over 5 million offset credits created under the Alberta system. Alberta emitters have spent more than $155 million on technology fund credits and offsets. The program saw 32 per cent of compliance attained by real intensity reductions in 2007 and 38 per cent in 2008.

The Chicago and Montreal Carbon Exchanges

With respect to emission reductions, the Chicago Carbon Exchange (CCX) is a self-contained voluntary regulatory scheme and trading system. Credits can be created on the CCX, in much the same way as in a government regulated system. On the one hand, a company may become a member of the exchange and agree to reduce its carbon emissions, thereby becoming a sort of voluntary regulated entity. On the other hand, a company may create a reduction project, the reductions from which, once they have been verified by a verifier that is approved by the CCX, may be registered on the exchange and traded. In short, the CCX acts as its own regulatory framework and determines the reduction requirements for its members as well as the validation criterion for reduction projects that are entitled to register credits on the exchange. The market for which the CCX is a platform is a voluntary market, in that the participants are not bound by law to reduce their emissions.

The Montreal Carbon Exchange (MCX) for its part is not a platform for a voluntary market but rather a market for forward contracts for delivery of ‘Canadian compliance units’ that will be created in a future regulated market to be put in place by the Canadian Federal Government. As such, the MCX is reliant on the coming into force of an eventual federal GHG emissions trading scheme in Canada. The MCX does not determine reduction requirements for any of its members, develop criteria for the validation of emission reductions or do anything other than function as a trading platform and clearing house for the contracts described above. The trading unit is a contract for future delivery of 100 ‘Canada Carbon Dioxide Equivalent Units’. Each such unit will be an entitlement to emit 1 ton of CO2 equivalent in the system to be defined by the government of Canada. The contracts will expire quarterly and the first expiration date is June 2011. Currently, the rules of the MCX provide for the physical settlement of the contracts with an alternative delivery procedure being available to the parties on an ad hoc basis.

Montreal Carbon Exchange activity

Although the exchange opened on 2 May 2008, the level of activity has been negligible. Exchange representatives attribute this to the federal government’s failure to deliver key elements to its offset system promised in mid-2008. This failure, along with the federal government’s non-committal attitude toward the execution of its proposed GHG regulatory scheme has depressed activity on the CCX market due to the uncertainty that the underlying element of the forward contracts will be available for delivery on the contract expiration dates.

The trading volume for the first quarter of 2009 for the four contracts that are currently traded is very low. Until such time as the federal government begins to create more certainty with respect to the timing of the coming into force of GHG regulation in Canada, there is little reason to expect any significant pick-up in the transaction volumes handled by the MCX.

The MCX must now contemplate what it will do in the event that nobody comes to the party in June 2011. In February 2009, the MCX sent out a survey to market participants asking them to give their view on different courses of action that could be adopted by the MCX in the event that the federal framework for GHG emissions trading is not in place by June 2011.

 

United States Cash for Clunkers Program: Greenhouse gas emission and other impacts

This program, part of the United States’ stimulus package, cost approximately $3 billion and concluded in September 2009. Approximately 700,000 rebates were used to purchase new cars in July and August, adding 0.3–0.4 per cent to GDP in the third quarter of 2009.

Greenhouse gas emission costs and benefits of the program

New York Times study concluded the following:

On average, USA cars are driven 12,000 miles per year, according to government statistics. Considering that the traded-in clunkers had an average fuel economy of 15.8 m.p.g. while the new ones deliver 24.9 m.p.g., a swap saved some 278 gallons of gas per year – which would have released almost 2.8 tonnes of carbon dioxide when burned.

Assuming the clunkers would have been driven four more years, the $4,200 average rebate removed 11.2 tonnes of carbon from the atmosphere, at a cost of some $375 per tonne. If they would have been driven five years the carbon savings cost $300 per tonne. And if drivers drive their sleek new wheels more than they drove their old clunkers, the cost of removing carbon from the atmosphere will be even higher.

To put this in perspective, an allowance to emit a tonne of CO2 costs about US$20 on the European Climate Exchange. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that a tonne of carbon would be valued at US$28 under the cap-and-trade program in the clean energy bill passed by the House in June.

The program might have been more efficient with modifications, like a smaller rebate. But even if the new cars bought under the program had zero emissions, the price of removing the clunkers’ carbon dioxide from the atmosphere would have been nearly $140 per tonne.

However, the New York Times analysis ignores two other major benefits of the program: air quality improvement and safety health benefits. Analysis of the similar British Columbia ‘Scrap it’ program concluded that air quality improvement benefits from removing older vehicles from the roads in Vancouver (the major city in British Columbia) could justify the program there. In addition, the health cost reductions by replacing older vehicles with much safer (e.g. ESP, ABS and air bags) new vehicles, would together with the CO2e and air quality index reduction benefits, make the program very attractive from a social cost–benefit viewpoint. Analysis of a similar program that could be adopted in Australia is required.

Energy and Environment (NER 60)

National Economic Review

National Institute of Economic and Industry Research

No. 60               December 2006

The National Economic Review is published four times each year under the auspices of the Institute’s Academic Board.

The Review contains articles on economic and social issues relevant to Australia. While the Institute endeavours to provide reliable forecasts and believes material published in the Review is accurate it will not be liable for any claim by any party acting on such information.

Editor: Dr A. Scott Lowson

© National Institute of Economic and Industry Research

This journal is subject to copyright. Apart from such purposes as study, research, criticism or review as provided by the Copyright Act no part may be reproduced without the consent in writing of the Institute.

ISSN 0813-9474

Energy and environment

Graham Armstrong, NIEIR

Abstract

Graham Armstrong provides an update on the Kyoto Protocol before considering several related issues. These include the differing responses to greenhouse policy by the Australian States and Territories on the one hand and the Federal Government on the other, developments in this field in the European Union, an update of the New Zealand Kyoto Target, and carbon trading in Australia.

Kyoto Protocol update

  1. The Kyoto Protocol (KP) was developed in 1997 by two major groups of countries: Annex B and non-Annex B (see below for definitions). Since 1997 the countries party to the Agreement have met regularly as the Conference of the Parties (COP) to clarify and refine the Articles of the KP.
  2. Annex B countries comprise developed economies and economies in transition (mostly eastern European countries) who have made commitments to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to the levels set out in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol document. The specified levels are for the first commitment period, 2008-12, where emissions levels are compared with a 1990 base. Non-Annex B countries, loosely called developing economies, comprise all other countries signatory to the KP.
  3. Annex B countries were called on to ratify the KP, that is to be legally bound by their commitments in Annex B. When countries comprising 55 per cent of emissions covered by total Annex B emissions had ratified the treaty the KP came into force. This occurred on 16 February 2005 following ratification by the Russian Federation.

 

As of 1 July 2005, the percentage of Annex B emissions covered by ratifying countries had reached 61.6 per cent with 0.2 per cent of emissions from countries likely to ratify. The countries opposing ratification, the United States and Australia, comprise 38.2 per cent of emissions (USA 36.1 per cent, Australia 2.1 per cent).

 

  1. Australia and the United States continue to oppose ratification for two main reasons: potential damage to their economies and the non-inclusion in Annex B of major and rapidly growing emitters, particularly India and China.

It is important to note that:

  • projections by the Australian Greenhouse Office (AGO) continue to indicate Australia will meet its Kyoto target, but mainly through reduction of emissions from land clearing;
  • all Australian States and a significant number of USA States support KP ratification; and
  • close neighbours and trading partners of the United States and Australia, Canada and New Zealand, have ratified the KP and are implementing strategies to meet their Kyoto commitments.

 

  1. COP meetings and discussions in countries around the globe are increasingly looking towards policies and programs to address greenhouse (global warming climate change) in the post Kyoto period, that is beyond 2012. The two major issues are:

 

  • how to include Annex B ratifiers in Annex B and non-Annex B countries in a post 2012 agreement; and
  • what form post 2012 agreements should take.

Post-2012 global policy discussions dominated the COP-10 meeting in Montreal, Canada, in December 2005.

 

  1. The United States and Australia (depending on future government make-ups), and some major non-Annex B countries, are likely to oppose targets and timetables for the post 2012 era, whereas most Annex B ratifiers appear to favour continuation of the Kyoto Protocol targets and timetables approach. However, there is broad global agreement that major GHG emissions reductions (“deep-cuts”) will eventually be required.

The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development

The recently announced Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development, although not viewed by partners as an alternative to Kyoto, will be a factor in future global policy discussions. An inaugural meeting of the group was held in Adelaide in March 2006. Current members of the Partnership are the United States, Australia, China, Japan, South Korea and India. Together they account for about half the world’s population, gross domestic product and greenhouse gas emissions. Of the countries only Japan is an Annex B Kyoto Protocol ratifier.

The primary aim of the Partnership, as set out in the group’s Vision Statement, is to achieve regional cooperation in developing and adopting cleaner (lower emission) energy technologies, including those based on coal, natural gas, nuclear (fission and fusion) and renewables, and technologies to capture and store GHG emissions.

Essentially the Partnership is a multi-lateral extension of existing clean technology agreements, for example that between Australia and India on clean coal. The main implication for States of the Partnership is that, in conjunction with the federal Low Emission Technology Fund, State development of low emission technologies could receive a further boost, depending on how the Commonwealth intends to act on progressing the aims of the Partnership.

Technology development, though essential for reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, does not alone lead to implementation of these technologies to actually reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Market signals complemented by market responsive regulations are a necessary adjunct to technology development. In this respect the plans and proposal outlined in Victoria’s Greenhouse Challenge for Energy (2004), and now being implemented, represent an exemplary integrated approach to future greenhouse policy development.

Thus, the Energy Technology Innovation Strategy (ETIS) and the earlier establishment of the Centre for Energy and Greenhouse Technology (CEGT), support for provision of market signals through development (with other jurisdictions) of an Emissions Trading System (ETS) and the development of Victorian Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Strategies (VEES and VRES), represent a balanced and responsible approach to the great challenges posed by global warming to global energy systems.

The Federal versus State/Territorial greenhouse policy positions

Introduction

The Federal and the States/Territories have very different views on greenhouse policy. Thus, despite some cooperation in the areas of energy efficiency (the National Framework for Energy Efficiency (NFEE), Minimum Energy Performance Standards) and in technology development there is fundamentally a wide difference in approaches to greenhouse policy.

Kyoto

The Federal Government continues to oppose Kyoto Protocol ratification whereas the States/Territories, while recognising that Kyoto is just a first tentative step towards an integrated global policy, support ratification.

Emissions trading system (ETS)

The Federal Government continues to oppose the introduction of an ETS whereas the States/Territories are putting a major effort into designing an ETS appropriate to Australian circumstances. Consultations on the ETS design principles developed earlier in 2005 were held around the country over the September/November period. Efforts are now focussed on detailed proposals on the 10 design propositions set out in the Background Paper for Stakeholder Consultation dated 12 September 2005 (www.cabinet.nsw.gov.au/greenhouse/emissions trading). A Secretariat has been formed headed by Anthea Harris (formerly of Frontier Economy).

Design issues to be considered as a priority

Point of liability – and liability average (large and small final emitters, comprehensive coverage).

  • Cap – what range of caps should be analysed: level, timing, flexibility.
  • Allocation – the methods of allocation, permit duration and impacts on electricity prices of different designs, the basis for administrative allocation (“grandfathering”) and the role(s) of auctioning.
  • Offsets – definitions, sources, baseline issues, impacts on permit prices.
  • Treatment of energy intensive trade exposed sectors: definitions, treatment options and impacts of these options.
  • The roles of research, development, demonstration and commercialisation (R, D, D and C) in longer term greenhouse gas abatement and how an ETS can promote these roles.

Process issues to be considered as a priority

There are a number of other issues which should be addressed as a matter of priority which are essentially process related. These include:

  • the legal basis for a scheme – particularly in relation to the constitutionality of a State based scheme. There is no point in States designing a preferred model, without considering what form of scheme is constitutionally sound; and
  • reporting requirements.

Short, medium and longer term greenhouse policies

The Federal Government has virtually no short or medium term policies, seemingly content to assume current policies (or lack thereof) will attain Australia’s Kyoto target, that medium term (2012-20) policies such as an interim carbon signal are not required until global action post-2012 is decided on, and that in the longer term current technology development policies are adequate.

The States/Territories believe that integrated market based and regulatory policies are required for short, medium and longer terms to put us on a path for an orderly transition to a more stringent carbon constrained economy. That is, there is a belief that early action to place activities on a progressively carbon constrained economy is required.

Thus, for example, the States/Territories and the Federal Government’s seeming abandonment of MRET is poor policy and short sighed despite the federal government’s R, D, D and C support for renewables. And the States/Territories are moving on a more rigorous approach to energy efficiency improvement (EEI) and promotion of lower greenhouse gas intensive (GHGI) electricity production.

Developments in the European  Union (EU) ETS

The EU ETS which began on 1 January 2005, has been beset by start-up problems. Firstly, about half the EU countries have not finalised their National Allocation Plans and this has restricted EU ETS trading in emission allowances.

Secondly, allowance prices have been much higher than expected: up to E30/tonne (now down to about E20/tonne compared with an expected range of E10-15/tonne. Besides the partial market (should the commencement have been delayed until 2006 to allow for completion of all NAPS), the rise in oil prices has led to a significant rise in oil linked gas prices, leading to substitution of coal for gas in electricity generation. This resulted in a higher than expected demand for allowances (in a restricted market) with generators not better off paying for coal plus allowances rather than generating with high priced gas.

New Zealand Kyoto target update

Original estimates (2002) of New Zealand’s carbon trading status were that New Zealand would have a 30 Mt surplus of CO2 credits over 2008-12, worth about NZ$450 million. However, 2005 projections indicate a deficit of 36.2 Mt costing NZ$543 million due to rapid growth in energy (mainly transport), industrial process emissions, miscalculation of Kyoto forest sequestration credits and over-estimation of program (EEI, etc.) impacts.

The New Zealand carbon tax of NZ$15/t CO2e was estimated to cost the average household about NZ$4/week and raise about NZ$360 million a year. A review of the New Zealand Climate Change program in the fourth quarter 2005 resulted in termination of the proposed carbon tax and development of a new climate change policy is now underway.

The New Zealand experiences should indicate for Australia:

  • doubts on whether the Australian emission target will, in fact, be attained as the Federal Government continues to claim; and
  • the difficulties associated with climate change policy designs and impacts.

Carbon trading in Australia Current markets

Currently a range of initiatives, mandatory (M) and voluntary (V), most with a trading element, are reducing, or aim to reduce, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions through greenhouse gas abatement. Certificates associated with these measures have a market value in 2005 totalling about $ 325 million. These measures are briefly outlined below.

1.             MRET (M)

 

MRET is currently a high cost route to GHGA, effectively sunsetted at about 6 Mt CO2e GHGA in 2010. Renewable energy certificates (RECs) from accredited renewable sources are now trading at about $30/MWh (about $ 25-35/t CO2e) from a range of renewable electricity sources.
The value of REC market in 2005 is about $100 million and about $285 million in 2010.

 

2.             New South Wales’ Greenhouse Abatement Scheme (GGAS) (M)

Recently extended to 2020, the Scheme requires electricity retailers to purchase their share (based on electricity sales of the estimated target market determined by regulations each year). NSW Greenhouse Abatement Certificates (NGACs), from a range of accredited renewable, fossil and energy efficiency improvement sources, are currently trading at about $14/t CO2e.

The value of the NGAC market in 2005 is estimated to be about $155 million and to be about $315 million in 2010.

3.             Queensland 13% Gas Scheme (M)

This measure is aimed at increasing the share of gas in the Queensland electricity generation mix and requires electricity retailers in Queensland to source 13 per cent of their electricity from gas (large loads over 750 GWh/year) are exempt (see Section 4.5 of this report for details). The Scheme which commenced on 1 January 2005 is implemented through tradable accredited Greenhouse Electricity certificates (GECs) which are currently trading at about $15/MWh.

The value of the GEC market in 2005 is estimated at about $70 million and in 2010 about $60 million (GEC price expected to drop despite increased volumes).

 

4.             Green Power (V)

Green Power involves the voluntary payment of a premium for electricity to cover the retailer costs of acquiring Green Power RECs which cannot be used for acquitting MRET liabilities.

The value of the Green Power market in 2005 is estimated to be about $15 million and perhaps some increase to $20 million in 2010.

5.             Greenhouse Friendly Certificates (V)

GFCs which accredit GHGA from eligible sources (including flaring of methane at landfill gas sites) are voluntarily purchased by companies to offset their greenhouse gas emissions from their activities. Currently there is a very limited market for GFCs which are trading at about $4/t CO2e.

The estimated GFC market value in 2005 is <$5 million and in 2010 to be about $10 million.

6.             Greenhouse Abatement Certificates (GACs) (V)

This market, which is just commencing, is the voluntary purchase of GHGA accredited certificates by entities to offset GHG emissions from their activities. The GACs differ from GFCs because of the wider range of eligible sources and their generally more stringent eligibility (additionality) criteria.

The rationales for purchasing GACs vary from “green image” to “contingent liabilities” and “learning by doing” in advance of a mandatory emissions trading system (ETS) introduction. Use of renewables for production of thermal energy (process heat, water heating), which are not eligible under MRET, GGAS or GP can be eligible to produce GACs.

The estimated value of the GAC market in 2005 is <$1 million and in 2010 possibly $ 10 million plus, as interest in GACs increases.

Total estimated value of the above “carbon” markets in 2005 is about $280 million.

Some companies, such as Energy Developments Ltd (EDL), are significant players in this market (EDL Annual Report indicates about $20 million of accredited certificates in 2004).

Future carbon markets

  • Current markets, in absence of new measures, could build to about $700 million in 2010.
  • The 31 October 2005 announcement by Victorian Premier Bracks of a Victorian Renewable Energy Obligation (VREO) to sustain the renewable electricity in Victoria is faced with collapse as a result of a static MRET. The VREO target is 10 per cent of electricity end-use consumption by 2010. Compared with an MRET only policy this would require about another 2,500 GWh of Victorian RE by 2010. At $35/MWh VREO (higher cost than MRET RECs) this “carbon” market would be worth about $90 million in 2010. VREO details are currently being considered.
  • Main potential future measure is an Emissions Trading System (ETS) now commencing operation in the EU, Norway and proposed for Canada to meet their ratified Kyoto Protocol commitments.
  • ETS elements: tradable carbon emission permits to attain a specified greenhouse target (information available on www.iea.org.).
  • Federal Government remains opposed to ETS but supported by States/Territories who are now designing a national “made in Australia” ETS.
  • Ten design propositions/issues including:
  • method of allocating permits (auction, AA, hybrid);
  • target: now looking at beyond Kyoto (2012) period and approach to GHGA (greenhouse versus economic uncertainty);
  • point of permit liability (who must hold and acquit permits) – some stationary energy sector possibilities set out in Figure 2.1; and
  • means of addressing adverse economic impacts on certain economic sectors.

ETS permit prices, economic impacts and size of the permit market will depend on the specific design of the ETS: potentially $3 billion total value of permits (at $10/t CO2e) in 2010.

Table 1 E and E NER 60

The concept of Australian Greenhouse Gas Abatement Program (GAP)

Currently in the absence of an emissions trading system (ETS) there is no national carbon signal initiative. As indicated above, there is a range of State programs encouraging greenhouse gas abatement (GHGA) that mainly focus on renewable electricity (gas electricity in Queensland and New South Wales).

MRET and Green Power are high cost GHGA routes and no program covers the range of GHGA opportunities, thus not encouraging least cost GHGA. For example, except for domestic solar hot water (SHW) under MRET production of thermal energy from renewables (for example, production of biogas from renewable wastes avoiding landfill and displacing fossil fuels), although often relatively low cost, is not eligible under any programs.

What is suggested here, in advance of an ETS, is a national GAP implemented through tradable certificates and based on new projects with a greenhouse gas intensity of <0.3t/CO2e and not viable under market conditions (that is, the projects would be additional, beyond BAU, as under the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism rules). Energy efficiency improvement (EEI) projects would also be eligible, albeit raising difficult baseline/additionality issues.

More work is required on the GAP concept, but it is one worthy of consideration, perhaps initially on a voluntary basis (there are niche market opportunities) and later to replace existing programs.

Potential GAP features

  • Energy sources, including production of thermal energy from thermal sources, with a GHGI lower than 0.2-0.3t CO2e/MWh would be eligible for tradable abatement certificates.
  • Would be a greenhouse gas abatement measure (NOT a renewable electricity scheme) implemented through tradable GACs not RECs.
  • Between 0 and 0.2t CO2e/MWh GHGIs which fossil fuel technologies would qualify?
  • fuel cells: 0.4+?;
  • cogeneration: probably not but depending on how GHGI estimated (electricity, heat) could qualify at 0.25;
  • other? Geosequestration with CCGTs and possibly coal, hybrid RE/fossil technologies for example biogas/gas electricity generation;
  • energy efficiency: difficult baseline issues.
  • Would eligible sources be restricted to emerging technologies? If so, how would emerging technologies be defined? Additionality test?

Definitions of Large Final Emitters (LFEs) and Small Final Emitters (SFEs):

  • data sources on energy use (sources) and emissions (levels) (ABARE, AGO) and decision, following analysis, of SFEs, LFEs. LFEs in Canada emit >8,000t CO2e (about 0.16 PJ of gas emits 8,000t CO2e);
  • treatment of fugitive emissions.

Decisions required for these emissions on acquittal points (upstream, downstream) and/or alternative policies: analysis and recommendations being prepared by Vic. ETS Technical Group (DPI, DSE, DOI).

Suggest an 0.3 upper limit

  • All renewable energy applications would qualify, not just renewable electricity as in MRET, GGAS, GP: thermal applications of renewable energy would qualify.
  • However, given MRET and VREO would renewable electricity qualify?
  • Should a portfolio approach be adopted?
  • Could be badged as a greenhouse abatement program (GAP) OR low emission technology application (LETA) program.
  • Implemented through gas and electricity retailers and certificates. Target?
  • Project cost of certificates? Up to $20/t CO2e if renewable electricity excluded. If used portfolio approach, different prices for each portfolio would emerge.

 

Demand Side Management in California

National Economic Review

National Institute of Economic and Industry Research

No. 60               December 2006

The National Economic Review is published four times each year under the auspices of the Institute’s Academic Board.

The Review contains articles on economic and social issues relevant to Australia. While the Institute endeavours to provide reliable forecasts and believes material published in the Review is accurate it will not be liable for any claim by any party acting on such information.

Editor: Dr A. Scott Lowson

© National Institute of Economic and Industry Research

This journal is subject to copyright. Apart from such purposes as study, research, criticism or review as provided by the Copyright Act no part may be reproduced without the consent in writing of the Institute.

ISSN 0813-9474

Demand side management in California: current and proposed measures

Graham Armstrong, NIEIR

Abstract

Although definitions vary, demand side management (DSM), demand management (DM) and demand response (DR) measures generally encompass energy efficient improvement, load shifting and peak load control. Over the past five years, increasing peak load demands and regional supply shortfalls (due to one or a combination of inadequate inter-connections, generator capacity, unexpected summer load peaks) have focused DSM/DR/DM efforts on peak load control of air conditioning equipment.

In Australia air conditioning loads are increasing at a rate of about 50 per cent above overall load growth. Although there has been increasing interest over the past five years in DSM to address this peak load growth, there have been few actions beyond analysis and discussion of the issue. Peak load growth has been met by supply augmentation.

On the other hand in California, where electricity prices soared and supply shortfalls were experienced in 2000, a range of measures has been introduced.1 Today, California is almost certainly the jurisdiction with the most comprehensive array of DSM/DM/DR measures. These measures are mainly designed (often with overall government direction by the State’s Government) and delivered by energy utilities operating in the State.

Graham Armstrong believes that the United States experiences with measures for addressing peak loads are useful when considering the situation in Victoria and Australia in general – with the important qualification that policy design must be based on our particular circumstances and provides a preliminary program design for consideration and analysis.

Introduction

California can in some ways be viewed as a stand-alone nation state which has the fifth largest economy in the world. The Californian electricity demand requires a capacity of nearly 55,000 MW (about 25 per cent imported): this compares with total Australian generation capacity of about 50,000 MW (Victoria 8,000 MW). 2 Accordingly, California is a very significant global entity in the energy field.

California – A Nation State

  • Population of 34 million in 2002, 41 million by 2010.
  • 5th largest economy in the world.
  • 5th largest consumer of energy in the world.
  • 2nd largest consumer of gasoline and diesel – only the total United States uses more.
  • Lowest US per capita electricity consumption.
  • 1.5 per cent of world’s greenhouse gas emissions but low per capita emissions.

Source:   California Climate Change Programs: An Overview, Conference of the Producers, The Hague, 12 May 2003 presented by James D. Boyd, Californian Energy Commission.

In 2004 the State electricity usage was about 265,000 gigawatt hours of electricity per year. Consumption is growing at 2 per cent annually. Over the 1994-2004 period, between 29 per cent and 42 per cent of California’s in-state generation used natural gas. Another 10 -20 per cent was provided by hydroelectric power that is subject to significant annual variations. Almost one third of California’s entire in-state generation base is over 40 years old. California’s transmission system is also ageing. While in-state generation resources provide the majority (average annual of about 75 per cent) of California’s power, California is part of a larger system that includes all of western North America. Fifteen to thirty per cent of state-wide electricity demand is imported from sources outside State borders.

Peak electricity demands occur on hot summer days. California’s highest peak demand was 52,863 megawatts which occurred on 10 July 2002. On average peak demand is growing at about 2.4 per cent per year, requiring the equivalent of about three new 400 MW peaking power plants per year. Residential and commercial air conditioning represent at least 30 per cent of summer peak electricity loads.

California’s demand for natural gas also is increasing. Currently the State uses 2 trillion cubic feet (2,100 PJ, Victoria approximately 250 PJ) of natural gas per year. Historically the primary use of this fuel was for space heating in homes and businesses. Electricity generation’s dependence on relatively clean burning natural gas now means that California’s annual natural gas use by power plants is expected to increase. Overall, natural gas use is growing by 1.6 per cent per year. Eighty five per cent of natural gas consumed in California is supplied by pipelines from sources outside the State.

Californian initiatives in DSM/DR/DM have evolved in three fairly distinct phases over the past 30 years.

In the first phase, extending from the mid 1970s to around 1990, the emphasis, led by utilities such as Pacific General Electric (PGE), was on energy efficiency in an integrated resource planning (IRP) framework, in which the costs of reducing energy demand were compared with the costs of expanding supply. In this phase measures focused on energy efficiency with some attention to load control.

In the second phase, extending into the 1990s, less attention was paid to DM/DSM/DR as supply pressures (costs, levels) eased: a situation common around the world. Environmental concerns increased, particularly urban air quality and greenhouse, but more attention was paid to transport rather than stationary energy. DSM funding, focused on energy efficiency improvement (EEI) varied considerably in the period as regulatory wrangles remained unresolved.

The third phase, commencing in 2000, was precipitated by the electricity supply disruption and soaring wholesale prices. Since then DSM/DR/DM measures (both voluntary and the use of incentives) have been vigorously pursued with substantial public spending. The 2001 summer peak, weather and growth adjusted, was 10 per cent below the 2000 peak. The immediate response to the 2000 events was to install emergency peaking plants and to engage in a publicity campaign and incentive measures (lower tariffs for reducing demand below the previous year) to curtail demands. Rebates for the purchase of higher efficiency products were also tried to curb power consumption in 2000-01, but this approach was judged to be relatively ineffective as take-up was low and wholesale electricity prices fluctuated from one hour to the next, but retail prices did not.

Program funding has mainly been based on a combination of State funds provided on measured energy savings and utility funding, but in 2000 -01 the Californian Energy Commission (CEC) was appropriated an additional $ 380 million from special taxpayer funds for a range of DSM programs.

Recent developments

Although rebates continue, the policy focus has shifted to the potential use of time-of-use (interval) meters, which could be used with time -of-use (t-o-u) pricing (dynamic pricing in Californian terms, which includes consideration of real time pricing, RTP, covering price changes as wholesale prices change).

Backed by data from the t-o-u meters, rates can be adjusted according to several market variables, including demand, supply, wholesale prices and individual use. The State, with the major utilities, conducted a test to gauge customer response to variable pricing. About 2,500 small scale users across the State were given t-o-u meters and put on different pricing plans. In one plan, consumers were charged 13 cents a kilowatt hour for most hours except for 2:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. on weekdays, when the price went to 25 cents. On a few occasions the price was increased to 66 cents a kilowatt hour to mimic a period of special system needs. Evaluation indicated the program reduced peak demand by about 13 per cent.3

Results of the evaluation of 2003 programs is presented on www.energy.ca.gov.

Test results and results from general use of t-o-u might be quite different. Some customers might adjust their use to realise cost savings, while others might ignore the pricing changes. However, utilities, the Californian Energy Commission (CEC) and the Californian Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) are confident that, on the basis of the t-o-u pilots, this approach is effective.As a result, three major Californian utilities – PGE, Southern California Edison (SCE) and San Diego Gas and Electric (SDGE) are planning to replace conventional gas and electricity meters with up to 15 million t-o-u meters at a cost of around US$6 billion, beginning in 2006. The t-o-u meter expense will be offset to an unknown extent (depends on implementation policies and responses to them), by reduced peak usage: rate increases as a result of the meter rollout is expected by PGE to be small. In the period before t-o-u metering can make an impact, the California Energy Commission (CFC) estimates, that a 1 in 10 summer could result in a Southern Californian region shortfall of capacity of 2,000 MW (3.3 per cent) below demand by September 2005. Normal weather would not result in a shortfall and reserves would be adequate.As a response to the potential shortfall situation, the Californian Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) approved SCE’s request to implement additional energy efficiency programs aimed at reducing peak demand by 36 MW: insignificant compared to the potential shortfall. The decision orders SCE to expand four energy efficiency programs to immediately and significantly reduce peak demand – from residential customers and small, medium and large businesses.7

The programs:

  •  expand residential customers’ options for “instant rebates” – which are done at the point of sale – and are currently only available for compact fluorescent light purchases. The expanded program will include pool pumps and motors, refrigerators, air conditioners and whole house fans;
  • give  small  businesses  “no-cost”  lighting retrofits.  SCE    estimates    reaching approximately 10,000 customers through this effort; and
  •  allow larger business customers to apply for incentives of up to 100 per cent of the cost of the project on lighting retrofits.

Review of the Californian situation indicates that:

  • despite a range of in-place DSM/DR/DM programs the Californian system is still susceptible to disruptions;
  • t-o-u pricing may still some time off; and
  • the supply system is not being expanded at a sufficient rate to meet increasing demands.

 

The Californian Energy Commission (CEC) Integrated Energy Report8

This report, which is prepared every two years, with an update each alternative year, reports on the status of the State’s energy system and makes recommendations for action where it is deemed necessary.

Key issues identified in the 2004 Update are as follows:

  • implementation of the Energy Action Plan’s loading order strategy;
  • improved transmission planning is required to address inadequate transmission as it presents a significant barrier to accessing renewable energy sources critical to diversifying fuel sources;
  • reliability issues with ageing power plants;
  • the need for accelerated renewable energy developments; and
  • the need for acceleration of demand response programs that signal the actual price of electricity to customers in peak periods.

In the demand response area, the primary focus of this report, the 2004 Update calls for electrical utilities to aggressively implement the 2007 State-wide goal of reducing peak demand by 5 per cent. The 2004 Update appears to rely essentially on “dynamic pricing” (implemented through tariffs using t-o-u, interval meters) to meet this target.

Given the interval metering rollout schedule, likely rollout delays and uncertainty regarding peak tariffs and their impacts, it would seem that attention to other peak demand reduction and supply security are required if the target is to be attained. Thus, despite the 2000-01 disruptions actions to avoid a repeat the Californian system continues to be vulnerable to high (1 in 10) summer peaks.

The lesson for Victoria (and Australia generally) is that even after actual and significant supply disruptions, the implementation of preventive actions lags the requirements. Victoria/Australia has different circumstances: the private sector is responding on the supply side (but the Basslink delay reminds us of supply side reliance fallibility). BUT after five years of discussion, etc. little DSM to address peak loads has been implemented.9 (Would a serious disruption help?)

The 2004 Update, reviews progress on 2003 recommendations. In the DR/DSM/DM area:

(i)                        significant progress is reported on increasing energy efficiency funding and evaluation and monitoring of energy efficiency programs;

(ii)                       improved efforts are needed is reported on maximising energy efficiency of existing buildings; and

(iii)                     improvement is needed on rapid deployment of advanced (t-o-u, interval) meters and implementation of dynamic pricing tariffs.

In the case of (i) the Energy Commission recommended that the State10:

  • “Ramp up public funding for cost effective energy efficiency programs above current levels to achieve at least an additional 1,700 MW of peak electricity demand reduction and 6,000 gigawatts (GWh) of electricity savings by 2008.
  • Standardise and increase the evaluation and monitoring of energy efficiency programs to ensure that savings and benefits are being delivered. (Importance to be noted in VEES development.)

The State has made significant progress in this area, with the CPUC’s recent decision to adopt more aggressive goals for the investor owned utilities (IOUs) than the 2003 Energy Report recommended. These new goals, based on collaborative staff work between the Energy Commission and CPUC, require peak electricity demand reductions of 2,205 MW by 2008, exceeding the 2003 Energy Report goal by 505 MW, and energy consumption reductions of 10,489 GWh by 2008, exceeding the 2003 Energy Report goal by 4,489 GWh. These new goals will require approximately $522 million in annual funding by 2008 compared to the annual spending level of $348 million for 2004 and 2005.” And in the Executive Summary of the Update11 it is stated that “As recently as the 2000-01 electricity crisis, Californians embraced energy efficiency and demand response programs, reducing State demand by approximately 6,000 MW, more than 10 per cent of peak demand.”

In both cases (the 2003 Energy Report goals and the reductions to 2000-01) no evaluations are provided. This detracts from the credibility of the program results (see an outline of recent evaluation policies below). The Californian energy agencies (CPUC, etc.) proposed in a 2003 Energy Action Plan, in the energy conservation and resource efficiency area, that:

“California should decrease its per capita electricity use through increased energy conservation and efficiency measures. This would minimise the need for new generation, reduce emissions of toxic and criteria pollutants and greenhouse gases, avoid environmental concerns, improve energy reliability and contribute to price stability. Optimising conservation and resource efficiency will include the following specific actions:

  1. Implement a voluntary dynamic pricing system to reduce peak demand by as much as 1,500 to 2,000 megawatts by 2007.12
  2. Improve new and remodelled building efficiency by 5 per cent.13
  3. Improve air conditioner efficiency by 10 per cent above federally mandated standards.14
  4. Make every new state building a model of energy efficiency.
  5. Create customer incentives for aggressive energy demand reduction.
  6. Provide utilities with demand response and energy efficiency investment rewards comparable to the return on investment in new power and transmission projects.
  7. Increase local government conservation and energy efficiency programs.
  8. Incorporate, as appropriate per Public Resources Code section 25402, distributed generation or renewable technologies into energy efficiency standards for new building construction.
  9. Encourage companies that invest in energy conservation and resource efficiency to register with the State’s Climate Change Registry.”

The Decision builds upon Decision (D.) 04-09-060 and D.05-01-055 and an 21 April 2005 Decision 05-04-05, establishing the goals, policies and administrative framework to guide future energy efficiency programs funded by the ratepayers of the four largest investor-owned utilities (IOUs): Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PGE), San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDGE), Southern California Edison Company (SCE) and Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas).

D.04- 09- 060 established aggressive energy savings goals to reflect the critical importance of reducing energy use per capita in California. For the three electric IOUs, these goals reflected an expectation that energy efficiency efforts in their combined service territories should capture on the order of 70 per cent of the economic potential and 90 per cent of the maximum achievable potential for electric energy savings, based on the most recent studies of that potential. If successful, these efforts are projected to meet 55 to 59 per cent of the IOUs incremental electric energy needs between 2004 and 2013. On the natural gas side, adopted savings goals represent a 116 per cent increase in expected savings over the next decade, relative to the status quo. A three year cycle for updating savings goals, in concert with a three year program planning and funding cycle for energy efficiency (“program cycle”) was established and load reductions were included in savings goals.

In addition, an administrative structure for evaluation, verification and measurement (EM&V) was established to create a clear separation between “those who do” (the Program Administrators and program implementers) and “those who evaluate” the program or portfolio performance. (Victorian EES to note!) In particular, for program year (PY) 2006 and beyond, the Californian Energy Division will assume the management and contracting responsibilities for all EM&V studies that will be used to:

(i)                 measure and verify energy and peak load savings for individual programs, groups of programs and at the portfolio level;

(ii)                generate the data for savings estimates and cost effectiveness inputs;

(iii)              measure and evaluate the achievements of energy efficiency program, groups of programs and/or the portfolio in terms of the “performance basis” established under Commission-adopted EM&V protocols; and

(iv)               evaluate whether programs or portfolio goals are met.

The budget for EM&V was set, as a guideline, at 8 per cent of total energy efficiency program funds. (Note the significant resources that could be available for program evaluation at this level of funding.)15

Case study: Sempra Energy Inc/San Diego Gas and Electric (SDGE)16

Sempra/SDGE, serving a region in capacity constrained Southern California, operates a range of DSM programs, covering:

  • reduction of load during peak periods;
  • dynamic pricing; and
  • energy efficiency.

The utility claims over the past ten years to have cumulatively saved 1.9 million MWh, reduced peak load by 409 MW and provided cost savings to customers of over US$200 million.

2004-05 energy efficiency programs

Residential sector

Description of market segment:

Includes single family homes, condominiums, multi-family units, mobile homes and multi-family common areas.

The utility territory mainly has moderate coastal climate with high density housing and sparsely populated rural high desert and desert climates.

Provides electric service provision to approximately 1.2 million households.

Residential sub-segments:

  • single family customers;
  • multi-family customers; and
  • hard to reach.

Further segmented by end-use – air conditioners, all-electric homes.

Statewide residential rebates

Target market

All residential customers residing in SDGE’s service territory living in dwellings of 4 units or less, including condominiums and mobile homes.

 

Measures – rebates for:

  • Appliances;
  • Building shell – insulation;
  • Building shell – windows;
  • HVAC – air conditioning systems;
  • HVAC – controls;
  • HVAC – Ventilation systems;
  • Lighting – comprehensive products; and
  • Water heating – systems.

Industrial and commercial sectors

Commercial/industrial market segment includes over 138,000 electric meters and close to 30,000 gas meters.

Approximately 20 per cent of market consists of “large” customers – monthly kW demand above 500 kW.

Remaining 80 per cent of market consists of small and medium sized business with monthly demand of 500 kW or less.

  • Majority of the customer segment are considered “Hard-To-Reach”: rent or lease space; where English is the second language; businesses have less than ten employees; are outside urban San Diego, and annual electric demand is less than 20 kW or annual gas consumption is less than 10,000 therms, or both.
  • Almost 90 per cent of small and medium sized business customers have a monthly demand under 20 kW.

Industries are varied, including food service, property management, manufacturing, lodging, grocers and food growers.

Programs in these sectors include:

  • rebates for high efficiency HVAC systems and electric motor: delivered through system/product distributors;
  • provision of energy audits;
  • education and training programs for contractors, retailers, manufacturers;
  • building operator training and certification;
  • standard performance contract development and dissemination; and
  • incentives to participate in savings by design targeted at building owners and design teams to achieve “better than code” performance.

More information on the Sempra/SDGE program is set out in overheads from the utility’s Energy Efficiency Programs, Public Workshop, 3 March 2005. Although these programs are not targeted at peak load control, which will be addressed through t-o-u metering and tariffs, the SDGE’s comprehensive DSM measures that are summarised above:

  • can have a significant impact on peak loads; and
  • are well ahead of anything being implemented by Australian utilities.

It might be argued that the southern Californian situation has brought about such action and that program evaluation detail is lacking, but the SDGE programs (current and planned) indicate an innovative attach on energy efficiency improvement and peak load control that appears to be accepted by the government and its agencies.

Other USA state measures

A 2004 paper, Demand Response in the United States, prepared by the Wedgemere Group for the New Zealand Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (EECA) outlines DR/DSM/DM programs in a range of USA states17 and Ontario, Canada.

The outlines are a useful summary of these initiatives (websites are provided). TOU meters, coupled with dynamic pricing, is strongly supported in the EECA paper based mainly on the results of pilot programs in the USA: an average 0.3 demand elasticity is reported (for example, a 30 per cent demand reduction for a 100 per cent increase in price).

Program packages to address peak loads are not critiqued. Attachment B of the EECA report outlines reasons why new direct load control programs were not proposed in California.

The reasons provided are:

(i)                 the load impacts from these programs are already well understood;

(ii)               they limit customer choice: the utility determines the end-use (usually AC) and response level and does not allow customer overrides;

(iii)             they limit peak reduction potential to the chosen end-use load;

(iv)              they are inequitable because they offer a reward to owners of AC units, but not to non-owners; and

(v)                they are expensive because customers are paid even when the program is not used.

However, the possibilities for designing innovative load control programs in combination with t-o-u dynamic pricing and EEI programs are not considered in the EECA paper. This detracts from the usefulness of the paper from a policy perspective in the Victorian/Australian context.

Briefly, the reasons for rejecting direct load control are critiqued as follows.

(i)                 Load impacts from the earlier direct control may be well understood but are not for new designs of direct load control programs.

(ii)               More innovative designs can allow customer overrides: but if overridden full peak pricing would apply.

(iii)             They could be extended to other than A/C peak loads but A/C load is the load which is overwhelmingly weather dependent.

(iv)              They can be designed to reward non-A/C owners with lower rates than all A/C owners: that is, A/C owners taking direct load control would still pay more than non-A/C owners, but less than A/C owners not taking direct load control.

(v)                In combination with t-o-u meters, there is no reason why customers taking direct load control need not be paid when the program is not used.

Concluding comments

The United States experiences with measures for addressing peak loads are useful for analysis and consideration in the Australian/Victorian situation.

However, policy design here must be based on our particular circumstances.

Preliminary program designs for consideration and analysis (modelling, etc.) are set out in Attachment A.

Attachment A:

Scenarios for long run projections of Victorian peak demands

Introduction

This paper outlines potential measures for addressing summer peak load demands and suggests three scenarios for analysis of these measures.

For given weather patterns, population, income, economic trends, and consumer preferences, peak electricity demands will be driven by:

  • overall electricity prices (peak prices are considered separately), which rise to some extent as new plants are commissioned, but significant price increases will be mainly due to greenhouse (carbon price/permit) policies;
  • efficiencies of air conditioning units;
  • peak pricing policies; and
  • building trends.

Over the past five years, when it has been very evident that summer peak demands were increasing rapidly, the “non-policy” has been to build low capacity peaking plants or inter-connections. There has been virtually no policy directed at peak load control. This brief paper suggests how peak load control might be addressed. The study focuses on scenarios of policies to reduce (from BAU) peak demands in the residential sector: commercial and industrial sector analysis of peak demands requires separate analysis.

Three scenarios, two of which progressively reduce peak demands below BAU, are presented below for the 2005-50 period.

Under the BAU scenario electrical energy summer peak demand will continue to grow as population and incomes increase in each scenario. Income growth and consumer choice may translate into increases in average dwelling size, cooling of a greater proportion of space volume (whole house rather than one or two rooms), longer hours of operation and perhaps lower summer space temperatures. In the projections presented, these economic and social factors are held constant: further scenario development work would be required to assess their impacts.

Potential peak reducing policies

Emissions trading (carbon pricing)

Although the Federal Government continues to oppose the introduction of an emissions trading system for the pricing of carbon and trading of emission permits, States and Territories are continuing to work on the design of an ETS appropriate for Australia.

Action by the States/Territories and the possibility of a change in federal policy, suggests a carbon/permit price of $5/t CO2e by 2010 in a mild policy scenario and a price of $20/t CO2e by 2010 in a stringent policy scenario.

In the study these prices are assumed to remain over the 2010 to 2020 period, but increase to $10/t CO2e and $30/t CO2e respectively over 2020-2050 as the global greenhouse policy regime becomes more stringent, offset to some extent by technology advances which constrain the emissions permit price.

No explicit carbon pricing is included in the BAU scenario.

Peak load pricing and direct load control

In Victoria the installation of interval meters in all buildings will not be completed until about 2020. By 2013 only about one third of households will be fitted with interval meters (GWA, p.2918). Accordingly, unless there is a roll-out schedule change, universal time of use (TOU)/peak pricing in Victoria will not be possible until 2020.

There are several alternatives for direct control (for example through radio waves) of air conditioner loads and several trials are underway (New South Wales, South Australia, Western Australia) and a Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE) Committee is addressing the options. Work in this area commenced in 2000, but to date progress on developing policies and measures has been very slow.

Minimum energy performance standards (MEPS)

Levels for three phase air conditioning units were raised in 2004 and MEPS for single phase units introduced in 2004 are due to be raised in 2006 and 2007, with the final stage to match 2004 world’s best regulatory (not economic) practice in 2007. An indication of the impact of these MEPS changes is provided by GWA 2004, Table 4, p.23 and in the accompanying text.

There will be a rated performance improvement for the least efficiency split system units permitted to be marketed in Australia from April 2006. This improvement will be about 2 per cent for <4 kW and 5 per cent for >4 kW units compared with the average units sold in mid- 2004. Of current models available, about 10 per cent of <4 kW and 17 per cent of >4 kW would meet the proposed 2006 standard (GWA, 2004).

It is estimated (GWA, 2004) that the sales weighted efficiency for single phase units will then be 13-14 per cent higher, compared with 2004, than it would have been without the new 2006 MEPS.

World best practice for air conditioners is led by Taiwan and South Korea. The Australian MEPS lag the use of regulatory world best practice. As indicated above, MEPS applies, as the name implies, to the minimum acceptable rating (1- star) when the most efficient units (5-6 stars) are up to 40 per cent more efficient. The impact of higher air conditioning unit efficiencies on peak demands is debatable. Wilkenfeld, in a recent paper (GWA, 2004) claims, “where operation is intermittent and/or limited to one space, it is more likely that an increase in efficiency will lead to somewhat cooler internal conditions but have little effect on peak load”. (p.4, GWA 2004)

Why cooler internal conditions would result is not explained. In any case, this type of limited, intermittent situation is likely to become less important over time. MEPS levels could be raised by 2008 (or at least by 2010 -12) and/or greater efforts made to promote higher efficiency (5-star and higher) units.

Building trends: stock, sizes, retrofits and standards

The energy efficiency of buildings is increasing due to increased awareness of the net economic and environmental benefits achievable by improving the thermal efficiency of building envelopes and systems. Stock increases form a standard part of NIEIR’s projection methodology, but judgments on thermal efficiency trends must be made on the basis of policy and underlying trends.
In the case of new buildings, the Building Code of Australia (BCA) is moving to higher levels of thermal efficiency. From the early 1990s to 2004 there was only a slow and moderate increase in the thermal efficiency of new buildings. For example, in Victoria the 1992 thermal efficiency standard for new residences of about a 2 star rating had only increased to an average of about 2.7 by 2003. However, in 2004 a 4 star rating was mandated and on 1 July 2005 a 5 star rating will become mandatory. And work is being undertaken on a 6 star rating which is being achieved in a small proportion of homes.

Similarly, in the commercial sector movement to a 5 star rating for new buildings is likely (but not certain) in 2006. In the existing buildings area, retrofits are achieving higher thermal efficiency but the trend has not been quantified. Offsetting these trends, which reduce peak demands for a given stock, is an increase in building size (new or through refurbishment). Again, this trend has not been quantified.

No peak load pricing or direct load control is assumed in the BAU scenario. Faced with this uncertainty the following scenarios are suggested by NIEIR.

Scenarios for analysis of summer peak demands

Business-as-usual (BAU)

Over the past eight years, peak electricity demands have been increasing at about 4.0 per cent per year and are projected to increase at 2.6 per cent per year based on a 10 per cent POE through to 2015.

Although interval metering continues to be rolled out throughout the NEM, differential peak electricity pricing and specific load control measures are not introduced in this scenario. MEPS are held at 2004 levels in this scenario.

A 5 star requirement for new residences over the entire projection period (30 per cent net reduction in space cooling requirement compared with pre- 2005 new residences). No net increase in building size. No explicit carbon price is assumed in the BAU scenario.

Mild policy intervention

In this scenario the following new policy measures are introduced.

  1. An emissions trading system (ETS) is introduced in 2010 which results in a permit price of $5/t CO2e over 2010-2020 and an average electricity price increase of $6.5/MWh in Victoria over 2010-2020 (GHC4E), compared with 2005 levels. Over 2020-50 as the permit prices increase to $10/t CO2, average electricity prices increase by $10/MWh ($10/t CO2) as Victoria’s electricity greenhouse gas intensity reduces to an average of 1.0t CO2/MWh compared with 1.3t CO2/MWh over 2005-20).
  2. Air conditioner MEPS are accelerated resulting in an average 15 per cent increase in efficiency of new air conditioner units sold from 2008. (This means in effect, for example, that a previously rated 2 MW unit becomes a 1.7 MW unit from 2008 to 2020 compared with 2004.) This can be modelled by reducing the 2008 on growth in temperature dependent demands by 15 per cent.

By 2050 efficiencies are assumed to improve by 35 per cent (compared to 2004 levels).

(i)                 Peak pricing policies increase summer (October-April) peak prices by 30 per cent over 2005-20.

Customers are offered a lower price increase of 10 per cent if they agree to direct load control achieved through fitting devices to AC units which enable central control of AC units (for example through radio waves). Thirty per cent of customers accept this offer by 2020. Over 2020-50 peak prices increase by 50 per cent and customers are offered a lower price increase of 20 per cent if they agree to direct load control: 50 per cent of customers accept this offer by 2050.

(ii)               A 5 star requirement (30 per cent net reduction) for new residences from 2005-20 and 6-stars (40 per cent net reduction) from 2020 to 2050. No net increase in building size.

Stringent policy intervention

In this scenario the following policy measures are introduced.

  1. An ETS in 2010 results in a permit price of $20/t CO2e and an average electricity price increase in Victoria of $26/MWh over 2010-2020. Over 2020-2050 the average price increase is $40/MWh from a permit price of $40/t CO2e.
  2. Air conditioner MEPS are accelerated resulting in a 30 per cent increase of new air conditioner units sold from 2008 to 2020. (This means in effect that a previously rated 2 MW unit becomes a 1.4 MW unit.)

Over 2020-2050 average efficiencies of new air conditioner units increase by 50 per cent compared with 2004 levels.

  • Peak pricing policies increase summer peak prices by 50 per cent over 2005-2020.

Customers are offered a lower price increase of 20 per cent if they agree to direct load control as in 2. above. Fifty per cent of customers accept this offer.

Over 2020-2050 peak prices increase by 80 per cent and customers are offered a lower price increase of 30 per cent if they agree to direct load control: 75 per cent accept this offer.

5 stars for new residences over 2005-10, 6 stars over 2010-2020 and 7 stars (50 per cent net reduction from 2004 new residences) over 2020-30. No net increase in building size.

Note that in the latter two scenarios customer behavioural attitudes (for example in temperature control) to air conditioning is assumed to be similar to those in the BAU scenario. Behavioural changes scenarios could be introduced into the analysis but would require considerably more resources than proposed above.

Demand side management in California: current and proposed measures

Footnotes:

1        See Armstrong, G., California South: Coming to a Network Near You?, National Economic Review, No. 50, February 2002, for a review of the electricity situation which spawned many of these measures. 

2        Bob Thorkelson, Executive Director, Californian Energy Commission (CEC), Statement to Californian Senate Energy Utilities and Communications Committee, April 2005. 

3        Wall Street Journal, Rebecca Smith, 11 May 2005. 

4        The CPUC regulates the older so-called investor-owned-utilities (IOUs). Newer utilities are referred to as private utilities. In addition, there are municipally-owned utilities. 

5        Joint press release, 11 May 2005. 

6        CPUC press release, 5 May 2005 (www.cpuc.ca.gov). 

7        Thorkelson, op. cit. 

8        Californian Energy Commission, Integrated Energy Report, November 2004 update. 

9        Energy Australia time-of-use meter implementation 

Energy Australia announced in June 2005 that it will offer Sydney, Central Coast and Hunter Valley residents lower cost electricity in shoulder and off-peak prices via new “smart” power meters. The meters will allow Energy Australia to introduce different rates at different times. Lower prices will be offered in the morning and overnight, with customers able to reduce power bills by choosing the pricing period in which they use appliances such as dishwashers and air conditioners. 

The three tiered pricing structure will mean peak prices are charged between 2:00 and 8:00 p.m., “shoulder” prices from 7:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., and off-peak prices from 10:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. 

The new system will be phased in gradually, with new residential homes, those upgrading their electricity installation and big users with annual bills in excess of $4,000 the first to be offered the new meters. Existing customers can convert to the new meters if they pay for installation. According to Energy Australia, prices will be 70 per cent higher in the peak period than current prices, 20 per cent cheaper in the shoulder period and 60 per cent cheaper during off-peak times. 

The company claims a family with a $900 bill could save $100 by changing 5 per cent of their peak electricity usage to off-peak and another 5 per cent to the shoulder times. An audit of Energy Australia customers has found changing operating times for pool pumps, washing machines, dryers and dishwashers could have a marked impact on bills.

10      2004 Update, p.54.

11      Ibid, p. xiii. 

12      California continues to actively evaluate and implement such pricing systems under a CPUC rule-making (R.02-06-001) edict. 

13      The Energy Commission’s new building standards, to be adopted in 2006, when combined with training and enforcement, are expected to reduce energy needs in new buildings by approximately 5 per cent. 

14      New federal appliance standards will increase air conditioner efficiency by approximately 20 per cent by 2007. However, if California were granted a waiver from federal standards, by 2007 the CEC estimates that California air conditioner efficiency could increase by another 10 per cent. 

15      Interim Opinion: Updated Policy Rules for Post-2005 Energy Efficiency and Threshold Issues Related to Evaluation, Measurement and Verification of Energy Efficiency Programs, Decision 05-04-051, 21 April 2005. 

16      Summary of Sempra Energy/SDGE presentation, Energy Efficiency Programs, Public Workshop, 3 March 2005. 

17      The paper regards Demand Response (DR) as only applying to peak load reduction measures, including distributed generation (DG), but including EEI in only a long term sense. This definition is not universally accepted. 

18      A National Demand Management Strategy for Small Air Conditioners, for the National Appliance and Equipment Energy Efficiency Committee (NAEEC) and the Australian Greenhouse Office (AGO), November 2004 (GWA 2004).